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ABSTRACT
Collaborative Programs in International Education:
An Analysis and Appraisal
February 1979
John Whipple Bing, B.A.
,
Harvard College
Ed, D.
,
University of Massachusetts/Amherst
Directed by: Professor David R. Evans
This is a study of international collaborative programs in education,
which, it is argued, are a particular consequence of global interdependence.
The focus of this study is on prc^rams developed by the Center for Inter-
national Education, School of Education, at the University of Massachusetts
(Amherst), in cooperaticai vith counterpart organizations in three other
countries.
A survey of U. S, foreign assistance programs is undertaken, with a
special emphasis on programs involving U.,S, colleges and universities,
U, S. foreign assistance efforts are considered to have three distinct phases;
The early period (to 1939); foreign aid and the politics of power (1939-1969);
and the diversification of power—foreign aid and interdependence (1970-1978),
A key finding is that the relative significance of traditional foreign aid programs
is declining within the third phase as conditions of interdependence strengthen.
Theoretical issues in collaborative international programs are studied
through a comparison of three approaches to the analysis of cooperative and
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conflictLve behavior. The first involves an analysis of the prisoner’s
dilemma game; the second, a study of altruism; and the third, an analysis
of behaviors in "commons" systems. An intergroup behavior matrix is
developed and described.
The relationship of group cooperation and ccnflict to conditions of
global interdependence is then explored. One finding is that cooperative
enterprises require groups of relatively equal strength, equitable rewards
for both parties, and guarantees against "cheating, " or the attempt at
unilateral gains through coercive behavior. Further, it is likely that
collaborative programs are made possible under developing global inter-
dependence, although such programs are not inevitable under these conditions.
Nonformal education programs in Ghana, Ecuador, and Thailand are
reviewed to identify their fundamental components and their unique and
common characteristics. Specific criteria and a working definition of
collaborative programs are applied to determine what aspects of these three
programs exhibit collaborative features. Oie purpose of the analysis is to
determine what if any relaticaiship exists between collaborative programs in
international education and the values reflected in the materials, methods,
and techniques produced by these programs.
Recommendations to improve the planning and implementation of
collaborative programs are then made. Possible future directions in the
development of collaborative programs are discussed, with
emphasis on the
need tor institutions to adapt to conditions of global interdependence.
With
vii
increasing fusion between issues in the domestic and international areas,
there are urgent needs for corresponding increases in research and
collaborative projects between U.S. universities and counterpart organizations
in other countries on matters of common concern. However, it is noted that
incentives at the federal level will be necessary to provide resources for
expanded research and development efforts by American universities in the
international sphere.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past seven years, a number of programs at the Center for
International Education, University of Massachusetts, have been initiated
with organizations on three continents. These programs have been intentional
departures from past program efforts in international education: They have
been termed ’’collaborative programs,” and those involved in their planning
and development have seen them as a response to changing relationships in
the world as a whole. Some basic questions about these programs have yet
to be answered, however. To understand the significance of these programs,
they must be placed in a larger context.
What are collaborative programs? How do they relate to past efforts
in U.S. foreign assistance, and to the growing awareness of interdependence
among nations and peoples? WT^iat factors of cooperation and conflict in
intergroup behavior can help account for aspects of these pregrams, and under
what conditions are they likely to develop? WTiat role can U.S, universities
play in the research and development of collaborative pregrams? These are
the major questions raised in this study.
What are Collaborative Programs?
This study investigates the nature of collaborative pregrams in inter-
national education, their fundamental characteristics, and the contexts in
1
2which they are likely to occur. A study of U, S, foreign assistance programs
with a special focus on the role of American colleges and universities is
undertaken in Chapter 1 1, The study reviews past international programs
conducted between U.S. universities and counterpart organizations and the
roles they have assumed within the framework of U.S. foreign aid. A
comparison of past and current programs identifies trends in the way such
programs have developed. This type of assistance is put into larger per-
spective by comparison with government and private technical assistance
programs of the past.
One basic question concerns why collaborative programs, based on
the cooperation of the participants, are more or less likely to occur under
contemporary circumstances than they have in the past. Put another way, what
are the necessary preconditions for the development of collaborative pregrams?
To investigate this question. Chapter III contains an analysis of the develop-
ment of different kinds of cooperative and conflictive behavior in specific
ccaitexts. How does the realization that unified global ecologic and economic
^sterns are gradually replaciig the disparate, isolated systems of the past
affect the behavior of people who share what are now perceived as common
resources? The concept of interdependence is studied as a basis for under-
standing the preconditions for cooperative behavior.
The Center for International Education at the University of Massachusetts
is analyzed in a short study in Chapter IV because of its importance as the
common initiator of the three programs, and its central role in research into
3collaborative programs in nonfonnal education. One case study and two
synposes of fully and partially realized collaborative programs are presented
in Chapters V and VI, These programs represent a diversity of approaches
to nonfonnal education and in type and level of coUaboration, one of the few
sets of examples of international programs of this type.
The last chapter (Chapter VII) gathers material frcm earlier sections
to develop a definition of collaborative programs; discusses the relationship
between collaborative programs and the self-reliance of the cooperating
groups; analyzes significant factors in the three collaborative programs; makes
recommendations regarding the developnent of such programs; and concludes
with a comment on future directions in International Education Programs.
Significance of the Study
If, in fact, the world is entering an era of interdependence, or has
entered such an era, then it is essential that national institutions (such as
colleges and universities, private organizations, and government agencies)
determine how best to develop those types of programs that can provide
unique opportunities for joint problem-solvii^. To that end, it is hoped that
this study may serve as a guide for those involved in planning and developing
collaborative programs with educational institutions in other parts of the
world. Such programs become more important as linkages develop between
domestic and international issues.
The analysis of international collaborative programs as a special
4consequence of interdependence suggests that these international programs
relate to a laiger framework of international behavior. The analysis identifies
preconditicns which contribute to or impede the development of these programs.
The historical study of international collaborative programs, especially
those involving U. S. universities, points to long-term trends in these types
of mutual development assistance programs. It may thereby provide planners
with wheels which they do not have to reinvent.
The three programs studied display many of the problems of implementa-
ticn inherent in this typ« of program, as well as the contexts in which such
pregrams are more or less likely to take root. Certain parameters which
may be helpful to future evaluators of such pregrams have also been identified.
If it is true that changes in international behaviors can be associated
with increased benefits for many, then there is a role for educators in studying
these changes and disseminating information about them. Education as the
'tnechanism of psychosocial evolution . . . the process of transmission and
transformation of knowledge and culture”^ has a substantial part to play in
the process.
It is also hoped that this study will lend seme urgency to the task;
for it is clear that many opportunities for collaboration in research and
program development on common concerns are being missed, to the likely
detriment of all concerned. Both the problems and opportunities of global
interdependence will remain and multiply; we must now learn how best to
take advantage of both.
5De sign of the Study
Three sources are utilized in developing an understanding of the nature
and characteristics of collaborative programs* A search of the literature
about foreign assistance programs (especially those involving U.S. education
institutions) has been made to identify antecedents of current programs.
Recent Center for Intematicnal Education programs are examined to yield
information about the structure of collaborative programs.
Dimensions categorized within the programs include program type,
nature, and objectives of the collaboration; type and description of collaborating
institutions; phasing of program activities; staffing of the program; funding
and locus of control of the project; and results of the collaboration.
The third source of information examined in this study is selected
literature in political science, anthropology and related fields. These are
researched for theoretical constructs helpful in explaining the context, causes
and characteristics of different types of intergroup activities, including
cooperative behaviors.
The program and theory studies are used to derive an operational
definition of collaborative program development. This definition includes
major characteristics of each program. It describes these programs in such
a way that they can be distinguished from other international programs in
education,
6Assumptions
The following are assumptions relating to the purpose of this study:
1. That international collaborative pregrams are unique and definable
forms of behavior between organizations within states. Because such programs
emphasize self-reliance among the pregram participants, they are preferable
to more coercive forms of relationships.
2. That international collaborative programs will continue to develop
under conditions of interdependence.
3. That a definition and analysis of such programs will assist policy-
makers and practitioners toward improving program effectiveness.
4. That the Center for International Education programs under study
will have some generalizable features.
Limitations and Concluding
Comments
This study is primarily ccncemed with project-based collaborative
programs, in which the primary purpose providing the legitimacy of the effort
is derived from grass-roots involvement of people who can use the methods,
techniques, and training developed through the project. This has been one
of the touchstones which has characterized the program development efforts
of members of the Center for International Education. Therefore, other
types of institutional linkages—those whose purpose is primarily to conduct
research or formal teaching in higher education, for example—are not
examined in depth.
7The study further does not provide a prescription for the development
of collaborative programs, nor does it carry out some of the implications
of its conclusions into recommendations for specific program designs. Others
are currently working on detailed project design ideas.
The future is a foreign country, and we are all strangers there. No
one can predict with certainty whether or not conditions will favor the
development of increasing numbers of collaborative pregrams—but this study
points in that direction. If these hopes are realized, even in part, then both
new opportunities and new problems lie ahead. Our goal, no matter how far
off, must be "to convert nations into peoples and to translate ideologies into
human aspiratienso ” As we approach a more interdependent world, we must
expect no less,
FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER I
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CHAPTER II
AID: THE LO^G PERSPECTIVE
One of the most remarkable aspects of the U. S, foreign aid program
is its short history. Aside from the military aid measures of the two world
wars, comprehensive foreign assistance efforts did not begin until about
1946. The participation of U. S, institutions of higher education in these
efforts has a longer history, but with some exceptions, this too did not
begin until the 1950s.
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize American foreign
assistance efforts with special emphasis on the role of U.S. institutions of
higher education. Phases of assistance will also be identified, as well as
the rationales for assistance during different phases. A comprehensive
history of U.S. foreign assistance efforts from their inception remains to
be written, and this chapter cannot fill such a large void: The major
purpose of exploring U.S. foreign assistance efforts here is to relate them
to the theory of interdependence and to examine the specific programs in
later chapters in the light of past efforts. This study, which reviews the
literature on U.S. foreign assistance efforts, is divided into three phases; The
Early Period, an interesting succession of various types of private, professional,
public and quasi-public initiatives in various parts of the world; The Period
9
10
of Strategic Foreign Assistance; and, most recently. The Beginnings of
Interdependence in Foreign Aid.
The Ea rly Period (to 1939)
What documentation exists on the early period of American foreign
assistance efforts is fascinating. Many efforts stem'jned from almost
accidental circumstances and were often conducted with a combination of
American naivete and Yankee shrewdness that characterized nineteenth-century
Aiuerican relationships with the world. Calling these efforts "foreign
assistance" is p«3rhaps misleading: missions abroad were undertaken for
muay purposes and were eclectic in their origins. Americans went abroad as
diplomats, students, missionaries, employees of foreign governments, as
members of the U. S. Military, and as representatives of American colleges,
universities and professional associations. Most of the problems and premise
of later technical assistance efforts are to be found in these early forays.
But they were chiefly characterized by their diversity of motives and aims,
and their almost serendipitous and accidental orpins. This is less true of
course, for the missionaries; but even they seemed less like a harbinger of
American influence than representatives with unique and limited (if exalted)
objectives. And often the missionaries themselves developed "projects" which
are surprising as seen through contemporary eyes: One group in Persia,
for example, taught Nestorian Christians, who numbered only "several
thousands" and were descendants of those driven into the Kurdish mountains
11
in the sixth century, to read and write in their own language, a skill they had
lost ten centuries before. Today we might call that an outstanding example
of community-based nonformal education literacy training.^
The European settlers of North America were recipients of foreign
assistance long before they were donors. The earliest example of this was
known as "The Irish Donation." As the result of deprivations to colonists
suffered during King Phillip’s War, Nathaniel Mather, brother of Increase
and pastor of a congregational society in Dublin, gathered a sum of money
to be sent to Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Connecticut "to the poor
distressed by the late war with the Indians. " Some of this foreign assistance,
wdiich it should be noted, was in the foim of a grant rather than a Loan
("soft aid, " it would be called today by the World Bank) was even earmarked
in part to the Indian population, "particularly if they had been Christianized."^
There were two primary forms of aid to the American colonists of
that period: What would now be called "disaster relief, " aid in the wake of
war, epidemic, fire, famine and flood; and grants "to struggling colleges,
libraries, and missionary enterprises, many of whom could neither have
O
been established nor continued to exist without such gifts. " Long before the
concept of foreign assistance had become rooted in the American establish-
ment, North Americans had been the recipient of many different types of
assistance. Included in this recitation of types of aid should also be the
military assistance that the Americans received from the French through the
Maiquis de Lalayette during the Revolutionary War.
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One of the first organized assistance efforts by an American institution
of higher education took place in 1876, It is worth examining this collaborative
effort in some detail, for three reasons: Its place in the early history of such
efforts; its remarkable success; and its foreshadowing of later efforts.
The Massachusetts Agricultural College opened its doors to its first
class in 1867 to forty-seven students. Later to become the University of
Massachusetts, it was a part of the agricultural college movement spawned by
the Land-Grant College Act of 1862, known as the Morrill Act after Congress-
man Justin S, Morrill of Vermont, who first introduced the legislation in
Congress in 1858. Ironically, the Massachusetts Agriculture College was
founded under the Vermonter's legislation just as a long decline in agriculture
was beginning in New England, Soon after its founding, the college was to
become involved in an intematicnal program in Sapporo, Japan.
The circumstances that led to the founding of Sapporo Agricultural
College are instructive. In Japan the Meiji restoration of 1868 opened Japan
to Western influence. "The new oligarchy, drawn in large part from the
lower bureaucratic ranks of the old feudal class, determined to adopt western
science and techniques, in part to consolidate their own power and in part
to advance the national welfare without permitting the conquest of Japan by
western powers.""^ Here we have the unusual circumstance In which a host
country decided to adopt certain aspects of Western science and technology
but in a plaimed and conscious effort to use these tools for their own
purposes
13
. . , The leaders of the Meiji restoration appear to
have been a remarkably able and perspicacious
group who were better able than most of their Chinese
contemporaries to appreciate the importance of care-
fully selecting certain western techniques and adapting
these to indigenous conditions and desires as the most
likely means of resisting western aggressive control.
It was as if they felt the time was very short in which
the techniques which gave the West power could be
selectively adapted to Japanese uses.^
In 1869 Charles De Long took charge of the American Legation in
Japan. His primary interest was in the development of trade between Japan
and the United States, and he thought that the sending of American advisors
in various technical fields would increase this prospect. At about this tune
the Japanese were interested in colonizing the northern island of Hokkaido,
”in the interest of relieving the pressure of population in the older areas,
of
checking possible Russian expansion, and of demonstrating what the new
regime could do in the way of modernizing Japanese life. ..." In so doing,
the government turned to the United States for technical assistance.
Pro-
fessionals from the fields of geology, engineering, finance, postal
affairs,
foreign affairs, and educators were invited to assist the Japanese
develop
aspects of their government, agriculture, and education.
In the field of
agriculture, a mission from Japan, received by President
Grant, was advised
to select the then Commissioner of Agriculture to assist
in the development of
Hokkaido. Horace Capron spent five years in Japan,
building experimental
farms near Tokyo and in Hokkaido. Before he left in
1875, he recommended
that a school he had helped develop in Hokkaido
be made a college and moved
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to the new capital, Sapporo. President William S. Clark of the Massachusetts
Agriculture College was asked by the Japanese minister in Washington to
oversee the development of the new college,
A Japanese delegation had visited Massachusetts Agricultural college
and had been impressed both by the practical agricultural training and by the
7
spirit of martial arts which prevailed at the College, (The Morrill Land
Act had specified that military training be provided to students,) Clark was
granted a year's leave of absence to develop the new College, and
with two assistants he arrived in Sapporo in the summer
of 1876, The college opened with fourteen students, a
staff consisting of a Japanese director, interpreter, and
farm overseer, and, in addition, to President Clark,
three other well-trained American agriculturists.
Later on other Americans joined the staff. In curriculum
and outlook the institution resembled the Massachusetts
State College at Amherst. The influence of the college
on Hokkaido was considerable. It introduced the use of
American agricultural machinery, the cultivation of
corn, potatoes, timothy, bluegrass, apples, onions,
cabbages, beans and tomatoes. The college also took
an important part in the larger development of Hokkaido—
contributing substantially to mining and industry as well
as to agriculture,^
Later, a student of Clark's became president of Sapporo.^ When Clark
returned, he introduced a number of varieties of Japanese fruits, ornamental
plants and trees to the United States, a few of the latter of which may be seen
on the Amherst campus to this day.^^ Educational exchanges
between the two
campuses have continued frcxn that time. From 1957 to 1961 the
University
of Massachusetts had an AID contract to work with the
University of
Hokkaido. And in 1976 the centennial of this cooperative
educational
15
enterprise was celebrated both in Amherst and Sapporo. The name of
William Clark may be better known today in Sapporo than it is in Amherst,
It would be easy to overestimate American influence in Japan during
this period. The British, French, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians also
played varied roles in the development of science and technology in Japan
at this time. However, certain patterns which marked the circumstances
surrounding this and related pregrams in Japan have some interest in terms
of the focus of this study.
1. The host group knew exactly what type of assistance they required
and sought out this assistance themselves. Significantly, the imported
knowledge and technology was adapted to a Japanese concept of their own
development. Further, as they hired their foreign staff directly, they
maintained a degree of direct control over how the development of these
ideas and techniques took place. (An amusing example of this occurred when
the emperor visited one of the experimental farms. The man in charge of
farm machinery, James Dun, was told that the emperor wanted to see the
farm machinery in action—and was told that he should wear the dress
normally used at imperial receptions—"A full dress suit, a boiled shirt,
a white tie, and a top hat. Thus outfitted the young Ohioan seated himself
on a machine and reaped a few rounds of barley and wheat,” He also
worked a steam thresher for the emperor, and, as James Dun wrote later,
"I believe I am the only man living who has undertaken the job in a dress
suit.
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2. The development of the project was a part of larger social changes
in Japan* It is clear that profound social changes were occurring in Japan
at the time of the founding of Sapporo College. The latter was not, therefore,
an isolated phenomenon, but rather a piece of a larger change. Margaret
Mead, in writing of changes in the Manus society, has pointed out that large
changes in cultures are most effectively carried out when "the change was
one which the people wanted, initiated and carried through themselves, not
something done to them or for them but by them, that the whole pattern of
life
. . , was changed at the same time, and that the whole change was
carried through very quickly." Thus, the changes 'T)ore the stamp of their
own culture. However radical the changes seemed to be, nevertheless the
choice of emphases, the points in the culture which they decided were crucial,
were selected in terms of existing cultural perceptions."^^ There are many
obvious dissimilarities between the Manus and the Japanese—the latter being
a nation rather than a single culture—but I believe the principle holds. It
is hard to believe that Clark could have been successful in developing a
school modeled on Western educational forms if there had not been strong
forces of change operating throughout Japanese society. And the literature
of development pregrams are a litany of failures when innovations are
attempted in isolation. One can conclude, therefore, that certain pre-
conditions must exist for the successful application of technical assistance
programs
17
3, Although there was no official relationship between the Massachusetts
Agricultural College and the College in Sapporo at the time the project was
initiated, the concept of ’’sisterhood" relationships between institutions
clearly began with this program. This was a system of linked institutions
of higher education, one in the United States and the other in the third world,
which developed in its most massive form in the fifties with the first large
influx of American technical assistance funds following Truman's Point Four
speech. Given its century-old status, the early Massachusetts Agricultural
College prototype must be figured as one of the most extraordinary examples
of this concept of assistance. The cooperation between the two colleges
is probably the most significant, and unquestionably the most long-lived,
of all activities between American and developing overseas institutions of
higher education prior to 1939. It must therefore be seen as a distant
precursor of the programs of the 1950’s and I960‘s,
Foreign aid during this period—considering foreign aid in its broadest
meaning as assistance offered to individuals, groups or governments outside
the United States by individuals or groups or the U, S. government—can be
organized into a number of disparate, overlapping, and eclectic categories.
These are provided to present the context in which later aid developed, and
how American colleges and universities fit into the larger picture. One of
the reasons for the miscellaneous nature of American assistance during this
18
period was the late development of colonialism as an instrument of U. S,
foreign policy as compared to the European powers. For example, it was not
until 1898 that the U. S. took over the role of colonialist in Cuba frcm the
Spaniards. Further, there was a long period of transition from the role of
the United States as a receiver of aid and assistance from other nations to
that of a donor. During this period, a number of hybrid types of international
relationships sprang up.
The Solitary Entrepreneur
How many Americans left the United States for direct employment with
foreign governments will never be known. Usually, they were hired directly
by the host government for specific development purposes: road building,
surveying, gaologic surveys, engineering, and the like. They were, in the
main, an extraordinary lot: part adventurer, part technician, and part
entrepreneur. Although in such a varied group, no example can be typical,
one such man was A. C. Jewett, who worked first as a pioneer in polyphase
electric transmission installations in California; then, as a foreign installing
aigineer for General Electric, he went to southern India, where he installed
a power plant for the Kolar Gold Fields in Mysore; later to Brazil; then back
to Srinigar in Northern India; then, finally, ”he was persuaded by a British
firm” to go to Afghanistan where he worked more for the Amir, Habibullah
Khan, then he did for anyone else. As the first American permitted into
Afghanistan since 1880, he arrived there in 1911 to stay for a period of two or
19
three years; but time goes much more slowly there, aud it was not until 1919
that he was permitted to leave the country, having completed the installation
of a hydroelectric plant for Kabul, the capital city.
He lived during those years under very difficult conditions; and when
he retired, it was not to California, but to the island of Tahiti in the South
Seas, "in the last house on the street that fronts the ocean," where he died
15
shortly afterwards.
Private and Quasi-Official Missions
It was not until 1874, partly in response to the missions in Japan, that
the U. S. Diplomatic and Consular Acts were amended to allow diplcmatic
officers to recommend to the governments to which they were accredited the
services of private Americans for employment. Congress finally lifted the
ban, at the urging of a Congressman from Ohio who argued that it would
increase trade and help "Americanize the people of Japan." Prior to that
time and residually well into this century the diplomatic office of the U. S,
government seemed to believe that private Americans working abroad were at
best a nuisance who could be tolerated only if they did not interfere with the
diplomats* work. But many Americans did go abroad at the invitation of
governments of institutions in other lands.
Private missions abroad
Educators such as John Dewey, who advised the government of China
and Turkey on educational reform, and James Mark Baldwin of Johns
Hopkins
20
University, who advised the Government of Mexico in educational reorganization,
were called upon by foreign governments because of the international interest
in the impact of the U.S, educational system on the successfully developing
U. S, economy. The American emphasis on practical and vocational training
was also causing interest during this period, which was a factor in the
17
Japanese invitation to the staff of the Massachusetts Agricultural College,
When in the years following the First World War, isolationist senti-
ment resulted in the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles in the U.S. Senate,
the U.S, government continued its hands-off attitude in the area of foreign
assistance. Here, in the main, it was the U.S. voluntary agencies which
began to develop the first foreign aid prc^rams of any significant size. A
fifty-year summary of these activities written in 1954 noted that "the
activities of these voluntary agencies include literacy, vocational training,
higher education, public health, social work, agriculture, farm credit, and
multipurpose community development, A summary in this same woric of
the problems, strategies, and methods of these organizations reads some-
what like a recitation of the same problems, strategies and methods later
encountered by the later government-assisted programs such as Peace Corps.
Most of the organizations involved were religious groups, although some,
like the Experiment in International Living and the Institute of International
Education (see below), had broader social aims. However, the massive
development of U.S. foreign assistance efforts following the Second
World
War might be termed the secularization of American foreign aid.
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Quasi-official missions
For about thirty years prior to the First World War, American
Missions were often placed in a quasi-official position with respect to both the
American and foreign governments. One of the more interesting examples of
this occurred in Iran, whose government look to the United States for
financial assistance and as a counterbalance to the Russians and British.
In 1910 the Persian government requested U. S, assistance in reforming the
finance and tax systems of the country. Members of parliament believed
that with a stronger central government achieved through a sound financial
base, it could more easily deal with the regional imperial powers. The State
Department agreed to recommend an American, but only on the understanding
that he would ccme as a private citizen with no official recognition. W. Morgan
Siuster arrived and for a time took over as virtual Treasure of the entire
country. This of course displeased both the Russians and the powerful khans
w^o had heretofore been unmolested by central government taxation.
When Shuster got up a central militia to collect taxes, it proved too
much for the Russians who were backing the brother of the deposed Shah.
Russian cos sacks, defending the shah's interests, resisted Shuster's tax
collectors and their guards and then presented an ultimatum to the Persian
legislature, which acquiesced and sacked Shuster. (Much later, of course,
the Russians and Americans switched horses but not the game,) The
American
government never, during the entire episode, officially
recognized Shuster's
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mission. It was not until much later that the U. S. government began using
overseas missions as a part of U.S. policy.
American Colonialism
Subsequent to the Spanish-American War, the United States inherited
sections of the Spanish Empire. Cuba and Guam were ceded to the United
States; and the Philippines was surrendered for a payment of twenty million
dollars. The Platt Amendment—a rider attached to the Army Appropriations
Bill of 1901— set the stage cfor U.S. -Cuban relations for the coming seventy
years. It stipulated conditions under which the United States could intervene
in Cuba, was made a part of the Cuban Constitution, and established a U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay. This and similar, if less massive, inter-
vention by the United States in the Dominican Republic and Haiti were
accomplished by official missions, for the first time, to deal with various
aspects of these countries health, education, fiscal, and educational systems.
The legacy of these interventions is painfully clear today. In general,
neither the military occupations nor the accompanying technical missions had
salutory results. As one observer remarked regarding the U.S. intervention
in Haiti from 1915 to 1934, the chief U.S. contribution had been "marines
and latrines.
Capital assistance
Wars have a way of stirring up interest in foreign affairs. The first
massive capital assistance to foreign governments occurred during and
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immediately after the First World War. Under the Liberty Loan Act and
various special legislation, more than 10 billicn dollars were loaned to the
Allied Powers. Before the outbreak of war, the United States had been "a
net debtor nation. European investors had for decades before 1914 provided
the funds for financing many forms of economic development on this side of
the Atlantic. These investments were an important part of the European war
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chest on the outbreak of the First World War."
Educational exchange
The United States was also a net debtor nation in educational exchange
until after the First World War. By the turn of the century, it has been
estimated that about two thousand students a year were going abroad for
educational purposes. It was not until after the war, however, that
organized exchange took place. The first institutions to develop organized
progimns were the University of Delaware in 1923, followed by Smith in 1925,
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and Mt. Holyoke in 1926.
Also as a result of the war, the Institute of International Education was
founded in 1919 with support from major foundations, including the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. It was designed "to promote the inter-
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change of people and ideas for the development of a peaceful world. The
Institute, which exists today in New York, was in some ways a forerunner of
aspects of the Fulb right Program.
International education has been an "integral part of the U. S. Office
of Education ever since it was founded"^^ in 1867. However, it
seemed to be
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no more successful at promoting international education activities in those
early years than it has been in the last decade, Cf early significance to
educational exchange was the participation of the United States in the Pan
American Union, joined in 1890.26
The Early Period; A Summary
The early period of American exchange and assistance encompassed
a remarkable variety of activities by American individuals and organizations,
private and public; it was a period of learning, of interaction with an in-
creasingly complex world from a position of increasing strength. It was the
public sector which refrained from making substantial committments to
international institutions and development—the refusal of the Senate to ratify
the Treaty of Versailles, and the consequent failure of the United States to
join the League of Nations was merely the most tangible evidence of the
strength of isolationist sentiment which prevailed right up to the outbreak
of the Second World War,
Foreign Aid and the Politics of Power (1939-1969)
During and following the Second World War, foreign aid, which had
been an orphan, was adopted by the U, S. government as one of its principal
instruments of foreign policy. And because the foreign policy of these years
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was regarded by U. S, administrations as the exercise of power, or at times
as the exercise of balancing power among the strongest adversaries, foreign
assistance was soon enlisted in these strategic tasks.
The shift in public sentiment which allowed these changes began during
the war. The isolationists, who had managed to bottle up internationalist
sentiment for so long, were defeated only by that most international of events,
a world war. In an article written in 1943, Robert M, Hutchins, then
President of the University of Chicago, signalled the ideological shift which
was soon to occur;
Now the liberal arts are the arts of communication. If
we are to have a democratic community in this country
we must give every citizen of it a liberal education.
The alternative is not to have a democratic community.
If the whole world is to be a democratic community,
then every human being in the world will have to have
a liberal education. . . . The education appropriate to
the good life and the good society involves the mastery
of the arts of communication, the reinterpretation of
fundamental ideas, and that habitual vision of greatness
without which Whitehead has pronounced education to be
impossible. From such an education we Americans
might hope to achieve a democratic community in this
country, and through it, in the world, ... The nature
of that world may depend upon American education.
Frank Laubach, a pioneer in teaching literacy around the world,
especially through Christian missions, saw the change ccming,
and the
"danger” of secularization as well;
This planet contains enormous festering sores, where
powerful overlords, many of them white, exploit the
poverty and ignorance of three-fifths of the human race,
A stupendous educational program is therefore the
first step for all the depressed regions of the world. .
. .
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While we teach a billion, one hundred million illiterates
to read, we must furnish them with simple literature
about health, agriculture, industry, home building,
morality and religion, and flood their minds with
Christian Ideals.
Missionaries are mfinitely superior to government
diplomats when it ccmes to helping and lifting the
neediest people,^®
While educators saw the future of the world as depending upon American
education, and missionaries upon the triumph of Christian ideals, presidents
and congressmen thought it should depend upon the propagation of the U.S,
political and economic system—especially in the face of the communist
"menace,” Thus, President Truman, in his inaugural address in 1949, spoke
of the necessity to "strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of
aggression, "and, In his fourth point, directed U.S. policy toward "a bold new
pregram for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial
progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas"
which he said would be based "on the concept of democratic fairdealing,
This period marks the proliferation of American foreign aid and
educational exchange programs. There was also a parallel increase in the
building of international institutions. The growth in international institutions
in the century following the establishment of the first modern international
organizations in 1865 can only be described as unprecedented in human
history.
The history of American foreign aid and educational exchange pregrams
is much better documented for this period than for the Early Period (ending
in 1939), Emphases for analysis for study of the middle period of aid have
been chosen on the basis to wiiich they relate to current and projected activities
by American institutions of higher education (hereafter referred to as
universities for the sake of brevity). Emphasis here is not on chronological
recapitulation, except within categories, but rather on the purposes and types
of aid during this period. The study of the middle period is divided into four
categories: International Instititions; the Fullbright Program; Security and
Technical Assistance; and the role of U, S, universities during the middle
period.
International Institutions
C, Fred Bergsten has summarized two waves of international
institutional building during the period under review:
The first wave came immediately after 1945, with the
creation of the United Nations system including its
economic components- -the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and subsequently the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
The second came around 1960 and included the
Common Maiicet, the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the regional
development banks and—though it was barely noticed
at the time—OPEC, ^
Immediately following the Second World War, the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) channeled funds (70% from
31
the United States) for the assistance of people in war-torn areas. The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
founded in 1945, and the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) established
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in 1965, are the principal agencies of the United Nations for technical
assistance programs in third-wo rid countries. Retarded by cumbersome
bureaucracies, these agencies have mounted technical assistance pregrams
which are in many respects parallel to those developed during the fifties by
various Western aid agencies.
The Fulb right Program
This program is notable for achieving more in the field of international
educational exchange than any other pregram, before or since, in any country.
Fulb right later wrote that ”in introducing the basic legislation in 1945 for
the educational exchange program, it was my thought that if large numbers
of people know and understand the people from nations other than their own,
they might develop a capacity for empathy, a distaste for killing other men,
and an inclination to peace. The Fulbright program was a hybrid,
skillfully drawing upon private and public, domestic and foreign, sources
for funding and programming, and relying upon the sale of U. S. surplus
military equipment for its initial funds. It made use of a network of private
and public institutions, such as the Institute of International Education
referred to above, the American Council cxi Education, the U. S. Office of
Education, and others, and integrated them all in the Board of Foreign
Scholarships, which cooperated closely with the Department of State. It
provided incentives for the cooperation of U.S. universities by calling for the
designation of officials in participating universities to assist in disseminating
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infomiation and gathering naminations for the program. Finally, it provided
for binational commissions in each country which cooperated in the program.
The function of these committees was to select grantees who would be sent
to the United States, and to provide places for American grantees. These
binational commissions were significant in countering attacks, largely from
Communist newspapers such as L»Humanite in Paris, that the American
professors and students under this program would be "simply agents, present
or future, of the American intelligence service,
Several features of the prc^ram are important to the purposes of this
study. The skillful blending of private and public funds and programming
is one. In a sense, the Fulbright program was a great source of investment
in learning for both American and foreign universities. Second, the innova-
tion of the binational committee, while not entirely without precedent, had
never before been developed to such a sophisticated degree. It was a
collaborative program in the sense that will be developed below in that the
planning, objectives, and resources for the pregram were shared. Finally,
participating universities became international organizations to the limited
extent that they had the opportunity to develop, in a small way, an inter-
national faculty. The program was exquisitely timed: three years earlier
or later it would never have been approved by Congress,
Security and Technical Assistance
These two strands of the U.S, foreign assistance program must be
considered together because at times they appear separately, and at times
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they were woven together to fomi one policy. Roughly speaking, whenever it
appeared to U. S, policymakers that foreign policy objectives could be achieved
primarily through military means, as for example during the McCarthy/
Korean War and later Cold War pt3riods, large-scale military and security
assistance programs tended to dominate the foreign aid arena; and at other
times, technical assistance programs had p3riods of resurgence.
Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA)
The nAA was an ancestor of both the Alliance for Progress and the
Fulbright Program, It was chartered as a semi-autonomous government
• corporation under the laws of the state of Delaware during the war and legis-
latively supported by the Pittman Act of 1940,^“^ It was a forerunner of the
Fulbright program in that, at least in its initial form, it was a quasi-public
institute; and, more importantly, in its use of the servicio concept, it pre-
figured Fulbright* s blnational commissions. The servicios were "jointly
administered organizations in the recipient nations, which operated outside
of norm 111 government channels, The program operated sporadically
during the war but by 1950 it was judged that "the Servicios had clearly made
a discernible ccmtribution to agriculture and rural development in many,
although by no means all, of the areas in which projects had been undertaken
36
and they were popular with the officials of Latin American governments."
It should be pointed out that IIA\ was created after President Roosevelt
in 1939 "pledged economic support to any Anerican country threatened vvith
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economic or military aggression." An unfriendly critic of U.S. aid 1ms
pointed out that with Japan threatening essential supplies of rubber, abaca and
tin from Southeast Asia, the U.S. felt it had to protect the only other available
source of these supplies. In commenting on the first appropriation of funds
to sponsor technical assistance missions in Latin America in 1941, the
critic commented: "It is important to remember the motivation for this
$80,000 precedent: to protect the nation’s rear on the eve of its entry into a
OQ
war. Altruism was not a factor."
Like the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations (OFAR) of the
Department of Agriculture, IIAA occasionally contracted wth staff of American
Universities to cany out their programs. Both these organizations tended
to support the technical assistance approach to foreign assistance, rather than
the security approach, the former because of the servicio concept, and the
latter because of its close ties to land-grant universities.
Post-war assistance: The Marshall Plan
The Marshall Plan was conceived in 1947 as a mechanism for rebuilding
war— ravaged Europe and of opposing communist influence in the region. Durii^
the war, the U.S. government had made available about 94 billion dollars
"for pregrams of assistance to foreign countires in pursuit of the political,
military, and economic objectives of its foreign policy," through the
mechanism of the Lend-Lease Act. Through the operation of the Economic
Cooperaticn Administration (EGA), which administered the programs set
up by
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the Marshall Plan, the U. S. gave or loaned 12 billion dollars to Western
Europe from 1948-1951.'^^ The program was a spectacularly successful
capital-intensive redevelopment effort. Ironically, its very success may have
had some long-term negative effects on U, S» technical assistance programs
in third-world countries.
Point Four and the Technical Cooperation
Administration (TCA)
During these years a great political struggle was being played out in the
United States, and a counterpart struggle was occurring with respect to the
purposes of foreign aid. There were those who believed that America was
engaged in an apocalyptic struggle against the tyrannical evils of communism
and, in that fight, no sacrifice, including seme basic concepts of democracy,
could be too great. There were others, who seemed in the minority at times,
who believed that the best defence against all forms of tyranny, including
communism, was to be achieved through the propogation and defence of self-
govemment, in whatever form it was to be found. Generally, the former
believed that U. S, foreign aid should be directed to assisting regimes, what-
ever their complexion, who claimed to be anti-communist. They maintained
that the "Communist menace must be fought in all parts of the world, but
especially in countries where poverty and social unrest created fertile ground
for Communist propoganda or direct action, This view was buttressed by
a number of reports, for example the Rockefeller Report to the President,
which set out strategic objectives for technical assistance:
33
Improving the standard of living of the people of
the underdeveloped areas is a definite strategic
objective of United aates foreign policy. That
grievances are constantly being exploited by sub-
versive forces hardly needs elaboration, Soviet
agents have been particularly diligent in efforts
to propagandize and control industrial and rural
workers.
Those others who believed that the greater danger abroad and at home
was tyranny in any form sided with the views of John Kenneth Galbraith, who
wrote that:
In most of the countries that are candidates for aid,
government is a possession, not of the people at
large, but of a minority ruling class. . . .
Under such circumstances, the spigot gains from
technical aid will go urmoticed by peasants and
laborers when set saga in st the draughts at the
bunghole by tax-gatherers, landlords, and usurers.
The answer, if we are to aid such countries at all,
is that we must aid them where the aid counts.
Above and far beyond Point Four, We must put out-
selves on the side of truly popular government with
whatever pressure we can properly employ.
(Italics in original.)
The bitter fruit of the victory of the ’’communist menace" view was to come
much later in Vietnam,
The important point here is that foreign assistance supporters were
beginning to divide into two camps: Those who saw the primary purpose of
foreign aid as being a major weapon in opposing communism, and to that end
might support whatever governments were anticommunist, without an excess
of scruples; and those who saw the primary purpose of foreign aid as
strengthening popular government, even if in so doing we supported govern-
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ments which were not ideologically ’’pure,” that were, in some cases, even
socialist.
The Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) was created in 1950
within the Department of State, TCA was the original institution which was
established to cany out the Point Four Program (as ECA had been to
implement the Marshall Plan). The organization drew much of its personnel
from IIAA and OFAR, and has been described as ’’field-oriented”; ”Ln general
terms, the objective of TCA-adm inistored technical assistance was viewed
as building people* rather than ’building things. It operated, in many
ways, quite differently than ECA, which was at this time distributing massive
sums of money to rebuild Western Europe, ’’The policy of TCA was
ccaisciously to divorce itself from any association with immediate U. S.
foreign policy objectives. Even the painting of U.S, insignia on equipment
and other materials distributed under the program was specifically prohibited.”
The Administrator of TCA noted that ’’there were no objectives except long-
term stability and no political strings attached to the granting of aid. The
basis of projects was simply a joint agreement to work toward the achievement
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of mutually acceptable goals which were established by the host country,”
In this respect, TCA adopted the servicio approach of IIAA, and the
people-to-people approach of the private organizations which had labored for
many years before the U.S, government adopted the technical assistance
concept. Indeed, for a short time, TCA cooperated closely with both private
organizations and with universities who had developed pregrams under HAA
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and OFAR. The Director "sought to have his staff leam all they could from
the voluntary agency people, particularly the Near East Foundation and the
missionaries, whose pioneering work he admired, The cooperation with
voluntary organizations was implemented through contracts with, among
others, the Near East Foundaticai and the American Friends Service Committee.
But by 1956 the Friends had withdrawn from their contracts because of security
check requirements and other voluntary organization leaders were later to
complain that "foreign aid has become a tool in the fight against communism.
Political groups abroad quickly leam that if there is no real communist
threat in their countries they had better create one in order to qualify for
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American aid."
The victory of the strategic approach; The Foreign
Operations Administration (FOA) and beyond
Those who believed that foreign aid should be used primarily as a
buttress for anticommunist governments were given support by two develop-
ments, one foreign and one domestic. In February, 1950, the Senator from
Wisconsin, Joe McCarthy, gave a speech in West Virginia in which he charged
that communists had infilitrated the State Department. It was the opening
salvo of a domestic ideolc^ical war. Then a few months later, the Korean
War broke out.
As so often happens, the adversary positions found another stage within
the government. ECA was about to phase out, having completed its function
of assisting in the rebuilding of Europe. The leaders of the strategic approach
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in Congress determined that EGA should not be abandoned; but TCA had
already been established. An awkward compromise was struck. The Mutual
Security Act of 1951 established the Mutual Security Administration (MSA),
An organization similar in both personnel and administrative structure to
its predecessor, the EGA, During this phase of bureaucratic infighting
between what one participant called the "do-gooders" and the "big-money
boys," the MSA was assigned only those areas of the world that had "strategic
significance."'^^ However, MSA was located in the Office of the President,
and it was only a matter of time before TCA was eliminated from the scene.
This occurred in August of 1953 when, under the Presidential Reorganization
Plan No, 7, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was established,
which "signalled the triumph of the EGA approach.
The plague of organizations, and reorganizations, which so severely
hampered the growth of coherent aid policies, did not end with FOA, Under
the direction of Harold Stassen, the FOA developed a large number of
university technical assistance contracts, which will be examined below.
But the Stassen/FOA period lasted but two years; in 1955 the FOA was itself
shifted to the department of state as a "semi-autonomous agency" under new
leadership and renamed the Litemat icaaal Cooperation Administratim (IGA),
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although much of its administrative structure remained intact.
Reorganized again in 1961, in the more centralized Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID), the agency was changed more in the way it was
run than what it was supposed to do. Most observers discount the effect of
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these reorganizations in determining the objectives, purposes and rationale
of aid; the players changed, but the game stayed the same.
At about the time that AID was reconstructed, the Peace Corps was
created. It was in this organization, patterned after the International
Voluntary Services (a private volunteer organization chartered in 1953) and
the British International Voluntary Services for Peace, that human-scale,
person-to-person technical assistance programs were revived as a part of
U.S, aid. One observer has written that "history may cite the Peace Corps
as the only real innovation of the Kennedy Administration.
How did the strategic approach to foreign assistance compare to efforts
of the early period? One example, while not necessarily typical, may be
instructive.
In the desert outside the city of Kandahar, in the Afghanistan where the
American engineer Jewett spent nine years, stands a gleam ingly modem
airport with long runways capable of handling the most modern commercial
jet aircraft. Its terminal building is beautiful, and when I last saw it, a quite
empty building. The airport was constructed with U.S, aid funds as a
strategic counterweight to one constructed in Kabul, the capital city, by the
Russians. It is a triumph of the capital-intensive, strategic approach to
foreign aid, A little more than a decade ago, some five years after
construction, it was handling only two DC-3s a week, and stood otherwise
unused. It would never have been built had not the Russians constructed an
airport in Kabul, There is no raticaial explanation for an airport of that size
on that site. But it stands there still, nevertheless, no more of use, probably.
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to the new communist rulers of Afghanistan than it was to the deposed King^
whose favor the United aates was so earnestly seeking. I believe, however,
that the turbines installed by Mr. Jewett sixty years ago still supply electricity
to the city of Kabul.
The growing role of American universities
in foreign assistance
Harold Stassen, before he became known as a perennial presidential
candidate, and before he was appointed by Eisenhower to serve as Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration, had served as President of the
University of Pennsylvania. And he came to his positions with MSA, and
later FOA, with a strong predisposition toward massively increasing the
participation of American universities in the field of technical assistance.
There were precedents, such as the informal relationship between
Massachusetts Agricultural College and the Agricultural College in Sapporo.
Most important to the development of University-government aid relationships,
however, was the initiative taken by John Hannah who, acting as President
of the Naticmal Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges
(NASULGC), wrote to President Truman fifteen days after Truman’s Point
Four speech offering to "make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits
of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their
aspirations for a better life." He then offered the services of the nation’s
land-grant colleges and universities for assistance "on a much broader scale
r o
than has been the case in the past." From that time to this, land-grant
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colleges and universities have been the major force behind American university-
based technical assistance programs. That Title XII, the current form of
government-university cooperation in foreign assistance, is primarily
organized around the land-grant system, is a consequence of this long history.
The pioneers in this field were Oklahoma State in Ethiopia; Arkansas in
Panama; Michigan State in Colombia; Purdue in Brazil; Arizcna in Iraq;
54Utah State in Iran; Illinois in India; and Cornell in the Phillipines. The
University of Illinois was soon joined by a consortium of five other land-
grant universities—Ohio State, Missouri, Pennsylvania State, Kansas State,
and Tennessee—that worked with nine Indian Agricultural Universities over a
period of twenty-one years. Many of these original contracts lasted well
over ten years, much longer than the average for later contracts. Some of
this may be attributable to the way in which TCA contracts were administered,
giving much more latitude in how projects were established and implemented
than was dc«ie in its successor agencies.
Almost all of these contracts were institutioa-building, university-to-
university programs, the ’’sisterhood” model mentioned earlier. Some of
these earlier projects, such as the Oklahoma A and M Project in Ethiopia,
went further than this into ’’related fields pertaining to the economic develop-
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ment of Ethiopia as the TCA may request and the college may accept."
Later, government agency officials were to point to these early agreements
as abrogations of their authority and sought successfully to circumscribe more
narrowly the authority of universities in the field.
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When TCA was supplanted by the Foreign Operations Administration
under Harold Stassen, foreign aid programs as well as the State Department
were under heavy pressure from Joe McCarthy’s permanent Investigations
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operaticais, and many
of the TCA officials were purged and replaced by the "big-money boys."
At the same time, Stassen determined that the number of university contracts
should be increased radically, and declared his intensions to do so in a speech
to the NASULGC convention. He then decreed that each mission director would
have a quota of one university contr-act permission to develop, and further
ordered directors to integrate these contracts into an overall country aid
plan.^"^
The effects of these changes left an almost permanent mark on govern-
ment-university relaticos. A good many contracts were prepared and
implemented in haste by newly appointed officials who were, in the main,
unsympathetic to university participation in the first place. For the next
ten years, universities and aid agency officials dealt with a tangle of hastily-
conceived projects and their aftermath. And even today there is a latent sense
of uneasiness about university contracts among many AID officials that may
5 8
stem from this early proliferation of university contracts.
The university community itself was decidely unhappy with the relation-
ship. By 1955, the Committee on Technical Cooperation of NASULGC
condemned the manner in which the government was handlu^ the aid- university
program in strong terms: "The Committee is convinced that with present
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administrative organization and lack of major concern for and support of
institutional contracts abroad at top ICA administrative levels, the program
will continue to deteriorate.
. .
.«'59 And so it did, through the fifties and
a successiMi of administrators at ICA and later in AID. It was not until 1964
.that the problems were addressed fully and responsibly.
The Gardner Report
In 1963, David Bell, the newly appointed Administrator of AID, determined
to improve the Agency's relations with universities. To that end he undertook
a number of initiatives, the most important of which was to request John
Gardner, then President of the Carnegie Corporation, to write a critique of the
Agency's relationship with the university community, with the assistance of
Education and World Affairs. The report, A.I.D. and the Universities.
generally referred to as the Gardner report, was published in 1964, and
received wide circulation both within the Agency and the university community.
In its 51 pages Gardner analyzed the past relationship, identified problems
and suggested solutions, focussed on the strengths and potential of universities
in foreign assistance, and suggested some changes in attitudes and basic
structures. Gardner criticized the lack of proper training for federal agency
personnel; noted the need for preserving the independence of both the agency
and the universities; noted that both parties had to benefit from the relationship;
criticized the short duration of most technical assistance programs; observed
that AID would have to invest in universities if it wanted to utilize their
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capabilities (and suggested institutional grants for this purpose); emphasized
the importance of research in university contracts, and suggested universities
address themselves not only to the discovery of new knowledge, but also "to the
devising, designing, and testing of new procedures and materials in technical
cooperation and to the analytical study— for purposes of improved decision-
making of development assistance activities and their consequences,"^^
Gardner had strong words of criticism for both universities and A, I, D,
He noted that most universities recognize that they are members of "an emerging
world intellectual community—a world with its own traditions, requirements, and
6X
aspirations." But he counseled those universities unable to integrate their
international activities into "the main stream of the university's life and being"
to "get out of overseas activity entirely."®^ On the other hand, he noted that
some A.I.D, officials "know little or nothing about the nature of the modem
university.
. . . Even those who respect the universities often do not know
them well enough to demand and get the best that the universities have to
offer.
Gardner's report had the effect of airing the mutual grievances of the
parties and lucidly revealing the potentials of a reinvigorated and reconstituted
partnership. He recommended seme procedural changes in contract relation-
ships, which the agency slowly adopted (some changes in this area were not
made until 1976), and he si^gested that a new unit be formed with AID to focus
on "educational and human resource development—problems that lie at the
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veiy heart of all economic development, all political maturing, all moderniz-
ing of social structure. With respect to this most important and difficult of
all development problems we have been inexcusably casual and aimless.
Perhaps his most important recommendation, which was not carried out
but may yet be, was for the creation of a ”semi-^utonomous government
institute to handle certain aspects of technical assistance, particularly those
aspects dealt with by universities. ” He thought that this institute should
also concentrate on educational and human resource developnent,
A report published in 1966 supported Gardner’s contention that
American universities were becoming more internationalized; ".
. , The
number and nature of university international programs reveals more than
institutionalizaticai. It is clear these programs are not just ’overseas
operations* or 'international dimensions’—they are becoming normal
ingredients of higher education. And Henry Steele Commager, noting
that American universities have played a significant role in the Fulbright
Program, the AID agency, and the Peace Corps, contended that although all
three "originated in government and are financed by government, they draw
from and depend on the academy for their effectiveness. The university,
in short, remains the vital center of the enterprise of international
67
education.
"
The middle period of U. S. aid: A Summary
A commentator has observed that ’history, rather than political
judgement, seems to be largely responsible for the shape and distribution of Aid
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programmes.
. . And it certainly seems true that the extraoidlnaiy
growth of U, S. foreign aid during this period was the result of World War II
and the leadership position that was virtually thrust upon the United States
following the War rather than by an altruistic political decision of the wisdom
or importance of aid programs. It seems equally true that, once established,
the strategic thrust of aid programs durmg this period, including of course
military aid, was not altered by changes in the political climate in Washii^ton
or by the almost incessant changes in personnel and structure of the aid
agencies. Similarly, government agency-university relations, described by
one observer as ”a very small frog in a rather large and often turbulent
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piddle,” have generally followed in the wal-^e of these larger changes in
geo-political currents. This is equally true of the final period under review,
when cracks in the facade of the strategic balance-of-power theories began to
appear, no doubt occasioned in part by reaction to the War in Vietnam, as
well as by the emergence of new economic forces led by OPEC. The implica-
tiais for what has been called foreign aid, and for American university
participation in international programs of assistance, are not without interest.
The Diversification of Power: Foreign Aid
and Interdependence (1970-1978)
The Reports
In the late '60s and early 70's, a spate of reports appeared assessing
past foreign aid efforts and recommending future courses of action. Those
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that received the widest currency at that time were the Peterson Report, a
report by the President’s Task Force on International Development, chaired
by Rudolph Ibterson; the Pearson Report, a study made under the sponsorship
of the World Bank by a committee headed by Lester Pearson; the Jackson
Report, written at the request of the Administrator of the United Nations
Development Program by Sir Robert Jackson, which assessed the United
Nations Development System; and various recommendations of the President’s
General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Problems, headed by
James Perkins. The reports were no doubt a response to increasing criticism
from many quarters concerning the purposes, methods, and effectiveness of
foreign assistance programs. In the United States, support for foreign aid
programs in the Congress and among the public was failing. Emerging
victorious and solvent from World War II, Americans had believed it was in
their duty and interest to help the world; emerging from the unpopular and
draining war in Vietnam, the Congress and public were becoming increasingly
isolationist. Even liberal supporters in the past, such as Senators Church
and Fulbright, were turning away, seeing in past programs an Executive
excuse for military adventures.
The reports are, in the main, defensive: They attempt to shore up
support for foreign assistance by recommending various reorganization
schemes and an increase in monetary committment to assistance programs.
The Peikins report recommended a specific spending goal for foreign
assistance, as did the Jackson report (usually expressed as a per cent of gross
46
national product). The Peterson report suggested, among other things, that
security and technical assistance be disentangled, and the latter housed in a
new agency under the President.
The reports are interesting more for their omissions than their
commisions. With the exception of a Rockefeller study released at about the
same time, ncne of the reports emphasize strategic balance-of-power argu-
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ments for aid. Associated with the reports’ general recognition of the
growing strength of the newly independent nations, this suggests some re-
thinking about global shifts in power and responsibility. But this is implicit
rather than stated in the reports, and nowhere, with one exception, is an
attempt made to present a vision for the future in which foreign aid would
have a context in which to be planned and judged. This exception is to be
found in the Pearson report. Here, an initial movement is begun, away from
the vision of a world where the Western nations contend with communist
countries for the hearts, minds, and allegiance of the third world, toward
that of a "village world, " where there is a growing interdependence am eng the
world’s communities: "Concern with the needs of other and poorer nations
is the expression of a'new and fundamental aspect of the modern age—the
awareness that we live in a village world, that we belong to a world
community. In this newly interconnected world, then, a major change of
profound dimensions may be occurring. Whereas the balance of power
theorists see the world as a nexus of incompatible and antagonistic forces,
the Pearson report suggests that ". . . the appeal of enlightened and con-
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structive self-interest. ... is a. respectable and valid basis for international
action and policy. ”
The fullest possible utilization of all the world’s resources,
human and physical, which can be brought about only by
international cooperation, helps not only those countries
now economically weak, but also those strong and wealthy.
This can be done through direct benefits from a bilateral
aid relationship and also more importantly, by the general
increase in international trade which would follow inter-
national development.
. . .
We know now that a war any-
where in the world concerns and may engage us all; that
the pollution of the environment in one area can affect
life on the whole planet; that epidemics and diseases do
not respect national boundaries.
And the report summarizes the argument by stating that "international
development is a great challenge of our age. Our response to it will show
whether we understand the implications of interdependence or whether we
prefer to delude ourselves that the poverty and deprivation of the great
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majority of mankind can be ignored without tragic consequences for all.
"
The Pearson report is also significant in that it emphasizes increased
trade as a goal at least as important as increased aid. Over the past decade
this point has been made with increasing frequency, most often by third-
world countries themselves, who advocate a new economic order in which
there are more equitable trade and pricing arrangements between the
industrialized naticms and the suppliers of raw materials.
But the Pearson report was the excepticai. In general, the reports
rehearsed old arguments and dusted off plans for yet more reorganizations
of foreign aid programs, without suggesting the new vision necessary to
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rethink the entire questicai of aid. They were predictably received. When
presented with the Peterson report. President Nixon promised "a new approach
to foreign assistance;" ^however, in reality, "the Peterson Report did not
exercise any controlling influence over American aid policy. In fact,
compared with the objectives outlined in the Report, the actual situation
continued to deteriorate. Objectives remained confused; policy instruments
were inadequately specified; and political support was not mobilized for an
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effective program."
Some of the reports’ critics had more insights into the changing relation-
ship of aid, foreign policy, and domestic development than did the reports
themselves, Samuel Huntington, of the Harvard Center for International
Affairs, noted that "there is something basically wrcng with a program when
its supporters define its goals in tenns of how much should be spent on it
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rather than what should be achieved by it. " He went on to recommend the
disaggregation of aid programs and their replacement by "more flexible,
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specialized, and purposeful mechanisms. " His most interesting comments
were on the possible future, or lack thereof, of aid pregrams as they had
existed over the past 20 years. He starts with an observation similar to
that of the Pearson report, that;
Perhaps the most fundamental change that has occurred
on a global scale during the past twenty years has been
the compression of the world, brought about by
population growth and the revolutions in transportation
and communication. This increased interaction means
that the United States has a new and fundamental interest
49
in th© prcffnoticai of a, human and physica.1 ©nvironment
suitabl© for th© survival and improv©m©nt of th©
conditions of ILf© on this plan©t. This int©r©st did
not ©xist in the past; it will beccan© increasingly vital
in th© future, ‘ ^
Huntington takes this analysis on© step further than th© Pearson report.
First he states that as a consequence of the new conditions of global inter-
dependence, future aid should be based on problem programs rather than
country programs that is to say, that they should be based on the solution
of common problems rather than on broad-based aid to countries. These
problems would be approached through technical assistance, "and to a much
lesser extent," through capital and commodity assistance. He mentions as
examples international programs to develop seabed resources and solve
environmental problems.
With increasing interdependence, the differentiation between domestic
and foreign problem solutions beccmes blurred. In all common areas, seabed
and fishing, environment and pollution, tariffs and trade, agricultural
development, and so on, it is less and less possible to consider the foreign
or dcmestic side of the issue without considering the other, Huntington
suggests, therefore, that domestic agencies "expand their operations to the
international scene, channeling the U, S. contribution to international
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agencies." With these changes, he sees the old mechanisms, the foreign-
aid act and agency, as "clearly anachronistic." And, he suggests, as the
complexity of intemational relationships increases, and foreign and dcmestic
issues begin to run together, "the entire concept of foreign aid could itself
8lbecome anomalous and irrelevant."
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In the international institutions area, the growth of organizations to
cope with commons areas continued. C. Fred Bergsten calls these the
"third wave" of instituticai building:
The third wave began around 1973, and continues to
this day. It has witnessed creation of a United Nations
Environment Program, a World Food Council, an
International Energy Agency (IEA), a series of
’producers associations* of exporters of primary
products, and most recently a Conference on Inter-
national Economic Cooperation (CIEC) with its four
standing commissions.®^
Extending the analysis of the effects of interdependence, Bergsten sees "the
basic issue of international relaticm ships for the foreseeable future [as] the
tension between the imperatives of international interdependence and the
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quest to retain adequate degrees of national autonomy."
Trilateral Politics and the New International
Economic Order
Although President Carter was considered an outsider by Washington
politicians, in at least one area he seems to have been well ahead of his
political contemporaries. He and many of his key foreign policy advisors were
members of the Trilateral Commission, a private study group influenced in its
founding by David Rockefeller. In his campaign. Carter stated the Trilaterialist's
major theme; ’We must replace balance-of-power politics with world ortler
politics.
"Trilateral" refers to the countries of North America, Western Europe,
and Japan, and the Commission’s very title thus suggests a transnational
concept. Formed in 1972-73, its founding members now populate many
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corners of the U. S. foreign policy establishment—C. Fred Bergsten,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presidential Advisor
for National Security Affairs; Leonard Woodcoclc, head of the U.S. L^ation
in China; Richard Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Economic Affairs; Walter Mondale; and others.
The Commission recommends "a broad strategy for the management of
interdependence.” They accept the existence of interdependence as a fact,
pledge that "the Trilateral approach combines enlightened seK-interest with
concern for a more effective and humane world order,” and set their major
global tasks as 'T^eeping the peace, managing the world economy, and
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satisfying basic human needs. ”
The Trilateralist’s caicems in a sense are the mirror image of those
third-world leaders who demand a new international economic order in which
there will be a more equitable sharing of the world’s resources. The noted
World Bank economist Mahbub ul Haq has said that:
The demand for a New International Economic Order
should be regarded as a movement, a part of a
historical process, to be achieved over time, rather
than in any single negotiation. Like the political
liberation movement of the 1940s and the 1950s, the
movement for a new economic order is likely to
dominate the next few decades and cannot be dismissed
casually by the rich nations.
And the importance of trade is again highlighted in a chilling warning by
Haq of the consequences of a future trade war in which the third-world
countries would be frozen out of the markets of the industrial
countries:
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If neither their labor can move across international
frontiers (because of immigration laws) nor the goods
that their labor produces (because of current tariff and
non-tariff restrictions), then there would be no recourse
left but to raise the slogan of international land
reforms.®'^
To this mix is added some interesting facts about U.S. trade. U, S,
exports to the developing world are now greater than the total of its exports
to Japan and Europe; They have tripled over the last five years. The United
States is becoming increasingly reliant on the third world for energy supplies
and raw materials. And third, almost two-fifths of U.S. net investment
O Q
earnings from overseas comes from investments in third-world countries.
These figures and Haq’s comments make the problems of interdependence
loom as large as the promise.
New Directions Legislation and the
Foreign Aid Establishment
As early as the beginning of the 1970s there was a realization in certain
quarters in AID that the institution-building era of the university-to-university
("sisterhood") contracts was nearing its end, and that in place of this
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horizontal relationship a new vertical "problem focus" was necessary, not
unlike the changes suggested by Huntington above. Thus, a university in the
United States would no longer concentrate on building the staff and facilities
of an instituticai in another country; the emphasis instead might be on tropical
agriculture, or hybrid rice, ornonformal education. What was true in this
area of AID was also reflected in decisions taken at the top levels of the
agency.
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In early 1972, John Hannah, Administrator of AID, anticipated
Congressional acticai on foreign assistance programs by reorganizing the
agency to place more emphasis on technical assistance in specific problem
areas and less on country-wide development plans. It was in one sense another
tilt in the see-saw battle between regional bureaus and sector units concerned
with population, agriculture, and education. But it also reflected the larger
changes that were occurring in other arenas at this time. In an internal
document announcing the changes, Hannah noted that in the past decade the
agency had displayed a "strongly directive style of foreign aid" with a "strong
emphasis on foreign policy objectives in specific countries." "But," he noted
somewhat wryly, "times have changed since the early 1960s.
In this document a fundamental change was announced. "We will . . .
attempt increasingly to direct our efforts to finding solutions to problems
common to many countries rather than, as in the past, continue to focus our
endeavors in a nearly exclusive country-by-country approach." Hannah noted
that the U. S. was no longer preeminent in the field of development assistance
and alluded to "the growth of new centers of economic and political power."
To achieve solutions to these common problems, Hannah outlmed two
areas for "redirection";
A more collaborative style of assistance which recognizes
that the people of the developing countries ar'e at the
center of development cooperation programs is the
keystone of this redirected program. , . . Broad
participation by American private groups in the practical
work of development will be an important means to
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facilitate the transfer of American experience and
know-how to people who need and want our help.
[Emphasis in original,]
With respect to the second area, Hannah no doubt had in mind some of the
linkages with universities that he had originally suggested to President
Truman some fourteen years before. But it also had a contemporary meaning:
He saw AID acting more and more as a broker between American private
institutions and institutions in foreign countries, thus forming the link between
domestic and internaticnal problem areas basic to the interdependence
philosophy. And finally, anticipating still later developments, he noted that
”A. I. D, is experimenting with block grants directly to developing countries
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who engage American private groups for agreed upon development work."
It is interesting to note that the statement to Congress made by the Secretary
of State regarding U. S, foreign assistance programs for fiscal year 1979
contained many of these points. The emphasis on commons problems in the
1978 statement is even stronger, however, clearly pointing out that the
many problem areas the United States shares with the third world.
The implementation of Hannah's redirection of AID took a number of
forms. There was a general increase in contracts with private groups to
carry out elements of the programs. Consultant reports such as one on
’’Using a Collaborative Style on Technical Assistance Teams” were solicited,
and eventually regulations for the development of collaborative assistance
programs between U.S. universities and institutions overseas were
established. And the University of Massachusetts undertook some experiments
in collaborative program development.
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”New Directions” legislation mandating a number of these refoims
were first passed by the Congress in 1973, as amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. Among the relevant sections on policy in this act
are;
(1) Bilateral development aid should concentrate
increasingly on sharing American technical expertise
. • . and less on large-scale capital transfers ....
(2) Future United States bilateral support for develop-
ment should focus on critical problems in those
functional sectors which affect the lives of the majority
of the people in the developing countries.
. . .
(3) United States cooperation in development should be
carried out to the maximum extent possible through
the private sector. . . .
(4) United States assistance should be administered in
a collaborative style. . ,
New directions legislation also concentrated on encouraging the participation
of the poor in development projects; on human rights; and on meeting basic
human needs. Capital-intensive projects were increasingly left to multi-
lateral organizations, as were the handling of large grants and loans. In a
sense, these new emphases were not unlike the old pre-cold war emphases
on the smaller scale people-to-people projects. Indeed, at this time under
the influence of E. F. Schumacher and his "small is beautiful” economic
and social theories, the concept of appropriate technology appeared. And
spanning all these ideas was the theory of interdependence, in which a
kaleidoscopic shift in the relationships between international, national and
domestic institutions and between groupings of nations was occurring.
The Universities and International Programs
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As has been noted, this period saw a shift in university participation
in foreign assistance programs from predominantly institution-building
relationships to one which focused on broad problem areas. The 211 (d)
grants (so named because they were created under section 211 [d] of title
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966) were grants to selected universities
to build their capabilities in specific problem areas. Five-year grants
have been made for research into topics in agriculture, health and nutrition,
law, economic development, education, and science and technology, (The
prc^rams outlined in Chapters V and VI were supported in part through a
211 [d] grant to the Center for International Education at the University of
Massachusetts,)
Perhaps the most significant piece of legislation regarding university
participation in development programs during this period was Title XII of
the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, This Act
mariks the resurgent influence of the land-grant universities in the aid
establishment, and provides for long-term federal support for involvement
in technical assistance programs in the area of "agricultural institutional
development and research,” Of special interest is the role it gives in
policy-making to universities, A seven-person Board of International Food
and Agricultural Development" is set up under the act, with responsibility
for planning, implementing, and monitoring the program. At least four of
the seven members of the Board (all of whom are presidential app>ointees)
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must be selected from the university community. This indicates a new
level of responsibility for universities in the foreign assistance field. The
Act also subsumes the collaborative assistance programs mentioned above,
under which long-range research is to be conducted between U.S. universities
and developing country institutions on common food and nutritional problems.
Although implementation of the Act is just now beginn ing^ many of the
old problems between the university and aid establishment have begun anew,
recalling the Stassen era under FOA in the early 1950s. The Chairman of
the Title XII Board recently reported to the Administrator of AID that
. . the Agency still appears to have seme difficulty in viewing Title XII
in the fullest dimensions of its potential and accepting it as an integral part
of the U.S. development assistance pre^ram in the Food and Nutrition area.
This seems to be creatir^ unnecessary problems for the implementation of
Title XII programs.” And, predictably, the "response of Missions to Title
XII tends to be quite cool, ” Clearly, the marriage of the universities to
AID through Title XII is not an entirely happy one. It appears that the re-
lationship may be short-lived in its present form.
On March 29, 1978, President Carter announced the establishment of a
Foundation for International Technological Cooperation as a part of a re-
structuring of foreign aid programs. The foundation appears to resemble that
suggested by John Gardner in his 1964 report, and to have many of the same
functions. The new Foundation would have co-equal status with AID under a
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c3.biH6t-l6vGl a.dniiiiistra.tor» Legislation to set up these new agencies is set
to be presented to Congress in January, 1979.^^
It will be interesting to see if the new structures begin to reflect the
international-domestic linkages required for the management of inter-
dependence issues. It will also be significant whether or not the government
gives priority to laig-term funding to universities and other noi^ovemmental
entities to begin to establish research and project development programs with
institutions in third-world countries on commons problems. If so, it will mark
the transition from the era of foreign aid to that of genuine mutual assistance,
a part of a much larger shift in relationships between segments of the world
community.
American universities have not yet begun in earnest to take advantage of
the opportunities this shift implies. Dante B. Fascall, Chairman of the
International Operations Subcommittee on International Relations has warned
that "the U. S. educational system is woefully deficient in preparing Americans
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to live in a highly interdependent world."
A few voices have been heard, however, in recent years, to suggest just
what those opportunities might be. Wallace B. Edgerton, the President of
the International Institute of Education, has seen a growing opportunity in the
field of educational exchange: "As the number of significant political actors
on the world scene increases, and as the relative dominance of the United
States diminishes, it is entirely possible that the United States' role in
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educational exchange may increase." Ralph Smuckler of Michigan State
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University predicts a commensurate change in university relationships with
third world. In advocating an "institution linkages" approach, he has noted
that:
American university relations are coming out of an era of
tutelage. In many situations, the assistance contract of the
past generation is obsolete. There are now institutions in
countries where such relationships existed which ought to
be approached on the principle of equality and the basis of
long-term, mutual gain.
. , . Institutional linkages permit
full acknowledgement of the principle of mutuality which is
increasingly important in international educational
relations.^®
Summary
The Early Period was a time of learning for the United States in both
foreign affairs in general and foreign assistance in particular. During the
nineteenth century, eclectic ventures by individuals, private organizations,
and semi-official missirms were undertaken in many parts of the world.
During the first half of the twentieth century, these efforts were expanded
and a period of American colonialism ensued, focused on the countries of
Latin America,
During the Middle Period (1939-1969), U.S. foreign assistance efforts
were for the most part organized under a variety of agencies within the
government. Aid increasingly served strategic interests, often through
capital-intensive projects, while people-to-people programs were scmewhat
isolated, particularly in a few successful but limited programs such as the
Fulb right Program and the Peace Corps. In those programs not perceived
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by policy-makers as tactical battles In ideological wars, American universities
played significant roles in assisting educational Institutions in other countries
in their own development.
During the last decade, a period of diversification of power and the
growth of global interdependence, the concept of foreign aid has been under-
going a review by Congress and by critics who see a need for programs with a
focus on joint problem-solving by institutions in the United States in
collaboration with counterpart organizations in other countries. Mutual
assistance has traditionally meant military aid; in the future it is likely to
increasingly enccanpass the pooling of resources by various countries and
by institutions in those countries to solve common problems.
It remains to Senator Fulb right to have the last word on this new
awareness of the relationships between members of the world community,
since he foresaw these developments seme thirty years ago, ",
. . We have
yet to accept and act upon the reality of interdependence for what it is; the
no
challenge and opportunity of our time,"
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE CONCEPT OF
INTERDE PENDENCE
For most of human history, the concept of abun<3ance was at least
theoretically tenable because there was always more land to be discovered,
more game to be hunted, more fish to be caught. That this is no longer the
case we are all too painfully aware. In 1798 Thomas Malthus sounded the
first somber warning regarding the unfortunate relationship between population
and the means of subsistence. Since that time, technology has been used to
extend the carrying capacity of the earth beyond those earlier expectations.
But technology, depending as it does upon our very finite energy supplies, has
its limits as well.
Just as the frontier was important to North Americans, supplying
abundant land, game, and raw materials, so the Americas and Australias
have been important to the earlier settled civilizations. Not only entrepreneurs
but poets have lamented the passing of these possibilities. Harry Edmund
Martinson has written:
Lifted on the winds of camfort by the djinn of speed
more and more humans look down at the ocean of
conquered distance.
And the world will gradually lose its self
when it has taken from itseK
the power of desolate wildness,
and the advanture of desolate wildness.^
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The frontier psychology is deeply imbedded in our behaviors. More is always
better; and when we needed more, it was always there, just beyond the
settlements. The white settlers did not worship nature as did the native
inhabitants of the American West; rather, it was treated as a force to be
tamed, used, and when used up, discarded.
So long as abundant land, game, raw materials, and energy supplies
existed, the problem of limits did not apply. The recognition of limits has
come only very recently, as the range of frontiers has been brought under
intense use. It has only been in the last ten to twenty years, a mere tic in
the history of the human race, that the beginnings of a general awareness of
the extent of the problems of limits has developed. Because of the consequent
scarcity and environmental degredation implied by the competition for
resources, and the dangers of conflicts resulting therefrom, scholars such as
the distinguished economist Robert Heilbroner have forecast some drastic
consequences. In an essay entitled "The Human Prospect, " Heilbroner has
written that "the outlook is for convulsive change—change forced upon us by
external events rather than by conscious choice, by catastrophe rather than
by calculation. As with Malthus’s much derided but all too prescient forecasts,
nature will provide the checks, if foresight and ^morality* do not. " And he
concludes that there is no hope for meeting the "challenges of the future
2
without the payment of a fearful price,
"
Still, although the dangers in the era of limits are undeniably great.
It is perhaps a bit early to calculate a "fearful price" for the survival of the
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human race. During periods of risk, there are often compensatory
opportunities. The end of the availability of abundant natural resources, the
approach of the era of limits, requires that each human community develop
more self-reliance through a careful and balanced relationship to its own
ecosystem;, and moreover, that those lai^er ecosystems which are held in
common by the world's communities must be maintained by the world
community itself. Everyone's long-term self-interest is served through the
development of mechanisms to maintain these systems; the problem lies in
leapfrogging the short-term gains made by exploiting the larger systems.
In addition, once the darker is made clear, that same system of science
which has contributed to the endangerment of the world's ecosystems can be
bent to providing solutions for its maintainance.
The important counter-argument questions why people would give up
personal short-term gains accumulated through the exploitation of resources
close at hand, for the long-term benefit of people they will never know
—
perhaps from a future generation? Indeed, if all we have to rely on is past
evidence, then it would seem that the short-term goals should prevail at the
expense of the larger, more significant concerns.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of these arguments, to
look at recent research in a number of fields that might contribute to an under-
standing of how people might be expected to behave in terms of their interests
in specified circumstances, and to relate these to the issues of collaboration
and interdependence. The more complex a problem is (and there can be no
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doubt that the problem of human behavior on a large scale is extraordinarily
complex), the more important it is that it can be viewed, at least initially,
in its simplest terms. This can be dene by examining the game called
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Cooperation and Conflict
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner’s Dilemma has been studied extensively by Rapoport and
Chamman, and their work"^ on this subject has been used as a basis for a
portion of the following analysis. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game which
derives its name from a story in which two prisoners, recently apprehended,
are separated from each other and each is told that if he confesses, he will
be set free with a reward, while the other goes to prison. They know if
neither confesses, they will both go free but there is a chance that the other
may confess to get the reward, and the one not confessing will then be sent
to prison. If both confess they will of course both be sent to prise®. The
game which derives frean this dilemma contains elements of both cooperation
and conflict.
Rapoport and his associates recruited a large number of undergraduates
at the University of Michigan to play a game which simulates the choices of the
prisoners. Each player is given a set amount of money to start with; each is
told that money will be taken away or added to each player’s accumulation de-
pending upon which combmation of choices is made. They soon find out that by
their mutual choice of a pair of options, each will be rewarded or punished by the
addition or substraction of certain sums of money, Rapoport notes that:
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise
when the interests of the players are partly coincident
and partly opposed, because then one can postulate
not only a conflict among the players but also inner
conflicts within the players. Each is tom between a
tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common
interest, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance
his own individual interests, , , , These conflicts are
fonnalized in game theory as nonzero-sum games,'^
Since the players cannot discuss the choices with each other before or during
the game, they cannot agree openly to cooperate, although they may tacitly
do so by consistently acting in concert.
The matrix below indicated the relative values of the payoffs to the two
players depending on the combination of choices made.
TABLE 1
PRISONER'S DILEMMA PAYOFF MATRIX
C
2
D
2
'
1
R, R S, T
T, s
1
p, p
The letters representing the payoffs are meant to be suggestive.
R stands for reward; it refers to the payoff each of the players
receives as reward for cooperating, _S stands for sucker's pay-
off. This is the payoff received by the player who cooperated
while the other defected. X stands for temptation, the payoff
a player may hope to get if he can defect and get away with it,
P stands for punishment, meted out to both players when
both have defected.
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In order to have the situation defined as Prisoner’s Dilemma
the following inequalities must be satisfied:
In a typical game, the actual payoffs might be as follows (following the
matrix in Table I): Upper left, 1,1; upper right -2,2; lower left, 2,-2; lower
right, -1,-1. According to game theoreticians, the minimax® strategy D is
a rational choice:
Although the outcome Dj^Dq looks bad compared to C^C 2 , it is
argued that the former is the only outcome which is defensible on
rational grounds. In short, it is the only outcome feasible under
the contraints of the game. The fact that it is worse than C^C
2
merely reflects the inability of the two players to communicate.'^
In other words, although the choice of D^is a bad choice, it is the least worse
choice given the fact that communication is not possible. The worst choice
is to the person choosing C when the other player chooses D.
However, the choices DP do not come up as frequently in the trials as
would have been predicted from the ideal strategy, and the investigators give
an interesting explanation of why this occurs:
Evidently the run-of-the-mill players are not strategically
sophisticated enough to have figured out that strategy DP is
the caily rationally defensible strategy, and this intellectual
shortcoming saves them from losing.^
There is another possible explanation, that the players train each other to
cooperate over a laige number of trials simply by repetitive selection of the
C choice.
From the point of view of this study, the most interesting results were
obtained when the payoff matrix was revealed to the players. The investigators
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theorized that the effect of the information about payoffs would actually
inhibit the number of C choices.
We argued that in a trial and error process, the tacit collusion
solution would be sooner or later hit upon and would persist
because of the steady positive payoffs it affords to both players
in contrast to the unilateral states CD and DC
,
which ought to be
unstable (because one of the players loses the largest amount in
each of them), and in contrast to the DD state, which is punishing.
When the matrix is displayed, however, so our argument went,
the dominance of the defecting strategy is a constant inhibitor
against cooperating. One always is subjected to the temptation
of defecting from CC to get the bigger payoff T, and one is afraid
to leaver for fear of getting S, It would be better for cooperation,
we thought, if these brutal facts were not explicitly before the
subjects* eyes.
The results turned out to be exactly the opposite. The
amount of cooperation observed in the Pure No Matrix Condition
is just about one half the amount observed in the Pure Matrix
condition, ^
Let us recapitulate the conditions of the game and some of the observed
outcomes. The players operate under constraiuts that apply equally to both.
These constraints can lead to a game outcome of either a prevalence of
cooperation, which yields a small reward, or conflict and exploitation,
which may yield larger rewards for the exploiter, at least to the extent that
he is successful in manipulating his oppcaient. The condition of exploitation
causes a proportionally greater loss for the exploited player as the gain for
the exploiter. The result may also be indefinite, with cooperation and
exploitation appearing randomly, although this has not been the case in most
experimental trials. And further, when the players understand the reward
and punishment structure of the game (when the matrix is revealed)o the
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level of cooperative play increases. Conversely, the less joint infomiation
available about the structure of the game, the less chance there is for
cooperation, although it is still higher than game theory would predict.
In later discussions of the implications of Prisoner’s Dilemma in other
areas, it will be important to remember the equality of the players in this
game. Each is rewarded or punished by the same matrix, by the same
rules, under the same conditicsis. If both cooperate, player A is rewarded with
one point as is player the real world is much more complicated. Sometimes
player is rewarded with two points for cooperation, player^with but one;
sometimes not at all. Further, unfortunately the matrix of rewards and
punishments is not always so clear as it is hereo Sometimes no one knows
exactly what the rewards or punishments for a cooperative or conflictive
course of action will be.
It is interesting to speculate on these matters. For example, if player
A is rewarded twice as highly as for cooperation, how long would B
continue to choose a cooperative mode of play? Certainly B’s incentive to
cooperate would be much reduced, and the tendency toward a conflictive mode
of play would proporticaiately increase.
In any event. Prisoner’s Dilemma provides a model by which we can
examine cooperative and conflictive or exploitive behavior, within the strict
limits of the reward schedule explained above. In the discussion to follow,
other areas will be found to have some of the same characteristics found in
Prisoner’s Dilemma,
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Reciprocity and Altruism
Reciprocity can be defined as a mutual helping relationship in which each
partner has both rights and duties. Sociologists distinguish this from cample^
mentarity, in which one partner's rights are another’s duties. Gouldner
(1960) has presumed that reciprocity is a basic norm of human societies:
Contrary to some cultural relativists, it can be hypothesized that a noim of
reciprocity is universal. ” Gouldner functionally defines reciprocity, in its
universal fonn, as having two related parts:
(1) people should help those who have helped them, and
(2) people should not injure those who have helped them,
Generically, the norm of reciprocity may be conceived
of as a dimension to be found in all value systems and, in
particular, as one among a number of "Principal Components"
universally present in moral codes.
The norm is however conditional upon such factors as the imputed values
assigned to benefits received, the status of the participants, the variable of
time, and other interests of participants which may be opposed to the con-
summation of a reciprocal relationship. The imputation of a universal notion
of reciprocity is a difficulty; on the other hand, it can be said with confidence
that such a norm is widespread among human societies.
There is one major circumstance that predisposes against reciprocal
relationships. This occurs, of course, in instances "when power disparities
12
allow one party to coerce the other." In such circumstances "the situation
is then ripe for the breakdown of reciprocity and for the development of
13
system -disrupting exploitation." However, in Gouldner's view, there is a
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reinforcing relationship between system stability and reciprocity:
The norm thus safeguards powerful people against the temptations
of their own status; it motivates and regulates reciprocity as an
exchange pattern, serving to inhibit the emergence of exploitative
relations which would undermine the social system and the very
power arrangements which had made exploitation possible,
Reciprocity, a form of cooperative relationship, is tlius seen as both a
consequence of and contributor to stability of social systems and a mitigating
influence on the development of coercive relationships.
Supporting evidence for these hypotheses are to be found in Rapoport’s
study of Prisoner's Dilemma, in which he notes that "the study of interaction
effects indicates that these effects are very strong. They tend to make the
members of a pair behave lil^e each other, And although the pair tends
most often toward the extremes of cooperation or attempts at mutual
exploitation, there is a tendency toward cooperation, especially when the
matrix is revealed, that is to say when the players can understand more
immediately the rewards of cooperation.
Studies in the field of sociobiology are also of interest in analyzing the
relationship between cooperation and conflict in social situations. Harvard
researcher Robert Trlvers has written of these issues from the point of view of
what he calls reciprocal altruism. From studies of wrasse (cleaner fish),
groupers, birds, and humans, Trivers argues that:
certain classes of behavior conveniently denoted as ’altruistic*
(or ’reciprocally altruistic') can be selected for even when the
recipient is so distantly related to the organism performing the
altruistic act that kin selection can be ruled out, . . .
79
It will be ai^ued that under certain conditions natural selection
favors these altruistic behaviors because in the long run they
benefit the organism performing them,^®
What interests biologists about seemingly altruistic acts is that they should be
self-extinguishing; that is, the animals practicing altruism should be put at
a genetic disadvantage with respect to those which exploit or do not practice
altruistic acts.
T rivers defines an "altruistic situation" as "any in which one individual
can dispense a benefit to a second greater than the cost of the act to himself.
He identifies three factors as promoting altruistic situations: (1) When such
situations reoccur; (2) When interactions occur among the same group of
individuals; and (3) when the rewards of such acts tend to be symmetrical,
of roughly equal benefit to each of the pairs.
Trivers then points out that "the relaticaaship between two individuals
repeatedly exposed to symmetrical reciprocal situations is exactly analogous
18
to what game theorists call the Priscaier's Dilemma. ..." Trivers gives
slightly different dimensicais to the matrix (see Table 2). For "cooperating"
and "defecting," he substitutes A-^ and A2 , which stand for the altruistic
choices available for the two individuals, and and C 2 , for the
"cheating
choices," or the failure, either total or partial, for one of the persons to
reciprocate an altruistic act. Trivers notes that the more interactions in a
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TABLE 2
RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM MATRIX
A
2
C
2
A
1
C
1
R, R
I
s, T
j
T, S
i
1
1
P, P
1
given situation the more likelihood there is that altruism will spread, or, as
he puts it, "the barrier to the spread of altruism is weak if n is large.
This point is important in discussing interdependence situations (or "regimes,"
as they are called by political scientists); here the number of interactions (or
n*s) is much higher by definition,
"Cheating" in situations of reciprocal altruism gives an immediate pay-
off as does defecting in Prisoner's Dilemma, but it is likely to be a momentaiy
advantage only, for a "cheater" in human society is soon ostracized. It should
be pointed out, of course, that in the situation of reciprocal altruism, a
greater time difference obtains than in the game situation, but the consequences
are generally the same,
T rivers briefly explores the possibility of more complex situations
involving reciprocal altruism. He notes that:
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Multiparty altruistic systems increase by several-fold the
ccgnitive difficulties in detecting imbalances and deciding
whether they are due to cheating or to random factors. One
simplifying possibility that language facilitates is the
formulaticn of rules of conduct, cheating being detected as
infraction of such a rule, hi short, selection may favor the
elaboration of norms of reciprocal conduct,
So far we have examined the ccaisequences of cooperative versus
conflictive or exploitive behavior primarily involving pairs of individuals.
Edward O, Wilson, in a recent work, has speculated from the theory of
reciprocal altruism to consider the ramifications of this concept cai larger
social units. To do this, he distinguishes between two types of altruism,
which he terms "hard-core” and "soft-core." The former is entirely without
a reward and likely to have evolved throi^h kin selection, serving the
altruist^s closest relatives and declining in frequency as kin relationships
become distant,
"Soft-core" altruism, in contrast, is ultimately selfish.
The "altruist " expects reciprocation frcan society for
himself or his closest relatives. His good behavior is
calculating, often in a wholly conscious way, and his
maneuvers are orchestrated by the excruciatingly intricate
sanctions and demands of society. The capacity for soft-
core altruism can be expected to have evolved primarily
by selection of individuals and to be deeply influenced by
the vagaries of cultural evolution.
Hard-core altruism, Wilson believes, is the "enemy of civilization;" if
humans possess more hard- than soft-core altruism, then the most enlightened
policies in the international arena are doomed to failure, since behavior
will be based primarily on the interests of kin groups. "International
cooperation will approach an upper limit, from which it will be knocked down
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by the perturbations of war and economic struggle, canceling each upward
surge based on pure reason.'* Returning to the matrix in Table II, hard-
core altruism would aUow the choice of A^A2 only in cases involving kinship.
Citing sociological research which indicates that when faced with the competing
influences of race, class, and ethnic membership, the individual chooses
whichever course of action, of identification, which will maximize his own
^eIf-interest, Wilson concludes:
My own estimate of the relative proportions of hard-core and
soft-core altruism in human behavior is optimistic. Human
beings appear to be sufficiently selfish and calculating to be
capable of indefinitely great harmony and social homeostasis.
This statement is not self-contradictory. True selfishness,
if obedient to the other constraints of mammalian biology, is
the key to a more nearly perfect social contract.
In this respect there is a community of viewpoint here with the biologist
Garrett Hardin who has formulated what he calls the Cardinal Rule of Policy:
Never ask a person to act against his own self-interest. He has delimited this
"rule," however, in the same way as Wilson:
Adhering to the Cardinal Rule, we must never ask men to act
as individual altruists; but we can appeal to them to adopt a
sort of second-order altruism and act together to create laws
that put an end to destructive modes of egoistic action. More
exactly, if it can be demonstrated that the long-term effects of
actions are deleterious we may be able to persuade people to
forego short-teim gains for the sake of the long-teim.^^
Certainly caie of the tentative outcomes of these analyses of cooperation
and conflict is to predict that in certain circumstances, individual self-interest
can be—indeed must be—compatible with the interest of others. What makes
this significant is that this occurs when there is sufficient understanding of
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these circumstances (when the matrix is displayed) for the participants to
grasp that individual short-tenn interest must be foregone for the interest
of the group over the longer term. Another very significant point is that
these circumstances are not, in game theory teims, zero-sum games. These
"I-win-you-lose" scenarios cannot by definition be cooperative. Second,
perceived equality of rewards and punishments is probably required as a
pre- requisite to cooperation. Third, coercion is a consequence of unequal
power relationships and tends to undermine cooperation. Fourth, reciprocal
cooperative relationships tend to contribute to system stability. Fifth—
and this point is similar to the first—cooperative relationships will be most
likely in those situations in which the participants understand that there is
both gain to be had from such cooperation and penalties for non-cooperation.
This may seem an obvious point, but it requires that "cheating" or non-
cooperation in the guise of cooperation be controlled, and it means that not
all situations will foster cooperative behaviors. And finally, it appears that
reciprocal, cooperative behavior is widespread throughout human societies,
and that it is fundamental to the establishment of linkages both within and
between groups.
Since the world has not seemed a haven for cooperative, altruistic,
reciprocal relationships during all of its recorded history, what has gone
wrong? Clearly the conditions for these behaviors have not been dominant
at many points in time and place. In many, perhaps most, situations, one
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group has dominated another; rewards and punishments for cooperation among
various interacting groups have not tended toward equality; exploitation rather
than cooperation has seemed more rewarding to the strong in relationships
with weaker parties; there has been considerable "cheatir^, ” or situations
in which one party has claimed cooperative ties while in fact developing
conflictive or exploitive modes of operation.
Certainly dominance, conflict, explitation and cooperation have all been
characteristic of human interactions at different times in different places and
can therefore be presumed to take place in varying ratios in response to
charging circumstances. The following describes a specific set of circumstances
under which the outcomes of cooperation and conflict are clarified.
The Tragedy of the Commons
What happens when the apparently infinite resources of land, air, water,
and raw materials beccane limited? Hardin has analyzed this question in his
study of the ecology of the commons. Under pioneer conditions, when a
seemingly inexhaustible supply of land and wild animals are available, the
taking of these abundant resources poses no apparent problem. No doubt the
abundance of these resources made immigration to the United States attractive
to Europeans and others for whom land and game was in growing short supply
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The reverence for these
unenclosed lands is vividly reflected in the literature of that period, for
example, in Cooper's Leatherstocking Tales.
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Hardin analyzes the opposite condition by examining the situation in
a commons that has a carrying capacity of 100 head of cattle, the cattle owned
by different individuals, and the limits of the carrying capacity having been
reached. How are the interests of the herdsmen best served?
As a rational being each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain,
explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks:
"What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?"
This utility has two components:
1, A positive component, vhich is a function of the increment of
one animal. Since the herdsman receives all proceeds from the
sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2, A negative component, which is a function of the additional
overgrazing created by one more animal. But since the effects
of overgrazing are shared by all herdsmen, the negative utility
for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction
of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and
another, , . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Each man is locked in to
a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit, , ,
in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all .^"^ Emphasis in original.
The consequences of individual gain is communal loss. The extent of the
loss varies with circumstances, but should the ecostructure suffer sufficient
damage, total loss cai result, as in the case when the land is completely
ruined.
It has been pointed out by another writer that the tragedy of the commons
"resembles that of the famous prisoner's dilemma,"
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Here, as there, it would be in the interest of all players to
maximize their joint utility. But to each individual player,
game theory attributes an optimal strategy which consists of
convincing the other player—or players-
-to act so as to
maximize their joint utility, while he himself obtains a
special advantage by acting differently,
Here an important conclusion can be tentatively drawn. In a pioneer
world, with expanding or balanced frontiers and resources, the prisoner's
dilemma (which we might name as the modem dilemma) does not obtain.
In the American West, for example, early hunters were in sufficient balance
with the other natural systems so that the killing of buffalo did not threaten
the entire herd. One person's killing of an animal did not threaten another's
food supply. But when expanding population and the taking of land threatened
the range and numbers of the herd, as occurred when the West was opened
for settlement, the "tragedy of the commcais" developed, and the herd was
virtually destroyed. It appears, therefore, that the dilemma we have
discussed in its various fonns is a typically modem phenomenon, although
it is entirely possible that it has occurred in limited and isolated fashion in
the past. And, as Hardin cautions, "we shall pay dearly if we try to live in
the world as it is now by a morality appropriate only to the pioneer condition."
The contemporary world, then, is one in which certain conditions have
changed substantially over the past two or three hundred years. The preceeding
analyses suggest that the new conditions under which we are all living require
equally new concepts about how groups of individuals will have to negotiate,
maintain, and align their relationships.
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One problem in developing this analysis is that a generalization from
individual behavior— in prisoner's dilemma and in much of the discussion of
altruistic behavior—to group behavior has been made. We have no proof that
group behavior will reflect the individual behaviors cited here. All that can
be said is that it is likely that groups will try to maintain many of the same
conditions that individuals do—security, well-being, safety, self-esteem, and
so on. Philosophers from Hobbes to Lewis Thomas have maintained that a
close relationship exists between individual and group action although the extent
to which this is true is speculative.
So far we have examined the problem of cooperative, conflictive, and
exploitive behavior from models in the fields of psychology, biology,
sociobiology and ecology. The next step is to look at these aspects of behavior
from the standpoint of contemporary political science.
The Nature of Interdependence
To begin, a summary of the points made earlier regarding cooperative and
conflictive behavior in the matrix conditions of Prisoner's Dilemma will be
needed to determine if these b haviors are also to be found under interdependence
conditions.
1. Self-interest can be compatible with the interests of others; reciprocal
behavior develops under favorable conditions and tends toward system stability.
Conversely, conflictive or exploitive behavior tends to destablize systems.
2, Cooperative behavior tends to develop wiien the system of rewards
and punishments are applied equally to all parties.
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3. Coercion is a consequence of unequal power relationships and is
unstable,
4. For cooperative relationships to develop, all parties must understand
the rewards and punishment system; the basis of the system needs widespread
dissemination and consequences of taking various forms of actions must be
predictable,
5, Penalties for cheating, or for noncooperation, must be enforceable;
otherwise, there will be an advantage to noncooperative behavior,
6, The Prisoner's Dilemma matrix applies only to situations in which
the participants have a joint interest in a common enterprise.
Definitions of Interdependence
Keohane and Nye, in their recent book Power and Interdependence
,
flatly
state in the opening sentence of their study that ’\ve live in an era of inter-
dependence,"^'^ They define interdependence as ^toutual dependence. Inter-
dependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal
effects among countries or among actors in different countries," They
also state that "we do not limit the term interdependence to situations of mutual
benefit," In terms of the miitrix that has been examined here, unequal inter-
dependence would occur where the benefits of R are unequal.
The authors note that purely symmetrical interdependence seldom exists
in the real world, and that purely dependent relationships are also rare. They
note further that there are both costs and benefits to most Interdependence
situations.
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They contrast interdependence theory with that of realpolitik, the
latter akin to the strategic approach discussed in Chapter II,
Traditionally, classical theories of world politics have portrayed
a potential ’’state of war” in which states’ behavior was dominated
by the ccaistant danger of military conflict. During the Cold War,
especially the first decade after World War II, this conception,
labeled ’’political realism” by its proponents, became widely
accepted by students and practitioners of international relations
in Europe and the United States, During the I960*s, many other-
wise keen observers who accept realist approaches were slow
to perceive the development of new issues that did not center on
military- security concerns. The same dominant image in the
late 1970s and 1980s would be likely to lead to even more un-
realistic expectations,
In contrast to the dominant political analyses of the 1950s and 1960s, wiiich
placed emphasis upon military power as the preeminent factor in controlling
relations among states, Keohane and Nye outline the development of ’’complex
interdependence” which has three primary characteristics:
1, The interconnection of societies through multiple channels, including
formal government offices, transnational organizations, international organiza-
tions, private professional groups, exchange programs, and the like,
2, The existence of shifting agenda among and between nations, so that
one issue does not dominate relationships. Domestic and foreign issues
intermix, and ’’different issues generate different coalitions, both within
governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict,”
3, Military force does not dominate relations between states.
The authors note that ”our three conditions are fairly well approximated
on some global issues of economic and ecological interdependence and , , ,
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they come close to characterizing the entire relationship between some
countries. They also note that conditions of interdependence do not exist
between states at all times and under all conditions; interdependence is a
condition of interstate relations which exists only with in the specific para-
meters listed above. However, they note that a strong argument could be made
Vthat complex interdependence will increasingly characterize world politics,
because each of the three conditions of complex interdependence corresponds
to a long-term historical change with deep causes of its own."^^
An Intergroup Behavior Matrix
Let us now examine a matrix which displays the consequences of the two
extremes of inteigroup behavior (Table 3),
TABLE 3
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR MATRIX
CP2 CN^
1
j
R, R
!
2
1
S, T
3
T, S
4 ;
P, P
1
i
!
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Here, and CP^ stand for cooperative choices available to the two groups,
and CN^ and CN^ stand for coercion and confrontation choices. As in the
original Prisoner»s Dilemma matrix, we will consider S<P<R<Tasa
starting point. Why is the reward schedule S/. P< R< T appropriate for
considering intergroup behavior? For the same reason it is for studying
individual relationships—there is the potential for conflict as well as for
cooperation inherent in the structure. As Rapoport notes in introducing the
schedule, ’ each player is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to
promote the common interest, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance
his own individual interests. This describes a dilemma central to
contemporary international relations as well, especially under conditions
where there are ’’commons” interests, as in trade, problems of pollution,
use of finite raw materials supplies such as oil, ocean fishing, seabed
mining, etc.
There are at least four differences between game rules in Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the conditions accompanying intergroup behavior. First, the
positions CP and CN are not alternate choices but the opposite ends of a
ccaatinuum: Real world choices usually fall somewhere between these two
extremes. Hence the Intergroup Behavior Matrix illustrates only the extreme
choices and their consequences. (The same criticism could be made of
Prisoner's Dilemma; the usefulness of these models lies in isolating the
consequences of discrete behavior.) Second, real-world groups can explicitly
agree to cooperate; in Prisoner's Dilemma, this is ruled illegal. Third,
force can be used to impose an S result on a weaker group (this is sometimes
termed colonialism); again, this is not allowed under the rules of Prisoner's
Dilemma. And fourth, to complicate matters further, the reward schedules
are sometimes different for different groups operating in the same world.
Geoffrey Barraclough has remarked that "there are large powers and small
powers, and one code of conduct for the large and another for the small, in
politics as well as in economics. And that, I suspect, is what the demand for
a new international order is all about. These codes of conduct are often
imposed and provide inequitable rewards and punishments to different groups.
What are the conditions under which CP/CP choices are most likely to
be selected?
1. When Rj^, are roughly equal or are perceived to confer net
benefits to both groups.
2. When R for both groups is higher than S and P.
3. When neither group has sufficient coercive power to force a payoff
in blocks 2 or 3.
4. When the rewards and punishments schedule, and the consequences
of different behavior choices, are understood by both parties.
5. When penalities for "cheating," in this situation meaning the choice
of CN, are enforceable.
The choices CN/CP are likely to occur \\hen one group can force the
other (or, perhaps, trick the other) into accepting the penalty S. CN/CN
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choices will occur in situations in which the reward and/or power balance
systems are unclear, and the CN choices will tend to be self-extinguishing
(although not undamaging), returning to CP/CP or CN/CP, because CN/CN
choices have no rewards for either group.
It should be pointed out that a reinforcement schedule of this kind relates
only to groups that have active common interests in shared systems
—
conditions which have only recently, perhaps within the last two-to-three
hundred years, begun to predominate.
What types of intergroup behaviors would result from the choices
available in Table III? In box 1, choices CP/CP would lead to joint agree-
ments, for example in the areas of free trade, ocean fishLug, limitations on
pollution, and to collaborative programs toward the solution of common
problems. Interdependence conditions, where one group does not dominate
or control another, where there is a balance of mutual interests and capa-
bilities, must prevail.
In boxes 2 and 3, CN/CP is the condition of exploitation and control of
one group by another, to the benefit of one and the deprivation of the other.
This is the expected outcome where force can successfully be applied so that
S will be extracted to the benefit T of the stronger group.
Box 4 CN/CN choices indicate a state of hostility, where either the
alternative R is not understood as a clear choice, or CN/CN is the result of
the unstable CN/CP, or irrational choices are made. Irrational choices
would be the selection of punishment P over the reward R, CN/CN does not
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necessarily mean a fighting conflict; it can also indicate a trade war or the
mutual destruction of a commons.
’’Real world" examples of box 1 behaviors are those in which agreement
to cooperate results in international conventions, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the Law of the Sea Convention (now
being debated under UN auspices); and the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
(SALT), a bilateral example. The importance of controlling "cheating" by one
or another party is apparent.
The conditions that allow for Box 1 behaviors are basically those
outlined in the operational definitions of complex interdependence. CN
choices are possible where unequal force can be applied by one group, or
where R-.?^R
,
the rewards of cooperation being inequitable. In this case
Rj^?^R2 may be unstable and lead to CN/CP and then, possibly, to CN/CN.
Force can even be applied in commons situations. In England, commons
lands were gradually enclosed from the twelfth to the eighteenth century,
forcing tenants off the land and eventually into the growing cities, to the
benefit of large landowners and later to factory owners with a need for a large
labor pool. The former farmers of the lost commons could only complain:
They clap in gaol the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common;
But let the bigger knave go loose
Who steals the common from the goose.
The literature of contemporary political science confirms some of the
speculations arising from the Intergroup Behavior Matrix and from studies
cai reciprocity, altruism, and commons situations. Let us next examine
some of that literature.
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Analyses of Interdependence
In reviewing contemporary analyses of interdependence, areas in vdiich
there is both agreement and disagreonent with the conclusions of the previous
section will be discussed. It is helpful to remember that the nation-state
has had a relatively short existence in human history, made possible by
revolutions in communication and transportation; and the interdependence
factors discussed here may be symptoms of changes in the nation-state
structure. This is especially true because of the limits to the importance
of military power in the contemporary world.
Harold Brown sees the need for a redefined concept of national security:
"In a world that is not only ecologically interdependent but economically and
politically interdependent as well, the concept of ’’national’ security is no
longer adequate. Individual countries must respond to global crises because
national governments are still the principal decision-makers, but many threats
to security require a coordinated international response." Stanley Hoffman
sees the possibility for a world order in which violence and economic dis-
ruptions are controlled, economic justice attained, and processes for the
settlement of disputes devised. This requires "a dense web of ties signifying
the prevalence of mixed interests over adversary relationships and a code of
37
behavior corresponding to a minimum of common values. " Miriam Camps
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notes that "mounting pressure on the earth’s resources and on the biosphere
and a growing recognition that we are approaching seme absolute limits, as in
the capacity of the atmosphere and the oceans to absorb some types of
38
pollution, have also created an awareness of a new kind of interdependence."
It is the growing "web of ties" connecting the interests of many national
groups which is creating an "awareness of a new kind of interdependence.
Interdependence does not exist because it is good or bad, an improvement or
deterioration over past systems; it exists because of changes in the political
and eccmomic structures connecting intemational groups. Returning to Table
III, it is this net of interrelationships which makes the choices CP/CP more
likely. The denser the web connecting groups, the less likely force can be
used to impose CP/CN choices. This is especially true when smaller groups
form coalitions to improve their bargaining positions.
"Commons" problems also limit the efficacy of force. Intemational
agreements, not armies, are required to halt the spread of air
and ocean
pollution. This also tends to reinforce the CP/CP choices. But Barbara
Ward has pointed to a glaring flaw in the capability of nations
to handle
their attempts at cooperation:
The greatest instituticaial gap in our world is created
by an
inescapable, planetary, interdependence which breeds
common
grievances and creates common needs and
opportunities, ye
is matched by virtually no instruments of
worldwide order and
weliare.^^
97
Both Hoffman and Camps also consider this issue. Hoffinan notes that "the
best chances for world order lie in the kind of pluralism that makes others
share actively in the management, benefits, and burdens of international
agreements or regimes and that allows us to accept their greater share
precisely because they too will have a stake in preserving that order.
And Camps is more sanguine about the possibility of international institutions
making a significant contribution:
. . .Institutions can be something more than mere modalities.
Codes, r^imes, the habit of regular consultation can constrain
governments and spell the difference between order and chaos.
The framework within which the interactions of governments
occur affects the nature of the interaction. Strongly staffed,
used imaginatively, and taken seriously, organizations can
nudge governments into acticns that would not otherwise be
taken. There frequently is a common interest that is different
from the sum of competing national interests.
In terms of our analysis, the common interest is R, the competing national
interests are T. Also from the matrix analysis, we can conclude that these
international entities must perform a role in addition to encouraging govern-
ments into action that will perhaps be taken in any event in their own self-
interest. This additional role is in monitoring agreements to prevent
42
"cheating,” to "diminish incentives for free-rider strategies," as Keohane
and Nye put it. Keohane and Nye believe, however, that "if bargains between
rich and poor are struck, they will have to be largely self-enforcing. Other
forms of enforcement will rarely be available or desirable. However, we
know from the study of the Inteigroup Behavior Matrix that self-enforcement
only has a chance to work when the participants are of approximately equal
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strength, certainly not the case between rich and poor countries. It is there-
fore likely that for the foreseeable future such agreements will cnly work when
there is reasonably impartial monitoring by a third group, probably an inter-
national organization.
We also know from the matrix analysis that when R=R, cooperative
agreements are encouraged; when R?^R, they are discouraged. Keohane and Nye
^ak directly to this issue;
If international regimes involving these poor states are to
become legitimate, industrialized countries must be willing
to transfer significant real resources, while allowing these
countries the freedom to make internal social and economic
changes. The Ladustrialized countries, in turn, will need to
be convinced that concessions lead to more than escalated
demands, and that the practical arrangements for regulating the
world economy will be workable and fairly efficient. The
negotiation process must hold out an attractive vision of the
distant future (to keep both parties in the game); it also must
provide, from time to time, specific payoffs that can be pointed
to as evidence that the system works. Both sides will require
these payoffs, althoi^h for the poorer states they may be
principally material, whereas for the wealthy ones, improvements
in the political climate may be more important.
This argument supports the contention that the condition R=Rmust prevail
for agreements to hold, while adding the point that although the rewards for
cooperation must have equal value for the participants, they may be sub-
stantively different.
Nowhere is this argument better illustrated than in the debate over trade
versus aid. Foreign aid, especially capital assistance and high-interest
loans, have recently come under criticism from both the third-world and
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the industrialized countries. Coming in for special attack is the policy of
many industrialized countries to import raw materials untaxed from third-
world countries, while taxing the import of manufactured goods. At the same
time, these same industrialized countries transfer considerable funds to
developing countries in the form of foreign aid. Robert Wesson of Stanford
points out that ’to make substantial handouts while discouraging people trying
to help themselves seems illogical and hypocritical.”^^ In a recent speech
delivered at Howard University, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania makes
the same point. He first notes that ’’the political demand for freedom leads to
a separation of the colonized and the colonizer. But economically, the
situation is very different; our nations are locked together. He then notes
that the current economic system promotes a situation in which the rich gets
richer and the poor poorer, and suggests that the only answer to the problem
is a transformation of the old economic order. In so doing he specifically
rejects aid as a primary method of redressing the balance: ’’And in any case
the whole idea of aid is wrong because it is both Ineffective in dealing with
the problem of poverty, and humiliating to the receiver. Within Nations we
no longer think it proper to deal with the problem of poverty through the
personal charity of the rich. His argument leads him to note that unless
the new economic order is voluntarily subscribed to, there will inevitably be
heightened cooperation among the poor wiiich could lead to a ”Trade Union of
the Poor, acting in combination against the rich. . o .” He concludes that
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’’confrontation is not a desired strategy of the weak; but if reason, justice,
and dialogue all fail to win the war against world poverty, then economic
conflict is bound to follow.
This result is not unexpected from the earlier analysis, when it was
judged that a high reward inequality will lead to 1) a higher probability of CN
choices by the group receiving the smaller reward, and 2) the need for the
weaker party to strengthen itself to prevent R?^R (which is essential in a
CN forced choice), in this case through a "trade unim of the poor. ’’ Hoffman
sees the strengthening of each group's position as mutually beneficial: "Each
actor ought to take internal measures to reduce his vulnerabilities and to
reinforce areas of genuine autonomy .... For only actors who do not feel
threatened by the many insecurities I have described will be able to cooperate
effectively, i. e.
,
in such a way that their compacts will be lasting, because
their transactions will be fair.
Conclusions
That the analyses of interdependence theorists follow in general similar
results as those derived frcm the Inteigroup Behavior Matrix should not be
particularly surprising, since both are describing the preconditions and re-
quirements for cooperative behavior. However, reference to the analysis does
help to clarify certain features of intergx) up behavior. It is clear, now, why
cooperative enterprises require groups of equal strength, equitable rewards
for both parties, and guarantees against cheatir^. The matrix also assists in
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an understanding of why noncooperative, coercive or conflictive behavior is
less likely under conditions of interdependence. It further points to the
increasingly important role of international institutions in monitoring various
kinds of transnational agreements. By extension, it also emphasizes the
importance of disseminating information about the consequences of various
types of intergroup or international behavior: Those who do not understand
the consequences of coercive behavior or of the exploitation of commons
environments will not necessarily act in their own best interests, hi other
words, "second-order" altruism can be promoted.
Further, universities and other research oiganizations should be working
with other universities in various parts of the world on "commons" problems
—
issues in the environment, use of raw materials, the seas, free trade and
other economic issues—toward solutions that will assist groups in more than
one part of the world. Such research will provide data necessary to informed
decisicai-making about commons and interdependence issues, while at the same
time forming a part of the interdependence net which is required to promote
cooperative choices.
Universities and other private and government organization have a
responsibility to promote the development of collaborative programs between
groups with common concerns and common interests
—
programs that will
lead to results that may be utilized by more than one of the participating
groups. These programs must, however, focus on issues which are
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genuinely common to the participating groups. At the least, such collaborative
programs should promote differential but equally valuable rewards for all
involved groups.
As the domestic economies and politics of different international groups
become increasingly interlinked, the universities have an obligation to prepare
students, teachers, and researchers to learn to survive in a different kind of
world—one in which the nation-state will increasingly depend on mechanisms
other than war to improve the quality of life for its people.
The medieval universities of Europe and the Middle East were inter-
national in character. As we approach a time of increasing interchange of
domestic and international issues across more permeable national boundaries,
today's national universities must assume international roles if they wish
best to serve their own societies. Bertil Ostergren, Chairman of the Swedish
Committee for Inte mationaliz ir^ University Educaticai, has put the matter
well; ”An internaticxial dimension should be introduced in all studies; all
students will, on one way or another, became participants in international
developments. And the international dimensioi will, furthermore, make
50them better qualified to solve purely domestic problems. "
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CHAPTER IV
COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMS AT THE CENTER
FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
Three programs will be studied in the following two chapters. The
first, the Ghana Program in Nonfoimal Education, will be studied in depth.
Nonform al Education Programs in Ecuador and Thailand will be analyzed
for comparison purposes, to shed additional light on the development on
nonfoimal education programs at the Center for International Education.
These three pregrams represent an unusually wide range of approaches and
philosophies to emanate from one organization.
The Case Study of the Ghana Nonfoimal Education Project is
presented in Chapter V; Synopses of the Thailand and Ecuador Project in
Chapter VI. Since these projects were all developed through the Center for
Inteinational Education at the University of Massachusetts, in cooperation
with institutions in the host countries, a study of the Center, its philosophy
and constituency, is presented as an introduction to the three projects, at
the end of this chapter.
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Issues in Collaborative Program Development
These three prc^rams operated on three continents. The Ecuador
Nonfoimal Education Program was the first of the three programs to be
initiated and was, in fact, the first nonfoimal education program undertaken
by the Center, It operated from 1971-1976, the first four years under a
contract from AID; the final year under contract from the Mmistiy of
Education of the Government of Ecuador. The Ghana Nonformal Education
program operated in the Eastern Region of Ghana from 1976-1978, with
major funding provided under an AID Institutional Support Grant. The
Nonfoimal Education Program in Thailand was initiated in 1977 and elements
of the premium are continuing. The Thailand program was funded from a
second AID grant.
The sequencing of these programs has significance, in that they
represent, to a limited degree, certain conceptual pre^ressions which are
at least interesting; and, while they have been quite naturally highly affected
by both the local circumstances characterized by the arenas in which they
operated, and their associations with the organizations which provided their
direction and support, the characters of these programs reflect larger
changes in international cooperative relationships, as well as the limited
but pervasive influence of the Center for International Education,
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In Chapter III it was ai^ed that the contemporary literature of
political science suggests that political and economic interdependence among
nations is increasing as various types of international interconnectedness
is accelerating— such factors as ccmmunications, trade, transportaticai,
education, and the like are estimated to be doubling across national boundaries
every ten years. This is bound to effect traditional aid programs and
relations between national subentities acting on the international level.
It has also been argued by others that collaborative pregrams
represent nothing new, except for the label; that such programs began,
involving U. S. institutions of higher education acting on the international
level, as far back as the late nineteenth century; and that programs labeled
"collaborative” today are really warmed-over technical assistance pregrams.
There is an element of truth to this assertion, and there is always the
danger of reinvention of the wheel, slightly modified, re-patented, and sold
under a new label. Staff members involved in initiating these kinds of
programs at the Center can attest to the initial suspicion such programs
meet as they are presented to potential cooperation institutions. Skeptics
assert that, at best, these pregrams are the old benign paternalism operating
under a brightly redesigned label; at worst, a sinister form of neo-colonialism
that doesn’t have the decency to present itself under its true colors. These
are serious charges and must be dispelled if we are to take collaborative
programs seriously.
110
The purpose of analyzing these programs, in conjunction with the
historical study of U.S. international assistance programs studied in
Chapter II, is to detennine whether, in fact, international collaborative
programs may have significant differences from past programming efforts
and whether these prc^rams differ in intention, structure, and effects. If
this is true, then these programs may represent an illustration of adaptive
behavior on the part of American institutions of higher education in an
attempt to come to terms with the kind of changed international climate
which has been discussed in Chapter III.
It is intended that the descriptions and analyses of these programs
lead to certain (restricted) generalizations regarding the nature and effects
of these programs on the involved institutions and participants. Observations
will then be made on the degree to which these conditions relate to those
which would be expected under the ’’interdependence” regimes described in
Chapters II and III.
There is a second purpose in studying these three programs. They
may be regarded as transition programs, having some characteristics of the
older technical assistance programs as well as newer .characteristics. The
intention of programmers to develop a new generation of formal relationships
has not always led to the degree of structural change necessary to bring such
programs into existence. In a comparative study of this type, it may be
possible to more sharply define both the structural characteristics of
Ill
collaborative programs as well as the problems encountered in their
implem entation
.
Each of these programs has an integrity of its own. Whatever its
successes or failures, whatever analyses are brought to bear on the larger
issues of causality, these programs were initiated by people who believed
that they could be useful in the solution of important problems. The analysis
of these cases will be made with with due respect to those people. At the
same time, these cases must be approached with the hope of learning how
to conduct similar programs in the future. It is not beyond the realm of
possibility that these types of programs themselves may not be the most
effective in reaching goals which they were meant to achieve or, perhaps,
that the organizations involved may not be the ones capable of achieving
these goals. It may be another possibility that the processes demonstrated
by some or all of these programs may be more important than the goals set
forth in program documents. Further speculation on these issues will be
found in Chapter VII.
The Center for International Education
There can be little question that the Center for International Education
(CIE) provided a constant institutional influence across these three programs.
In each of these cases, the Center developed a cooperative relationship with
institutions and individuals in the various host countries. However, Lq its
turn, the Center has been influenced by each of these programs, as well as
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by others it has undertaken, and it too has changed over the period covered
by these programs.
However, a sketch of the Center, its development, composition, and
other characteristics, is a necessary requisite for understanding of these
programs.
The Developn?at of the Center
The current Center brochure states:
The Center for International Education is one of several policy
and research-oriented programs within the School of Education
at the University of Massachusetts. Formed in 1968 when the
School of Education underwent complete restructuring, the
Center's original goals were to provide training in Development
Education, Internationalizing American Education, and Cross-
Cultural Communication and Training. Since 196 3
,
the Center
has added theNonfoimal Education Program, an undergraduate
international teacher education program,, activities in curriculun
and materials development on non-westem studies, and an in-
service M. Ed. pregram for teachers in the field who deal with
international studies.^
CIE at its inception was one of some eleven centers In the School of
Education which grew out of the restructuring referred to above. Of those
originally formed in 1968 and 1969, only five remain in a structure which
today more closely resembles the traditional departmental/program structure
normally found in professional scho<3ls. In 1968 the Center inherited from
the old School of Education a large AID contract to assist in the development,
administration, and teaching at a girls* school at Tororo, Uganda, This
long-term contract, initiated in 1963, was in its final stages. The Center soon
won a contract from Teacher Corps to carry out teacher-preparation programs
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in Massachusetts and Rhode Island using former Peace Corps volunteers,
aher smaller grants followed, including one from the National Endowment
for the Humanities, and then in 1972 the Center entered into a contract
with AID to research and develop nonformal education methods, techniques
and delivery systems in Ecuador. This contract was unlike the Uganda AID
contract in that it was not the traditional institutional development and
support contract in which an American institution of higher education assists
in the development of an institution in a third-world country. The Ecuador
program was directed toward research into nonformal education and, as
such, did not initially concern itself with institution-building. It was a
precurser of the ”New Directions" legislation which first passed Congress
in 1973 (see Chapter II),
In 1974, the Center was the recipient of a five-year institutional
support grant from AID (referred to as a 211 [d] grant from the 1966
authorizing legislation) to "increase the capability of the University of
Massachusetts to assist collaborutively developing countries, particularly
O
in rural areas, with development-oriented nonformal education programs."
It was under the aegis of this grant that the Ghana program was funded . See
Chapter V. A supplementary grant, initiated in 1976, funded two additional
sites, in Thailand and in Guatemala. This three-year grant ismore-or-
less co-terminus with the original five-year AID grant.
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Ccsmposition of the Center
It is not surprising that the original nine Center students and three
faculty, brought together in the crucible of as much of a revolution in
American higher education as such an institution is likely to experience,
considered themselves on the cutting edge of educational radicalism. They,
along with other students and faculty in the School of Education, had been
l3.rgely Lmp>orted from Stanford and the Peace Corps and we re offered the
opportunity to build a new institution from the ground up. Of the old school
of education, only the physical facilities remained; the old curricula,
programs, departments, as well as many of the faculty, had been largely
swept aside. Initially, these changes had the financial, moral and bureau-
cratic support of the President, Chancellor and Provost of the University
of Massachusetts, and early institution
-building at the School of Education
went forward in an atmosphere of creativity and excitement.
In the late I960's and early 1970’ s, the composition of the Center was
relatively homogeneous, consisting, for the most part, of white, male,
former Peace Corps Volunteers, Many of the changes which followed were
stimulated by an early Center member who was none of the above, A
Center faculty member later remarked; "Since there were ten of us, and
only one of her, the odds were unfair. Whenever there was an argument,
she always won," One of the more telling arguments of the early seventies
related to the composition of the Center. How, it was said, could the
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Center claim to be international when there was only one non-U. S. Center
member?
The self-evidence of this statement eventually won converts: the
percentage of foreign members of the Center grew from 11% in 1968 to 17%
in 1973, 31% in 1975, and to 36% in 1978. Although the faculty of the Center
have never been similarly integrated, foreign students have played a highly
significant role in all aspects of the Center since 1973. They have served
as proposal and report authors; as contributors to many Center ccmmittees;
as project directors of field programs; and as other professional staff on
various Center projects. And in their capacity as graduate students at the
Center, they have made vital contributions to teaching, research and out-
reach pregrams.
Because of the many obstacles to attendance of foreign students at
the University of Massachusetts, it is often the most talented and resourceful
which are likely to be in residence at the Center. The consequent
heterogeneity of the Center's membership has created unique organizational
qualities with consequences for the Center's field programs, as well as for
its relationships with the School, University, and outside funding organizations.
It has also had an effect also on the public rhetoric of the Center, and the
multiple perceived differences between that rhetoric and the reality of
the Center’s internal and external behavior has provided the major fulcrum
for internal dissent and external public criticism.
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Major Characteristics of the Center
Henry Steele Ccanmager has characterized American teacher education
as expansionist, ambitious, equalitarian, functicaaal, and miscellaneous.”*^
This would serve as a summary descripticai of the Center for International
Education from its inception to today. It is important to understand from
the outset that, for all its qualities of diversity and internationalism, it. is
unlil^ely that the Center could exist except at an American institution of
higher education. Commage r goes on to say
. . • from the beginning, American schools were expected,
even required, to take on many of the functions performed
in the Old World by other institutions; the Court, the
Church, the Military, the Academy, the Guilds, and even
the family, which functioned more efficiently as an educational
force in a stable and settled society like the European
than in one condemned by nature herself to mobility and
disintegration. In America, schools were expected to be
general social, economic, and political agencies and to do
almost anything that society wanted done. They were
expected to be the chief instruments of change and improve-
ment, of democracy and equality, of tolerance and
morality, ^
Philosophy and Practice Within the Center.
These qualities of American education are important to keep in mind
as we try to determine the degree to which the Center's philosophy and
practices represent a growing world view or a more limited and parochial
approach to educational issues in international arenas. This viewpoint must
inform any discussion of the generality of the educational qualities apparently
unique to the Center. Further, such a view must be brought to bear on how
the Center has developed its field programs, and whether these programs
consequently represent an ’’American” or an international undertaking.
In one of the earliest documents produced by the Center (during the
1968-69 academic year), entitled ’’Where We»re At-A Progress Report
of the Center for International Education,” three distinct elements of the
early philosophy and practices of the Center can be identified.
1. ’’The overall purpose of the Center for International Education
is sensitizing students to cultural differences while creating an
atmosphere conducive to mutual learning and growth. Our
priority rests ... on the assumption that world cooperation
for educational development and exchange, the blurring of
traditional national and cultural boundaries and the eventual
interm mgling of the peoples of the world are necessary and
indeed, inevitable. ... Although it may be obvious that
America has much in the way of technolc^y to offer the world,
we believe she also has much to learn from other nations.
. . .
Wnat we intend, then, is to teach a philosophy of ’mutual
exploitation, * one which recognizes the pitfalls of altruism and
properly acknowledges the mutual benefits which can be gained
by all who wish to learn from an in-depth cross-cultural
encounter. This, for us, opens the way to search for learning
environments which will provide maximum advantage for both
sides in any interaction between cultures. ”
2. ”... A feature common to all of our efforts is the education
experience derived from the operational responsibilities shared
with the faculty for further planning and implementation of new
programs.
.
.”
3. ”... We have incorporated a central feature of the
present Planning Doctoral Program into all of our degree
programs: all academic woric must be interwoven with relevant
experiential responsibilities so that conceptualization and study
do not take place in a vacuum, and operational projects are not
undertaken without a direct link to an academic program.”^
118
In 1974, these ideas found their way into the Grant Document which
was the legal basis for the AID 211 (d) grant. The document was written
by a cadre of Center members and stated "that mutual learning will be
insured by mutual respect for the needs and capabilities of all collaborating
groups, ” and "that skills and knowledge are learned as much through direct
immersion in actual problem situations as through academic treatment of
subjects: that theory and practice are interdependent and must be provided
in equal amounts.""^ These and other similar conceptual statements about
educational philosophy are in fact sprinkled throughout most of the public
documents produced by the Center.
The third strand, which refers to bureaucratic structure within the
Center, was a direct outgrowth of the "planning year" referred to in the
"Where We* re At" document. The School of Education, and to an even greater
extent, the Center, was insulated for a time (from the period of 1968 to
about 1972) from the larger bureaucratic structure of the University by an
activist Dean who, for this period, went effectively unchallenged in his
pursuit of "expansionist, ambitious, equalitarian, functional, and
miscellaneous" goals. Within the Center, in partial reflection of the entire
school, there existed a loose bureaucratic structure in which graduate
students played unaccustomed roles of project planning and development.
decision-making, and goal- setting.
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The concept of nonfomal Education n.f thp
The early group ot Center members had the luxury, as it were, o£
choosing their own way. That way initially branched in two major directions.
«
One was in the development of the Teacher Corps project, using former
Peace Corps Volunteers in curriculum development roles in two school
districts. That initial thrust has survived in smaller programs under the
rubric of "intemationalixing American Education," and has been a major
force behind the Center’s undergraduate prcgratns.
The second direction involved a decision to concentrate on out-of-
school education. It developed, in part, in the following manner:
In 1969 the first year seminar group became interested in
literacy and went to Washington, D.C. to attend a conference.
Speaking at that conference were people like Ivan Illich and
Paulo Freire, both unknown to Center members at the time.
The first year seminar group became very interested in
alternatives to schooling and succeeded in establishing a
relationship with Illich which led to several visits to the
Center and School by him, and residence by several people
from the School,
. . at CIDOC, Illich’ s center in Mexico.
During that year extended discussions took place in the
Center and people began thinking seriously of non-school
educational techniques.^
The first application of these techniques by Center members was in the
Ecuador project, and what has come to be known as nonformal education
serves as a major focus for Center pregrams to this time, most recently
through the contract signed with the Indonesian government In 1978,
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Alarums, and excursions
At about the same time as, and largely in response to, the award of
the nonfoimal education institutional support grant (211 [d] ) to the Center,
there developed a backlash against the grant by a small number^^ of
individuals within and outside the Center who protested the acceptance of
AID funds in the strongest possible terms. They received limited support
from one faculty member of the Economics Department, but otherwise acted
as individuals. In an open memorandum written in March 1974 to the entire
Center membership, one of the dissenters wrote: 'It does not make any
sense to me that AID would invest all that money in the CIE, at Amherst,
existing hundred of places [sic] available and needy, in less developed
areas, were it not for AED*s role as an agency of technical and cultural
colonialism. An internal rebellion failed to develop, so articles soon
began to appear in the Amherst press. Leading with the ccmforting news
that according to the Center director, "The CIE does not participate in police
training, " one commentator went on to specualte why AID money had been
awarded to the Center:
Another possible explanation for AID*s interest in non-form il
education is the State Department's dismay over pacification
efforts in Vietnam, If improved methods could be found for
penetrating rural villages and hamlets, identifying potential
allies and troublemakers, and securing reliable intelligence
sources, AID*s services would be more beneficial to the CIA
1 O
and the Pentagon, as well as to a regime’s police efforts.
It should surprise no one that the same issue of this paper labeled Gloria
Steinem a CIA agent. But the vituperation of the Center's critics reached
a fever pitch when, almost eight months later, a further article appeared
m the local student newspaper with all the old charges yet reaching a new
height of verbal eloquence, lumping Centermembers under the appellation
of "foreign aid pimps. During this period, the Center's detractors
formed their own ad hoc committee which they called the "University
Committee on International Research," expropriated University stationary,
and wrote letters to various officials at AID, "warning them that the
University had serious doubts about the virtue of the grant and that its
acceptance might cause trouble. All this was to no avail; even the
desperate attempt to enlist the support of the "colonialist" agency failed and
the grant was awarded.
It would, however, be wrong to dismiss this debate entirely as the
agitation of a few disgruntled ideologues. Inter-group fairness and equity
in Center p retrains, as reflected both within the Center and in its field
programs, has been a concern of thoughtful Centermembers from the
beginning of the oiganizaticaio The most important consequence of this
dialogue was the development of a document entitled "Guidelines for the
CIE in Its Collaboration with Funding Agencies," produced in the winter of
1974, and discussed widely throughout the Center for the following two years
The document was a guide "toward positive advocacy for action, " and was
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created because ’'one of the consequences of cooperative relationships be-
tween parties, be they individuals or institutions, is that some or all of such
parties to an undertaking run the risk of losing all or some very essential
elements of their independence and the personal character of input.
They were ultimately approved by the Center’s Policy Program Advisory
committee, and for a number of years served their function well. At one
pomt reference to the document helped to prevent the Center from accepting
a contract provision which would have forced the Center to maintain closed
document files. Most importantly, however, they affirmed the Center's
concern with principles of equity.
All organizations have seams, areas of weakness which are most
subject to either internal or external stress or both. In times of great
pressure, the fabric of organizations tend to tear along these seams; when
there are a few significant problems, it is difficult to tell that the organiza-
tion is not made of one fabric.
The most basic stress on the Center is the problem of an organization
committed, on the one hand, to principles of mutual learning, fairness and
equity among Center members, and field projects which reflect cooperative
program development; and, on the other hand, the personal, institutional and
legal barriers to the attainment of these principles.
If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the Center has
sufficient construction materials to move a goodly distance. Put another
way, the more idealistic the rhetoric the smaller the likelihood of realizations.
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In order to realize some of its principles, the Center should transform
them into goals and objectives which are capable of realization. This would
mean lowering the number and the extent of these goals; it would also mean
an increased chance of making them effective.
Because of the history of the Center, its collegial, even communal.
prmciples, there has always been an expectation among Center members
that Its collective power and economic resources should be equitably shared.
During good economic times, when the ratio of funding to need was high, the
Center has moved toward the achievement of this type of sharing; during
more difficult times, the goal has been little advanced. During these latter
periods, the Center has tended to tear along those seams which bind tc^ether
the various groups within the Center. Individuals who represent power
within the Center have been caught between their adherence to principles
of equity and their responsibilities within a hierarchical University community.
Those individuals are therefore, at times of stress, perceived as obstacles
to the achievement of equity.
It is basically the high degree of rhetoric which tends to obscure the
fact that it is probable that there is more power-sharing and resource-sharing
within the Center among its various constituencies than in any other can parable
organization within the School or University. This might also be extended to
include other similar programs at other universities both in the United States
and elsewhere. It is for this reason that the entire milieu of available
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options be considered: really dictates that achievable objectives rather
than thetoric should be put forward.
Some of the real constraints are related to the unique position of the
Center as a multi-cultuial, multi-national organisation with a broad per-
spective and constituency locked inside a raral, resource-poor land-grant
university. The Centermight be best abstracted as a unit pulled, on the
one hand, by its parent institution; and on the other, by what it perceives
to be its global constituency. When these forces act in the same direction,
there is little external tension; when they act in opposite directions, the
Center’s seams begin to appear. In a sense, the constraint represents the
familiar problem of parochial vs. global interests: When they are perceived
as convergent, progress is possible; when they are perceived as divergent,
the possibility of conflict becomes higher.
The Center: A Summing Up
At the recent (spring, 1978) Tenth-Year Conference of Center members,
a number of the types of problems mentioned above were discussed in plenary
meetings of current and past Center members. Some Center members
spoke of inequities in sharing; that primarily Americans publish through
the Center; that speaking out involves great risks; of the apparent violation
of the principles of collaboration in a recent Center contract; of the need to
develop alternatives to American-based assistance efforts (for example,
through regional assistance networks).
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Some saw the Center as a crucible; "In the struggle with the Center
for dignity and recognition, we redefine ourselves.
"It, the Center,
as process, was the best training I could have had. If it ever solves its
problems, no one will be learning how to deal with problems. ... If all
these problems had been solved,
. . if there were strict rules, I would
never have learned how to compete and how to get along with people where
there are not enough resources to go around."^®
But the most perceptive comment came frcm a Center member who
saw the Center as a microcosm, emblematic of some larger and more
important contemporary issues:
As a Center we reflect the kinds of key issues that we face
outside in our work situations. And in a sense, the microcosm
is a reflection of the kinds of things we’re struggling with.
And in that sense we’re at a very critical juncture—I think
maybe you can say that every two years or every six months—
in the larger field in terms of issues like this, and in terms
of developnent. And using that analogy, I think this is more
than an ongoing dialogue, more than just another retreat, I
think that this reunion, , , is a critical juncture in the Center
in grappling with these issues, in how it decides to cope with
the things that it reflects When you talk about
education for liberation, at some p)oint we’re going to have
to begin with ourselves. ... I hope that the sense of
community that we have shared at times lives on because
that is the greatest source of nourishment for the kinds of
crossfire situations that we’re in.^^
An organization reflects both its constituent parts and the larger order
in which it is anbedded. It is because the Center is at times both one and
the same that makes it interesting. As the various programs are examined in the
following chapters, it is necessary to remember how these pregrams were both
affected by, and affected, the organization that was their sponsor.
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It is also essential to discern how the concepts of collaboration which
were introduced, to differing degrees, and with differing levels of success,
were rooted in the ideas and concepts of people who struggled with principles
of fairness and equity. This dialectic of struggle everywhere informed the
projects under study, and were based in the Center's own philosophy,
composition, and structure.
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CHAPTER V
THE GHANA NONFORMAL EDUCATION PROGRAM;
A CASE STUDY IN COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of this case study is to outline the interactions between
the major parties involved in the Ghana Nonformal Education Program in
order that the preconditions, problems, impediments, motivations and
other factors which helped or hindered the collaborative process can be
identified. In a later analysis, these factors will be related to trends in
international programs identified in Chapters II and III. This study will
not attempt to describe the program in Chana from an economic, political,
or anthropological viewpoint, except to the extent that the data is available
and relates to the way in which the organizations and individuals interacted
during the span of the program.
Approach and Structure
Margaret Mead has written that 'the field anthropologists finds
. . .
that we learn far more quickly from watching real things happen, and the
disciplined testing of hypotheses ccmes best after the hypotheses have been
so derived."^ When direct field observation in widely separated places is
not possible, the case study is one way of trying to reconstruct the course
that events have taken.
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The presentation is primarily descriptive, and the outline is derived
in part from an analytic structure designed by Harold Lasswell to generate
systematic and empirical data.^ The case study contains information on;
1. The participants (both individual and institutional)
and a brief narrative chronology
2, Perspectives of participants
3, Situations encompassed by the project
4. Strategies utilized by participants in reach ing
varying objectives
5, Outcomes or direct results of activities undertaken
through the project
6. Long-range effects of the project.
Analytic questions related to the development of an understanding of this
program and those outlined in Chapter VI, and the context in which they
occurred, will be posed in Chapter VII,
To the extent possible, I have identified the major involved individuals
at the outset but eliminated the names of staff and other participants from
the cases in the narrative. In some instances, it has been necessary to
refer to the persons involved, when the identification is either necessary to
the narrative or when a person is organically tied to the development of the
program. More specifically, this refers to those who have had more than
the usual effect of personality cai a program,
A Note on Sources
This case study draws on a number of sources. These include
program documents such as reports, memoranda, eva.luations and especially
letters to the Center fron staff in the field and from cooperating organizations.
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Reports and evaluations by outside organizations and individuals not directly
attached to the Center or to cooperating organizations are also included where
available. Taped interviews have also been recorded with as many of the
involved principles as has been feasible. The author has also drawn on
perscaial notes and recollections where other documentation is incomplete
or unavailable.
Nonformal Education in Ghana
Participants and Chronology
Institutional participants
There were three major institutional participants in the Ghana Non-
formal Education program. These are; The Institute of Adult Education
(lAE) of the University of Ghana in Legon; the People’s Educational Associa-
tion (PEA) of Ghana; and the Center for International Educaticn (CIE).
The Institute of Adult Education
The Institute was established in 1949 and is responsible for the
development of adult education programs throughout Ghana. These efforts
included:
1. Non-degree courses in general education outside the University
of Ghana.
2. Specialized courses of trade unions, cooperatives, and other
voluntary organizaticns.
132
3, Courses for the General Certificate of Education (G.C.E, ),
4. Part-time and evening degree courses at the University of Ghana.
The Institute has nine regional offices staffed by Resident Tutors.
When the Institute was renamed in 1962 (taking over the work of
the former Institute of Extra-Mural Studies of the University of Ghana), it
was also assigned the task of providing support to the PEA by assigning a
resident tutor who is designated National Secretary of the PEA, a post based
at the headquarters of the Institute. Resident tutors assigned to regional
offices are also given certain responsibilities with respect to the PEA,
especially in developing the content of nondegree courses.^
The People's Educational Association
A pamphlet distributed by the PEA describes the organization as
follows;
The P.E.A. is a voluntary, independent association of adult
students. It is democratically constituted, and unsectarian.
It aims at providing opportunities for serious study for all
those who wish to understand the problems of the great
changes taking place in their own society, and in Contemporary
Africa; and who wish to keep abreast of the world’s fast-
developing body of knowledge.'^
The PEA was established in 1949 as a voluntary association of Ghanaians
dedicated to out-of-school education toward the principles of self-reliance.
Although in the past it primarily provided extension, nondegree courses in
general education subjects for those already literate, it has of late beccane
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involved in providing learning experiences for village-level nonliterates.
With the exception of the National Secretary (selected and funded by
the lAE), the President and other positions within the PEA Executive
Cominittee are elected. The PEA maintains nine regional headquarters;
each region has its own executive committee. The officers of the branch
units, which are based on a single town or village, consist of a chaiiman,
vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, publicity secretary, and committee
members. Membership in the PEA is open to all who pay a small annual
fee.
In addition to conducting courses, the PEA holds one-day schools
and week-end conferences. There is an annual conference which determines
policy and elects the national executive committee,^
The Center for International Education,
University of Massachusetts/Amherst
The Center has been described in Chapter IV.
Other Institutional participants
Other organizations with a more limited role in the day-to-day
development of the pregram include the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) and its office in Accra; and the Ghanaian office of the Africa
Bureau of the German Adult Education Association. The functional roles
of these organizations will be described below.
project and Cooperating Institution Sf.nff ,
Preject staff
The three coordinators of the field project were, in order of their
tenure, Felix McGowan, Ramoshebl Ishmael Moletsane, and Janice Smith.
Project staff and their general responsibilities were: Stephen McLaughlin
and Jonas Kwablah, vocational training support; Vidal Kwami Quist, village
development projects; Robert Russel, cultural groups support; J. K.
HansOTi and Fanny Dontoh, adult literacy programs; and Elvyn Jones-Dube,
Village development program and facilitator training.
Staff at the Center for International Education who assisted in aspects
of this project included: David R. Evans, Center Director, Nana Seshibe,
site selection and site coordination; George Urch, site selection and site
support; June Bouiheau, site support and fiscal affairs; David Kinsey, site
support and program development; Linda Abrams, organizational develop-
ment; and John Bing, administrative support.
PEA staff
A number of PEA staff volunteered their time to help develop the
project. They included T. K. Hagan, National President; F. K. Bioh,
Regional Secretary, Eastern Region; Mary Okyere, Regional Treasurer,
Eastern Region; A. A. Pinamang, Assistant Regional Secretary, Eastern
Region; M. K. Awah, PEA member, Eastern Region; John Brobbey,
Second Vice-R^ional Chairman, Eastern Region.
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lAE staff
The following Institute staff were involved in the development of
the nonfoimal education program in Ghana: Kwasi Ampane, Director of
the Institute at the time of the initiation of the project; Joseph Opare-
Abetia, National Secretary of the PEA at the time of the initiation of the
project; Lawrence A. Okraku, former Senior Organizer. Eastern Region,
and currently National Secretary; Kwame Oduro, Senior Resident Tutor,
Eastern Region; E, A. Haizel, current Acting Director,
Other institutional staff participants
Other staff involved in aspects of the project included: Werner
Keweleh, Director of the Africa Bureau in Ghana of the German Adult
Education Association; Haven North, Director of USAID/Ghana at the
initiation of the project; and Bernard Wilder, AID staff member in
Washingtcai.
Chronology
In June of 1974, partially as a consequence of its work in Ecuador,
the Center for International Educaticai was awarded an Institutional Grant,
for the subsequent five-year period, to increase its capability to assist
thirtl-world countries, in the development of nonformal education pregrams,
especially in rural areas. The grant was to lead to increased University
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capabilities in research, evaluation, training, materials development,
and consulting in the area of nonfoimal education. At the heart of this
process was the need to develop these capabilities in collaboration with
those educators and others in third-world settings who had similar concerns
and interests. The Grant Document states that "one field site will be
selected and developed as a means for applying skills and knowledge in non-
formal education as well as for learning more about the essential and
variable elements in nonfoimal education program
Historically, most international programs have begun with a site,
clients, agenda, methods, and solutions predetermined. The Nonfonnal
Education Grant Document took the opposite approach: One of the most
important matters to be explored was how best to determine where, how,
with whom, and to what end programs in nonfoimal education could be
developed.
The following is a condensed chrcnology of significant project events,
June, 1974—Award of Institutional Support Grant by the Agency for International
Development to the Center for International Education, University of
Massachusetts,
January, 1975— Staff (Nana Seshibe, George Urch) visit four African countries
(Senegal, Lesotho, Kenya, and Ghana) to identify nonfoimal education pro-
grams and potential project sites. Brief talks held with the Institute of
Adult Education, University of Ghana at Legon, at that time.
July-August, 1975—Return visit to Ghana by Center staff. Potential
collaborative projects were discussed with the Ghana YMCA, Aburi District
Council, Department of Game and Wildlife, and the Institute of Adult
Education and the People's Educational Association.
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Education and to theGhana YMCA informing them of the arrival of the Coordinator of the DMa==project and asking their assistance in visa approvals. The tostitmeresponded, but not the YMCA group.
JJisutut
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McGowan, UMass field coordinator, andDavid . Evans, Director of the Center for International Education tonegotiate ^agreement for project development. The result was a documententitled: Proposal for Collaboration between the People’s Educational
ofTe
Education and C^ter for mternational Educationt the University of Massachusetts (UMass)."
Februaiy, 1976—Arrival ot Steven McLaughlin, UMass intern.
March, 1976-Unofficial visit of R.I. Moletsane to the site team.
April-May, 1976—Visit of Kwame Oduro, Senior Resident Tutor, Eastern
egional Office, Institute of Adult Education, and Emmanuel N. TetteyGhana Broadcasting Corporation, to the Center to plan the development of
noniormal education pregrams.
June 1976—McGowan resigns position and returns to Amherst.
June, 1976—McLaughlin initiates work with the Koforidua Fitters to develop
a site for their work.
September 17, 1976—Moletsane arrives in Koforidua, Ghana to take over
as Director of the project.
October, 1976—Vidal K. Quist, member of the Koforidua PEA, becomes a
staff member with the project.
October, 1976—Moletsane and Quist identify about ten villages in the Eastern
Region for facilitator development initiatico.
November, 1976—Robert Russell arrives from the Center to join project
staff and to begin work with the PEA cultural groups.
November 1976—Lawrence Okraku, Senior Organizer, Institute of Adult
Education, visits Center,
November (ongoing)—Development activities organized by facilitators in
Okorase, Nyerede, Akwadum, Nankes^, Koforidua, Suhyen, Jumapo;
Training and relocation projects organized through the Koforidua Artisans
Cooperative Society; Cultural group activities supported by UMass team in
Suhyen, Koforidua, Okorase, Vakpo, Larteh.
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-“ducts a Cultural Groups Leadersshop in Larteh, Work-
February 21, 1977 Janice Smith arrives from Center
over coordination of the project.
in Koforidua to take
February 25, 1977—Sod cutting ceremony to open Okorase Pipe-Boi
Project, which had been assisted by the project team. Moletsane gi
iom Water
ves address.
February 26, 1977—Moletsane leaves Ghana for UMass,
February 26-27, 1977—Team hosts Leaders' Workshop for facilitators,
cultural group leaders, and literacy class leaders.
March (ongoing)—Village Development activities continue in Okorase,
Nyerede, Adkwadum, Nankese, Jumapo and Suhyen. Work with fitters and
cultural groups continue. Continuing dialogue with the lAE and the PEA
cultural groups continue. Continuing dialogue with the lAE and the PEA
regarding the nature, scope, and objectives of the collaborative process,
June 3-July 23, 1977— Linda Abrams, Center faculty, conducts staff organiza-
tional development training and works with team to plan and implement
three facilitator training workshops,
June 26, 1977—Arrival of Elvyn Jones from Center to work with team on
village development projects and evaluation.
June 26, 1977—First Literacy Facilitator Workshop held to introduce the
Ashton-Wamer learner-centered technique,
June 29, 1977 Russell and Ocraku published I, A, E, Issues Paper on the
subject: "What have we learned from cultural groups, and where do we go
from here?"
July 7, 1977—Snith delivers address on the team's nonformal education program
at the annual conference of the Ghana German Adult Education Association.
July 15-17, 1977—Seccnd Literacy Facilitator Workshop held to develop
materials for use with village classes and to discuss broader implications
of facilitators' role.
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July 27, 1977-Team NFE presentation at the lAE Staff Seminar Trn, a-As a result of Team's invitation, Hagan attends A niimhe f ’issues relating to the PEVlAE/UMass collaboration are disLs's^f
Au^st 26-27, 1977—Team hosts two day workshop lor PEA cultural eroimleaders and Cultural Union Durbar. (The concept of a ™i« of cX«r“"groups IS established.) ultural
September 2, 1977-Dedication ceremony,
Okorase. Speeches by facilitator Benson,
Regional Commissioner Osei.
Pipe-bome water project,
team member Quist, and the
ReLr““
September-l^oember, 1977-Evaluation and report-writing activities:
con mue le visits to facilitator and literacy programs. Gennan AfricaBureau agrees to fund tools for fitters' classes; lAE agrees to pay salary ofdevelopment worker lor fitters; AID funds a development project for culturalgroups; grant proposal for support for projects submitted to AID by PEA.
December 3, 1977— Project closing ceremony held at Koforidua.
June 1978—AID approves funding for PEA projects.
Perspectives
It may be useful to examine at the outset the major similarities in per-
spective and approach (and, implicitly, the differences) among the three
organizations most involved in sponsoring or contributing to the Ghana Non-
form al Education Program .(henceforth called simply the project). The specific
approaches and perspectives of these institutions will be examined in detail in
the following section.
The LAE and the CIE are both university-based organizations with a
stated mission to research adult educaticn programs. The Center's con-
stituency includes graduate students at the Center, and by extension the concerns
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they represent, which relate to the development of educational opportunities
m third world countries, as well as preparing teachers for service in U.S.
schools. In addition, certain areas such as cross-cultural education and
mtemationalizing American education have been traditional areas of focus
within the Center,
The Institute was created in October, 1948 as the result of a visit to
Ghana of Mr. T. L. Hodgkin, the Secretary of Oxford University Delegacy for
Extra-Mural Studies. The Institute currently has program foci in a general
certificate of education (GCE) pregram; professional courses; vocational
courses; part-time degree courses; a research group; correspondence courses
residential courses (short seminars); a diploma in adult education course;
experimentation in rural development," and various open lectures, debates
and other short educational experiences often held on conjunction with the
PEA.^
The PEA and the Institute were created at about the same time, in
1948-49. The aforementioned Mr. Hodgkin came to Ghana "to discover if
there was any potential demand for the kind of adult education such as is met
in Britain through courses provided by University Extra-Mural Departments
in co-operation with voluntary organizations,"^ Extension courses were
offered PEA members to provide a bridge between the University and the
larger Ghanaian community. Thus it appears that the original concept of
the PEA was in part to provide a demand for university-based extension
courses provided by the predecessor of the lAE. As a brochure issued by
the National Secretariat puts it, the reason for the establishment of the PEA
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’was to provide an organised body of part-time students with which the
Department of Extra-Mural Studies could work,”^^ The Constitution of the
PEA requires that the two central authorities of organization, the National
Annual Conference and the National Executive Committee, shall have
resident tutors and organizers of the Institute as voting members of the
former, and ex-officio members of the latter. So, in fact, both historically
and legally, the two organizations are firmly linked together.
In the 1970*s the PEA began a shift in program emphasis which brought
it further toward the arena of community action, partly as a result of a changed
political climate, and partly as an attempt to make the organization more
relevant to community needs. The 1975 National Seminar on the PEA and
Ccmmunity called for:
New strategies and realistic prc^rammes which would
relate to the needs of a large and diverse categories
of people. There is the need, for example, for re-
examination of the constitution of the Association to
make it more relevant to the present conditions.
Furthermore, as a national educational association,
the P. E.A, should have clearly defined objectives
which will cater not only for the literate but for the
illiterate population as well, to make people learn
to read and write at least their own languages and to
think about and discuss their own problems to find
ways for solving them and to create opportunities
for participation and action in community affairs.
The P. E. A, could now became a forum for the
study of community problems and act as a link between
different development agencies and the community.
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This emphasis on community action, although always inherent in the PEA's
history, was a shift away from the liberal education and GCE courses that
had predominated during the formative years of the organization.
The Center’s initial discussions with Institute and PEA staff on the
potential joint developnent of nonformal education activities therefore met
with considerable interest, tempered by the judicious skepticism of seme
years of dealing with Western ’'experts" who could solve problems in every
place but their own countries. In any event, the Center's interests dove-
tailed closely with the new directions undertaken by the PEA at about the same
time as Center representatives arrived for pregram development.
The followirg is an in-depth analysis of the perspectives of each of the
organizations involved as they developed over the duration of the project. In
dealing with institutional perspectives and purposes, there is a considerable
danger of oversimplification. Within each of the organizations, as is
generally true of all organizations, there was and is a multiplicity of view-
points and tendencies. Wherever possible, these will be developed. Where it
is not possible, primarily for lack of information, the organization's actions
will be credited as its purpose, and as reflecting its viewpoint.
German Adult Education Association—Africa Bureau
The Africa Bureau is a private, adult education association with some
support from the German government. In 1975 it selected Ghana as the head-
quarters for its African operations. The Institute of Adult Education has
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been its primary linl^ in Ghana, although it does have ties with the Ghana
Broadcasting Corporation.
The Bureau has been a significant donor to the lAE. It has cortributed
Volkswagen busses, copying machines, movie projectors, tape recorders and
other hardware to the lAE. The PEA has been the recipient of funds which has
subsidized expenses associated with workshops, conferences, and one-day
schools^
When the first UMass Coordinator reached Ghana, he met with the
Director of Bureau operations, Werner Keweloh, and they discussed potential
areas of joint cooperation in working with Ghanaian institutions. Although no
formal arrangements were made, the two organizations tacitly worked together—
as opposed to undermining each other’s efforts—throughout the duration of the
project. Some of the first efforts at cultural group work was initiated by
project staff in Larteh, which had been the recipient of financial assistance
from the Germans for at least the previous year. The Bureau also provided
the fitters project with a set of tools for fitter's vocational training classes
vdiich had been initiated by UMass staff.
The Bureau also utilized UMass staff to further their support of a
counterpart People's Educational Association group in Sierra Leone, One of
the Center's staff visited that country with Bureau staff in December, 1977
to consult on methods for use in adult education,
Keweloh became interested in comparing the styles of the Center and
the Bureau. He wrote that he thought the Bureau to have adopted a ''macro-
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approach," "in comparison to the micro-approach on the basts of projects of
the University of Massachusetts. "14 By this he presumably meant, in part, that
the Bureau worked primarily with the top levels of the Institute, whereas
the Center worked largely with the PEA and in vUlages. He also may have
meant that the Center focused on program development whereas the Bureau rvas
mainly concerned with developing the material resources of the Institute of
Adult Education,
The Bureau has received much praise from Institute and PEA staff for
their contributions to the resources of both organizations. The Bureau staff
was invited to attend a number of Institute workshops and cultuiul group
presentations at Larteh. But the Bureau also came under some criticism from
pea and Institute staffs for alleged attempts at manipulation of programs. The
minutes of a staif conference of the Institute held in July 1976 cany such an
implicit warning: "It was felt that the [People’s Educational] Association
should decide on what kind of aid it was to accept from the German Adult
Education Association since the indiscriminate acceptance of certain offers
did not seem to be in the interest of the Association. "^5 However, this state-
ment could also be a warning to the PEA not to try to use the Bureau’s funds
to gain too much independence from the Institute. In any event, the Bureau
staff may have seen the project’s operations as a helpful counterweight to
their own: Hence their interest in publishing a document comparing the two
approaches.
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m a sense, the Bureau was one of a number of organizations with
which the project interacted in seeking support for project activities. And the
project, like the PEA and the Institute, was the recipient of resources which
made some of its activities possible. The Bureau, in turn, saw some of its
programs—such as the cultural group of Larteh, and the PEA in general-
strengthened through the programming efforts of the project.
Agency for International Development
The Agency for International Development (AID)'s interest in nonfoimal
education and collaborative programs have been detailed in Chapter II, The
institutional support grant to the Center for International Education was one
way for AID to expand the capacity of an American university in both these
areas, as similar grants had to other universities in the areas of educational
technology, tropical agriculture, and the like. The emphasis on collaborative
programs in this grant was, in its emphasis on the process of institutional
interactions, a departure from past grants, and signalled AID*s, and at a
greater distance, the Congress’s recognition that the traditional fonns of
foreign assistance were sometimes insufficient to produce effective and long-
lasting results. As the Ecuador project was an experiment in the development
of nonfoimal education, the site projects under the institutional support grants
(the Two-Site Grant was actually an off-spring of the initial institutional
support grant) was an experiment, in part, in the process of cooperation
between educational organizations in the United States and third-world
countries.
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The form of the grant from AID dictated certain consequences. To
begin with, since the grant was initiated by AID Washington offices, rather
than field missions, the fomter displayed a continuing interest in the program
while the field mission in Ghana showed little interest i n the day-to-day workings
of the project. The AID Washington technical officer in charge of monitoring
the grant. Dr. Bernard Wilder, visited the program in Ghana four times over
the two-year life of the project; in contrast to this level of i
officials in Ghana involved themselves in the
nterest, USAID
prcgrmn only rarely, such as
their invited appearance at the closing ceremonies.
Further, since the grant was made to the University of Massachusetts
to strengthen its capacity to supply services to third-world countries, rather
than to mstitutions in those countries themselves, AID found itself adopting
a position similar to the Institute of Adult Education in Ghana with reference
to the project-concerns were often voiced by AID staff that the Center should
involved itself primarily with models of project collaboration and nonfoimal
education research, and only as necessary with projects themselves. In a
letter dealing with the first project report, the AID Project Officer wrote:
The recommendations (of the report} deal primarily with
what should be done to make the rural education program
more effective and efficient. They do not deal with How
this should be done in terms of the institution to institution
collaborative/working relationships. Without this you are
engrossed with the trees and have forgotten the forest
. . .
I am sympathetic with this preoccupation with the rural
folk with whom one is working on a day to day basis. However,
we must not lose site fsic] of our more general objectives
for the site. ‘
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In the same meeting which censured the Bureau, the Institute also
indirectly warned the PEA about its community development work with the
project: "The implementation of practical projects by PEA branches was
welcome. It was however observed that the Association should not lose sight
of the educational objective that each project must have. "W Although the PEA
has a mandate to work with Illiterate as well as literate people, the lAE does not:
Their work is supposed to be confined to research in this area, while the
Department of Social Welfare handles the literacy programs.^® The Executive
Secretary of the PEA (an Institute appointee) at one point warned project staff
that the project might become caught up in village development wotlt that would
result in just another social welfare project.
The pressure from AID to concentrate on the research aspects of the
project at the expense of the village development section dovetailed therefore
with the Institute position. Indeed, this tendency to walk down two roads at the
same time was imbedded in the grant document, and the history of the project
reflected at various times attempts to reconcile the two purposes.
Because of general Congressional pressures, then, as well as the type
of grant awarded UMass, AID was primarily interested in developing a model
or models of collaborative working relationships with third-world institutions
in the field of nonform al education, and project activities were important only
to the extent that they contributed to these ends.
There is a thread which appears here for the first time that can be
148
seen ttoe to ttae to emet^e frt™ the background concerns of all the
ot^anlzattons that effected the project. One aspect was mentioned above and
relates to AID's concern with the project's
"preoccupation with the rural
folk" to the detriment of "geneml objectives." The issue actually first sur-
ces wrthm the Center itseU; but within this context is initially seen in AID/
Washington's reaction to the Center's guidelines. The Guidelines are referred
to above as a response to concerns about maintaining the independence of
groups Within the Center, particularly thirti-world influence, and of the
interests of the Center as opposed to those of funding organizations, particularly
AID. The Guidelines statement is a tortuously worded, sometimes contra-
dictory document which warns against 'tnanipulative intrigue or
. . . zealous-
ness" and the loss of "flexibility of a learning institution" through an "unequal
relationship with political bureaucracy and its policy. " These concerns reflect
Center member's preoccupation with, on the one hand, the radical view that
there was only one way to salvation, and the Center wasn't on that road; and
on the other, that the Center's purposes could be manipulated by a funding
agency.
The Guidelines denied both the radical’s claim to ideological purity and
the funding agencies’ right to control project outcomes. Cooperating
communities
. . . legitimize the projects or grants" and should 'Tbenefit fairly
in resources, professional growth, staffing, and decision-making. This
statement calls for a spirit of equity to operate between the Center and the
groups which cooperate with the Center in the development of joint programs.
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especially canmunity groups.
ADD, through the technical officer in charge of the UMass institutional
grant, responded that it agreed with the guidelines as they relate to cooperating
camm unities and management of funds, but objected to the "entirely negative
tone" of the section dealing with the funding agency. The officer wrote that
"the Agency for International Development has increasingly over the past few
years emphasized the policy of working in a ’collaborative style’ with the
LDCs less-developed countries and with its grantees and contractors. "^2
Hence, at the outset, the issue of project purpose was introduced in a
dialogue between AID and the Center, as was the corollary issue of
how the relative importance of nonfoimal education research versus village-
level development should be detennined.
One month after the program was begun in Ghana the AID project
officer visited the two staff members and, in a wide-ranging discussion of
issues, emphasized his interpretation that the overriding goal of the 211(d)
grant is to develop institutional capacity in non-formal education. One of the
things this means, he continued, is the development of a replicable, general-
izeable model containing certain training techniques, materials, evaluation
techniques, etc. 22
This thread of research, model-building, developing "replicable"
projects as a priority over the objective of developii^ village-level projects
will be referred to in relating the debates occurring in other institutions
involved in the project.
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One of the goals of the AID-UMass relationship was to develop a
"professional dialogue" which would over-ride the typical grantor-grantee
relationship. During and after the four trips undertaken by the AID-
Washington technical officer, there were numerous times in which open
discussion took place regarding project development issues. The AID official
often took the role of an active staff member, recommending courses of action
strategies and taking stands on various issues.
Finally, many of the project activities initiated or supported dur ing;
the life of the project will receive further support by a direct contract between
AID and the PEA, a contract recently approved, although in process for
almost a year. This contract, as well as another relatively large contract
given to support cultural group activities in the Atebubu district (through an
organization formed in part by a former UMass staff member) represents a
commitment on the part of AID to continue support of many of the project
components.
Institute of Adult Education
The Institute will be examined in terms of its relationships with the
PEA, the University of Massachusetts, the the project. The latter should
be considered separately insofar as it is a hybrid of the University of
Massachusetts, the PEA, and, to a limited extent, the Institute. The
perspective of the Institute and its staff will be maintained throughout to the
extent that this has been revealed through available documents, letters.
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int6rvi6ws, 3Jid mamoranda of conversaticn.
As has been noted, the Institute and the PEA have been linked together
since their founding, some thirty years ago. The British and Ghanaian
educators who helped create these two organizations believed that they were
separate but inseparable. Within this contradiction lies the basis for some
of the problems that arose during the duration of the project.
Both the Pli.A and the Institute began their existence with some
independence; The PEA had a separate grant frcm the Department of Social
Welfare and Conmunity Developm^t during the Colonial Regime. The
Institute, of course, was an integral part of the then University College of the
Gold Coast, now the University of Ghana at Legon. During the early sixties,
by the account of its former director, K,A.B. Jones-Quartey, the Institute
became "more or less a mere unit of the party establishment" and lost its
'hcademically objective orientation. During this period, which saw the
development of Kwame Nkrumah's one-party government, the PEA was
"almost completely shattered. " After the revolution of 1966, both organiza-
tions were restored, the LAE however more quickly than the PEA.^®
The major thrusts of the Institute during the fifties were extra-mural
or extension classes, especially in areas which were concerned with nation-
building. These were generally noncredit courses; the first request for
assistance in developing these courses was made to the British to develop a
course in "problems of government, " During the sixties, a younger
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clientele demanded credit courses, and Knrumah“s government organized the
Institute to provide courses which fit into the party’s program.,
By the early seventies, the Institute began to look in the direction of
research, correspondence courses, and the development of nonfoimal education
through the PEA.^^ Clearly, literacy became the major focus for the Institute
in its concerns to utilize the PEA more effectively.
The Eastern Regicn of the PEA was the strongest branch of a generally
weak PEA during the mid seventies. The Annual Report for the period May
1974 to April 1975 notes that ”it is only the Eastern Region that has sent a
full list of members to the National Secretariat. Efforts to develop PEA
programs were concentrated in this region. (It should be painted out that the
strength of this region within the PEA was laigely due to the growing strength
of its elected officials there.)
The Senior Resident Tutor for the Institute in the Eastern Region,
K, A. Oduro, issued at least two circular letters to the PEA membership
during this period regarding, in part, the development of literacy pregrams.
The first, in July of 1974, noted that "the P, E, A, is a dynamic movement.
At the moment we in the eastern regicxi are planning to start a literacy
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campaign to make as many people as possible literate," A second letter
from Odoru issued in April of 1975, began with hortatory zeal; "I should like the
P, E.A, in the Eastern Region to shine above those in other Regions. To do this
I propose to give the necessary inspiration, direction, and impulse to action. We
shall need to bring many more people, literate and illiteratie, into our body and make
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m impact on the community The literacy idea was a great idea. We
should take it up immediately and urgently,
This appeal was echoed at the national levels of the PEA and the
Institute two months later, at the PEA»s National Executive Meeting. There,
the Director of the Institute, Emmanuel Ampene, urged members of the PEA
to ’’support efforts of the Institute" by intensifying its efforts on a literacy
drive. 34 There is no evidence, however, that these exhortations brought any
significant results. Not only were the efforts of the Institute isolated from
the chapter work of the PEA, but in addition there is considerable evidence
that the Institute’s work in literacy was not coordinated with that of the
Department of Social Welfare and Ccanmunity Development,^^
When, therefore, representatives of the Center mst that summer (1975)
with Ampene to discuss the possibility of working with the PEA in literacy and
other areas, he recalled later that "it was a much-needed shot in the arm. "3^
In January, 1976 the first coordinator of the project, along with the Director
of the Center, arrived to develop a collaborative arrangement with the
Institute; during a visit to the Center eighteen months later, Ampene said
that the project’s "major objective was to make the PEA more effective in its
programs of helping either members or nonmembers in a community improve
their quality of life, ”3'^ He said that he considered the agreement worked out
at that time to be "the operational agreement protecting all of us.
The Proposal for Collaboration was worked out by the Center Director
and Joseph Opare-Abetia, a Senior Tutor with the Institute who was also
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National Secretary of the PEA (appointed by the Institute), with the active
cooperation of the staff of the Eastern Region of the Institute. Kwame Oduro
and Lawrence Okraku (who was the Senior Organizer of the Eastern Region).
The Proposal was approved infonnally by all concerned; the next step being
approval by officials of the University of Ghana at Legon.39
The document was entitled "Proposal for Collaboration between
People’s Educational Association/institute of Adult Education and Center for
International Education of the University of Massachusetts (UMass)" ^0
(hereafter referred to as the proposal). It called for approval by the
’’appropriate bodies of both the participating institutions"; thereafter, it would
become the "working document between those institutions."
In fact, the document was never approved by any other groups within
either University,
It called for a relationship based on "professional cooperation and
exchange, rather than one of a contractual or traditional technical assistance
nature," one expected to evolve "over the next two to three years,"
Significantly, the proposal noted that "the proposed collaboration will in fact
involve the PEA more directly than the Institute . " The document then goes
on to describe new directions within the PEA which involves "a new type of
activity" leading to "a direct improvement in community lifco" Noting that
for various reasons, relatively little has been done in terms of specific project
which embody these new directions [ , ] the major object of this proposal is to
begin a process which will lead to the implementation of these new directions
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in a feasible way.” The document quotes a PEA woricing committee from the
1973 Consultative Conference which called for;
programmes which will improve both local and national
talents and skills, not only for the few educated classes,
but also the illiterate majority who form the bulk of the
workup adult population. These activities should,
. ,
raise the living standards of the people.
. , . The PEA
should be part and parcel of the community and take the
lead in promoting and participating in community
work, ... 41
The proposal suggested that the development of PEA branch pilot
projects would be the most appropriate way to reach these objectives, with
follow-up case studies. It further suggested that the facilitator model was
a technique that could be adapted to these projects.
The proposal further called for the development of projects to increase
the involvement of women in PEA work; to seek supplementary funding from
"international agencies”; to increase communication within the PEA; and
called for an intern exchange between the involved institutions. Finally, the
document specified the staff and other resources to be forthcoming from the
Center, and assistance from "PEA/IAE” to obtain assistance in housing,
office support, limited office space, "access to limited transport as available
and needed for joint project activities,” and access to communications
facilities (telephone, cable, postal).
Significantly, no elected PEA officials were involved in the negotiation
or drafting of the proposal.
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For the next three months the project coordinator, now joined by
Stephen McLaughlin from the Center, traveled to various parts of the country
looking at PEA prc^rams and talking with Institute and PEA staff. The majority
of their time was spent in the Eastern Region with Oduro, but lack of trans-
portation and housing in Koforidua proved a significant hindrance. During that
time Opare-Abetia wrote to Evans with the message that "there is no doubt that
with the field trips the areas in which we can cooperate are becoming clearer
and clearer. "42
Toward the end of that period, McGowan wrote a concept paper on non-
formal education which was distributed to Institute and PEA officials. The
paper—titled "Non Formal Education— ’Learning’ fora Just Society"— reviewed
the urban-rural and school ing-nonschooled divisions within Ghanaian society and
concluded: "Illiteracy classes then, are not needed—half so much—as social
consciousness classes for those both at the top and at the bottom—classes that
would help all Ghanaians ’read’ their own changing world, and changing life
patterns—not books
Shortly thereafter, McGowan and McLaughlin met with Opare-Abetia
and a discussion was held about the implications of the paper. Opare-Abetia
was in general agreement with the analysis of the paper, but he felt that the
paper failed to suggest anything about what he and others working in the PEA
should do about them— in other words, there were no programmatic proposals
offered. McGowan responded by noting that the design of prc^rams should
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best be left up to the Ghtmaiaus themselves. He further said that if the
lastitute wasn’t interested in the ideas presented in the paper, perhaps another
Ghanaian organization might be. Opare-Abetia said he thought there were a
number of ideas which the Center had tried elsewhere and that the Ghanaians
the project worked with would expect the UMass staff to provide leadership of
some sort. McGowan agreed to write a follow-up paper in which he would
make some program development suggestions.45
In the short document that McGowan wrote following this meeting the
basic suggestion that was made was that the PEA work to foster increased
consciousness among educated Ghanaians of their obligation to create a just
society, 46
On May 10, three months after they had requested accommodations,
McGowan and McLaughlin moved from the University of Ghana, Legon, into
temporary housing in Koforidua, and began working in the Institute office in the
center of town. At this time, McLaughlin began his research work with the local
fitters (auto mechanics) of Koforidua.
The internship program, mentioned in the proposal, was meanwhile
initiated in April with the visits to the Center of Kwame Oduro, Senior Resident
Tutor of the Institute in the Eastern Region (headquartered in Koforidua), and
Bnmanuel N, Tettey of the Music and Culture Division of the Ghana Broadcasting
Corporation. These visits coincided with the visit of Joseph Ansere, a
resident tutor and staff member with the Institute in Legon, who was in chaise
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of correspondence courses for adult students, who came to the United States
for a period of study at the University of Wisconsin.
The primary purpose of the visits was to allow jomt planning for the
development of the project in the Eastern Region. It was further expected that
there would be an exchange of views and information about nonformal education
and a senes of meetings and discussions regarding appropriate methods and
techniques that might be used in the Eastern Region. Finally, the Center staff
had a good deal to learn about the entire context of education in Ghana, and it
was presumed that these visits would contribute to this process. The visit of
Tettey was specifically linked to the possibility of developmg music and folk-
lore as a method of stimulating village-level development, as had been done
to a limited extent by Center staff in Ecuador.
At meetings with Oduro and Ansere, Center staff discussed a number of
issues. Practical issues included accommodation, transportation, office space
and communications. All were in lunited sup>ply in the Eastern Region, and the
level of inflation (about 120% per year at that time) contributed to the practical
difficulties of program development.
Oduro and Ansere spoke of the need for clarity of objectives in project
development and counseled that "if you are going to do anything, do it
quickly." They stressed the desirability of working in the areas of literacy
and local village-level technology, public health: Literacy was thought to be the
key.
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During these conversations, the Center staff were advised to write
directly to Ampene again seeking fomial approval of the Proposal for
Collaboration. The Center was informed that Ampene, the Director of the
Institute, may have felt that he was not properly informed since the Center had
been dealing directly with the National Secretary of the PEA, Mr. Opare-
Abetia. Little, they thought, could be accomplished without the formal approval
of that agreement.
A second cautionary note was sounded with respect to the research work
conducted in Ghana by students of the Center. The motives of foreigners in
Ghana might easily be misinterpreted if the people thought they were used as
guinea pigs for foreigners’ research. The Institute staff thought it might be
wise to consider applying for prior approval for research from local organizations
under the collaborative agreement,47
A third warning was given to the Center by Oduro during his stay in
Amherst, During a lecture to the Center, and later in a paper entitled "The
Collaboration Model in Ghana, " Oduro stressed that the Center staff showed
little understandlr^ of the relationship between the Institute and the PEA. In
this paper he wrote, "The Institute of Adult Education is the parent body of the
PEA and therefore its very senior partner. The Institute of Adult Education can
exist without the PEA and can do without it, but the PEA can neither exist nor do
without the Institute of Adult Education," On the issue of collaboration, he
wrote: "The collaboration is not so much with the PEA as with the Institute
of Adult Education. This point should be absolutely clear."
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Finally, regarding the Center's relationship with the Institute, he
wrote: "Ghana, like most African countries, wants partnership not patronage.
Even this partnership should not be such as to undennine the self-reliance.
It should be a partnership which would leave the Ghanaian freedom to decide
and act for himself. The principle should be that the guest has gone to contribute
what he has for the hosts and that the major advantages of the partnership should
rest with the host.
In a report written for the Director of the Institute seme time after his
return to Ghana, Oduro raised the following issues;
1. He discussed the Ecuador Project and its potential application to
Ghana, including the facilitator model.
2. The Fun Bus, a Massachusetts project for using music and drama
in rural development, was discussed. Oduro recommended it be considered for
adoption by the Institute.
3. The issue of the PEA vs. the Institute was again raised, "To
introduce me as ’Mr. Oduro of the P. E.A, Ghana’ as was sometimes done at
the Centre was a reasonable though serious mistake.
"
4. The alleged lack of a feasibility study, which had taken place in
Ecuador, was criticized.
5. The question of graduate student research was again raised; "We
did not want young graduates who wanted to take advantage of our situation of
topics for their dissertations for a doctorate degree,"
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6. The Center is young and has "no consistent prognmme which we
could see in the States itself."
7 . "The Center tor Inteniational Education is tmly international
The only people I did not meet, and this was no fault of the Centre, were Red
Indians, I would have loved to meet one.
"
Oduro concluded his report with recommendations: That the collabora-
tion should be encouraged; that the Center should study the situation in Ghana
thoroughly; that 'fevery step" in the preliminary work should be undertaken in
cooperation with the Institute; that annual internships at the Center be
established for Ghanaians; that a counterpart relationship be established with
a Ghanaian adult educator in Ghana; and that literacy programs should be
introduced by the project. ^9
In June the Coordinator of the project returned to Amherst and resigned.
During the interregnum before the arrival of the new project director
R. Ishmael Moletsane in September, Oduro wrote Evants to inform him that
Ampene "has not agreed to the Collaboration."^^
Partially as the result of offers from Oduro to assume the role of
project coordinator, the Center developed a policy of offering consultancy
arrangements with those who assisted the development of the project in Ghana,
and Oduro was informed of this policy in a letter in July, And Amherst
staff wrote to explain the situation to McLaughlin: "We felt that it will only
be feasible for the Ghanaian Coordinator to take up this position [toat of Project
Director} when the institutional relationship is cleared up, Letters also
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went out to Ampene andOpare-Abetla. requesting their continuing cooperation
and infonnation on the Proposal for Collaboration.
R. Ishmael Moletsane arrived in Ghana in September, 1977, and his
first official act upon arriving in Koforidua was to hire Vidal Quist, an official
of the PEA m Koforidua and retired civil servant, as a staff member with the
project team. This step had been recommended by both McGowan and
McLaughlin.
In their first conversation in Koforidua, Moletsane and Oduro discussed
a number of issues. Oduro said that collaboration could not proceed until
formal approval had been given by Ampene; that the project must work with
the PEA only through the Institute; that little in the way of transport would be
available through the Institute; and that he was not in favor of the assignment
of Robert Russell to the Eastern Region for work with PEA cultural groups.
Shortly thereafter, Opare-Abetia, in a conversation with McLaughlin,
agreed to Russell's assignment and wrote a letter to him offering his
sponsorship.^^
In early October an important meeting was held between project staff
(Moletsane, McLaughlin and Quist) and Ampene, T. K. Hagan (National
President, PEA) and Opare-Abetia at the Institute office in Legon. At this
meeting, Opear-Abetia officially introduced Moletsane, and he made the
following points: that he had come to assist Ghanaians to achieve some of
their objectives in the field of adult education, and to introduce some new
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techniques and methods to that end; that he had also come to learn from the
Ghanaians; that he was receiving the cooperation of the Institute staff and PEA
members in Koforidua and thanked them for his accommodations; and he
introduced his staff member, Vidal Quist. Ampene replied by welcoming
him and noting that the University of Ghana at Logon's Vice-Chancellor had
been informed of the project activities through a two-page report.
Opare-Abetia informed Ampene about a problem regarding the inter-
pretation placed on consultancies by certain staff of the Institute which had
discomfited Moletsane, Ampene determined he would look into the matter.
The meeting ended with reassurances of cooperation by all parties.^®
Within the following few months project staff initiated development
activities in ten villages; Russell began cultural group workshops in Larteh;
and Moletsane assisted the Eastern Region Institute staff in developing
literacy woricshops. Work also continued with developing a site and classes
for the Koforidua fitters.
In December, meetings were held with Opare-Abetia, Hagan, and
others regarding the possibility of funding for PEA projects directly with
USAID/Ghana. These meetings were held in conjunction with the visit of the
AID/Washington grant monitor, Bernard Wilder. Project staff during this
period were fully involved in the development of village-level programs and
few meetings were held with Institute staff during this period.
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Moletsane's original assignment was for a six-month period. Because
of prior commitments, he could net serve for a longer time. The Amherst
staff requested project staff to explore the possibility of a co-directorship
between Quist and Janice Snith, who had been chosen as Moletsane>s successor
from the Center. Quist was in any event scheduled to visit the Center on an
internship in February, and it ms felt that joint planning could be accomplished
at that time.
During Quist* s internship at the Center, cables and letters were
received from the project indicating that Opare-Abetia had strong reservations
to the co-directorship idea. "Basically, the Institute’s reaction has been that
they were not consulted in the process leading to this decision." Further
problems were discussed in the relationship between the project and the
Institute. These included the pattern that had developed of the project working
directly with the National Secretary instead of through the eastern region office;
the long-range continuation of the project, and funding for its ccaitinuation;
and Opare-Abetia further indicated that the Institute would expect that any funded
position should go to an Institute person.58 in a meeting later in February,
Opare-Abetia reminded McLaughlin that the PEA is dependent on the Institute,
and that a previous PEA President had failed in an attempt to separate the PEA
from the Institute because the PEA was so dependent c«i the Institute for even
the small amount of resources it received frem them,^^
Faced with these objections, Amherst staff decided to send Smith as
Project Administrator, and to let the other staff positions work thanselves
out after discussions with project staff in Koforidua.
Shortly after Smith's arrival, and Immediately prior to Moletsane's
departure, one of the village projects with which the team had been working
was inagurated by the Regional Commissioner. The Reghmal Conmissioner
is the representative of the central government at the regional level. During
this ceremonial meeting (which was also addressed by Moletsane). the
Commissioner said that he was somewhat embarrassed that foreigners had
come to show the leadership that should have been perfoimed by Ghanaians.
Members of Institute staff took this as a criticism of both the PEA
and the Institute, and at a meeting with project staff on the same morning as
the ceremony, promised more support for the work of project staff from the
Eastern Regional Office. It was further suggested that the project "build
models, not do community development work,
Also, during Quist's internship, the remaining team members in
Ghana, all Americans, decided not to consider further the ideal of a co-
directorship with a Ghanaian. The reasons they gave were two-fold. To
begin with, the Institute had premised further assistance to the team and
further collaboration, although apparently unspecified in nature. The team.
at this time, decided to work more closely with the National Secretary of
the PEA. Further, with less than a year ranaining, it was thought that the
attempt to convince the Institute to accept a PEA co-director was not worth
the effort,
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During the period March to June there was more frequent contact
between the project team and Institute Personnel. The team co-hosted a
leaders' workshop with the Institute in late February, and were joined for the
first time by Ms. Fanny Dontoh, a PEA member from Accra who had a special
interest in literacy.
The team also held joint planning sessions with the Koforidua staff of
the Institute during this period.
The Senior Organizer for the Institute became interested in adapting
the facilitator model used in Ecuador to Ghana. O.fher potential joint projects
discussed included consciousness-raising for community development; testing
of the Ashton-Warner literacy method; and a one-day school on co-ops.
At about this time two trips were under discussion. The first was a
long-planned trip by Opare-Abetia to the Center in Amherst to discuss a
revision of the collaborative agreement. The Center requested that all parties
to the agreement, including the PEA President, T. K. Hagan, advise and
consent to the trip. The second was a suggested trip by UMass faculty
member Linda Abrams to work with Institute staff in the area of organizational
development training and with project staff in preparing facilitator training
programs. The first trip never occurred, possibly because of the difficulties
in getting approval from all concerned; and the Abrams trip met with resistance
at first from the National Secretary, He preferred that PEA members rather
than Institute staff receive training.
The Director of the Institute, however, saw some merit in having the
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kind of training that was projected, and thought that such a visit and training
by a UMass faculty member nr ight be useful in retraining Institute staff in the
methods and techniques of nonfoimal education, hr this conversation with the
project administrator, the history of the PEA/Institute relationship was also
discussed, and it was agreed that the Institute was a key factor in the PEA's
revitalization. Past political problems had hampered the work of the PEA
leadership, and a long recovery was seen to be in progress.
Another member of the Institute staff offered some frank criticism of
the past performance of project staif. The first project administrator had
lost the opportunity to bring some rapid program development; too many
graduate students working on their dissertations followed; the structure of the
project staff is unclear; in general, project staff have been too casual about
status relationships. Consequently, Institute staff are often unable to relate
with project staff.64
During the period immediately before the arrival of Abrams, the
project staff sponsored a literacy workshop, and the first joint project/
Institute Issues Paper was published: "What Have We Learned from Cultural
Groups and Where Do We Go From Here?” by Robert Russell and Lawrence
Okraku. Further, in the Annual Report of the People’s Educational
Association, written by the National Secretary, the project was prominently
mentioned for the first time in a publication by the Institute:
The worthy contribution the UMass Team is making
Hn the literacy area] must also be mentioned. In
collaboration with the Eastern Region office of the
168
Institute of Adult Education and the Regional Executive
of the PEA, the team has organized a number of woric-
shops on literacy methods vviiich have given some PEA
members the skills for mounting literacy programmes.
It is no wonder then that the Eastern R^ion has the higher
number of literacy classes run by PEA members. 65
Abrams visit took place from June 3 to July 23, 1977. During her
visit, she helped plan three facilitator training workshops, two of which were
conducted during her stay, and in addition developed informal organization
development seminars for project staff. The latter included bringing together
the PEA Executive with project staff to write drafts of a funding proposal for
AID (originally discussed during Wilder's visit in December). Fundamental
to this process was the Institute Director's approval to the PEA to seek separate
funding, which represented a shift from past positions.
On the 27th of July, the project staff were invited by the Institute
Director to make a presentaticm on the work of the project in the Eastern
Region. It was the first time that project staff had been invited to attend an
official Institute function and the staff decided that "we could best present
our 'collaborative* program if we did it with all partners in the collaboration
represented. Therefore, we asked Mr. Hagan to accompany us.
. .
"®'^PEA
officials (aside from the National Secretary, of course, an Institute staff
member) had not in the recent past been invited to an Institute staff gathering.
The discussion and questions after the presentation touched on four
issues: (1) Cultural Groups, (2) History of the Collaboration, (3) What
could be learned from the project to date, and (4) The future of the program.
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Attention was focused on the history of the collaboration, and the Institute
Director was asked by other staff why transportaticn and acccmmodation had
not been provided to project staff. He replied that none had been promised;
and that moreover, he had never formally approved the collaboration, because
he did not know vjhat to report to the Vice-Chancellor. Moletsane‘s report,
which had been distributed, he found to be in error on this matter—that of
transport—and he asked that the report be amended.
Institute staff also raised the quest icai as to whether the project was a
research program or an action project. Project staff responded that it had
been designed "from the beginning" with "both the goals of establishing a
program and doing research."
During the meeting, the PEA National Secretary stated that relations
with the PEA National Executive (elected officers) were excellent; he was
countered by the National President, who disagreed, and called attention to
the fact that in spite of repeated requests from the Executive, and in contra-
vention of the PEA constitution, no executive committee meeting had been
called during the year. (Because the Executive Secretary controlled the PEA
budget, it was impossible for an executive to reimburse associated meeting
expenses such as travel and board costs without his sanction.) Consequently,
the Secretary was censured by his colleagues for refusing to call a meeting
of the executive. The matter would not have been raised except for the
presence of the PEA President.®^
Durir^ the summer and fall of 1977, three facilitator workshops and
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a number of cultural group meetings were held. On September 2nd, the
Water-Supply Project at the village of Okarase was brought to completion with
a ceremony addressed by the Regional Commissioner. In his speech he noted
the ’’patriotic and communal spirit” of the community and congratulated "the
people and all those individuals in this village and especially our friends from
the University of Massachusetts whose invaluable effort and assistance have
made the dream of pipe-bome water to the people here materialize,
Much of the latter part of the fall was taken up with discussions about
how aspects of the project could continue after the team had disbanded. The
fitters’ classes were premised continuation when the Institute agreed to assign
a field organizer to oversee the fitters’ project. The German Adult Education
Association agreed to donate $1, 700 worth of mechanics’ tools for the fitters’
classes. The Regional Cemmissioner agreed to pay the salary of McLaughlin’s
co-worker, Jenas Kwablah, as well as donating supplies and equipment.
The PEA agreed to follow-up the literacy classes with a committee to
oversee the classes that were bemg held in the Eastern Region. The same
method was followed to contiaue facilitator activities. In fact, both of these
activities, as well as cultural group functions, were expected to be subsumed
under the new PEA grant from AID, Further, cultural group activities in the
Atebubu area were being continued and expanded under a new AID grant.
Also during the fall, the Institute Director traveled abroad for study
and was succeeded by his deputy, and the National Secretary resigned and was
replaced by Lawrence Okraku,
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With respect to the Institute, there was no summary judgement on the
collaboration with the Center, just as there had been no formal approval of the
collaborative agreement. At the closing ceremony of the project, however,
the new National Secretary made the following comments:
They [the UMass group] have ccme on a research
project and we as a university department are
interested in the result of this research, because
this is the time that we are laying greater emphasis
on nonformal educatic8i« I am very sure that with the
impetus they have given to the Eastern Region PEA,
with the identification of what nonformal education can
be and is, we shall be able to help other branches of
the PEA in the whole of the country to carry on with
nonformal education programs.
The People* s Educational Association
hi this and the following section, mention of specific project meetings,
events, plans, etc., will only be referred to vvhen they have not been mentioned
in previous sections or when they are seen in a different perspective.
No significant meetings occurred between representatives of UMass
and executive officers of the People*s Educational Association during the
planning stages of the project. This was no doubt in part due to the innocence
of the Americans with respect to the institutional relationships between the
Institute and the PEA: They believed, apparently with logic, that when they
spoke to the National Secretary of the PEA, that they were speaking to the
PEA executive and to the chief representative of its membership. The
distinction between elected and appointed leaders of the PEA was not under-
stood at that time. In additicn, it is likely that strained relations between
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the National Secretary and the elected leadership of the PEA contributed to a
lack of communication during early stages between UMass and the PEA
executive. As early as November, 1975, the minutes of the PEA Executive
record the strain between the National Secretary and the Executive: "Members
wanted to know where the National Secretaiy«s loyalty lies, since he seemed to
serve the Institute of Adult Education and the P. E.A. It was pointed out that
this clarification was raised because members felt the National Secretary
appeared to lean too much towards the Institute in his work than the
Association. "72
It was not until May of 1976 that the UMass team—at that time consisting
of McGowan and McLaughlin=-was formally introduced to the PEA by the
National Secretary, at a meeting of the Regional Executive in Koforidua in the
Eastern Region (although both had travelled extensively to visit local PEA
chapters with the National Secretary prior to that date). At that meeting the
National Secretary intimated.
. .
that the Americans came here to share their
ideas and experience with us but do not offer an aid programme as the German
Adult Education was doing. " McGowan, in response, noted that "after one
year's stay he would return to the Unived States and that he would be replaced
by a Ghanaian Coordinator to represent the University of Massachusetts."
McLaughlin explained he would be working in "community involvement of the
P. Eo A. and to make research on his own for his dissertation which would be
useful for both Ghana and other parts of the world. " In response, Vidal
Quist, on behalf of the Regional Executive, "expressed gratitude to the
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Americans for the Scholarships granted to Messrs. K. A. Odoru.
. . and Mr.
E. N. Tettey.
.
.
" And the Chainnan, T. K. Hagan, who had recently re-
turned frcm a nine-month training leave, "appealed to members.
. . to find
accommodation for the Americans.
Members of the PEA sought clarification from McGowan on how a
program of nonfoimal education would relate to their own aspirations and
improve the quality of life for their areas. Generally, McGowan replied that he
had come to assist Ghanaians achieve their own aspirations and to improve the
quality of their lives. How he would assist Ghanaians to achieve their
aspirations was not made explicit. Further, "some members of the People's
Educational Association very much doubted that an outside agency could
assist Ghanaians without investment of any equipment and/or money. " And
when McGowan resigned and returned to the United States, he left "without
officially bidding good bye to the officers and members of the People's Educa-
tional Association with whom he was supposed to collaborate." Many members
of the local PEA then "drew the unfortunate ccaaclusion that he might be a
Central Intelligence Agency official who had come to collect information on
Ghanaians for subversion by his organization." '^^
It was against this backdrop that the second project coordinator, R. I.
Moletsane, took over some three months later in September. His first
negotiations with the Institute Senior Resident Tutor in Koforidua for trans-
portation and office help were unsuccessful. But through the efforts of
McLaughlin, Hagan, and Quist, lodging and office space were soon secured.
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By October Moletsane had made the decision to collaborate directly with the
PEA through the National President, National Executive, and local Regional
Executive, although he occasionally solicited the advice of the Institute Senior
Resident Tutor.
By October 1st, on the recommendation of Hagan, Vidal Quist was
appointed as a team project staff member. In so doing, he temporarily solved
the transportation problem, since Quist agreed to lease his car to the project.
Together, the enlarged team decided to launch village-level nonformal
education development work, with the specific type of assistance to be de-
termined by the villages themselves. Because of transportation concerns
(distance from Koforidua), only three of the villages selected had PEA branches.
Moletsane began attending Koforidua Branch PEA meetings on a regular basis,
and was soon familiar with most of the PEA members in the Koforidua area.
The attitude of PEA members toward the project began to change. "He always
made it plain that he had come to learn and share ideas and not to impose an
ideology on Ghanaianst As an African coming immediately after a white
American to start projects with rural people in their own settings, the members
of the People’s Educational Association began to abandon the notion that the
University of Massachusetts Team was another CIA outfit."
By the end of October, eight projects in nearby villages had been
identified. Further, a decision had been reached to invite Russell to work
with PEA cultural groups, and permission had been received from the National
secretary and local PEA officials. Transportation was still a problem,
however. Roads in the Eastern Region are rough, and spare parts for auto-
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mobiles are expensive when available at all, Quist could not be adequately
compensated for the wear and tear on his car.
Through December, in the space of three months, a large number of
village-level projects had been activated, cultural group activities were being
supported by the team, and the first Joint PEA/lAE/Project activity was
presented, a Regional Workshop on Literacy, which was addressed by
Moletsane. Work with the fitters* project was continuing. Further, Quist’
s
trip to UMass for study of nonformal education and joint planning had been
agreed upon. At this time the National President of the PEA observed that
the team "is playing the role of organizers for the PEA, helping in literacy
work, trying to find out problems in the villages.
. .
During discussion between Hagan, Moletsane, Quist, Russell and the
visiting Dr. Wilder from AID/Washington in December, 1976, the topic of
direct AID funding for the PEA was discussed. AID/Ghana was able to support
voluntary organizations through a direct contract, and the above-mentioned
group entered into discussions on what kinds of funding would be most
appropriate. It was felt that money to hire PEA organizers could be utilized
at the regional levels of the PEA. A small committee was formed consisting
of a member of the project team and representatives of the PEA and Institute
to explore development of a contract proposal.
At this time, another series of changes began in the project. Because
of prior committments, Moletsane had to return to the University of
Massachusetts to complete his degree work. Quist began a six-week intern-
176
ship at the Center. Although it had been originally suggested by Amherst
staff that Quist be returned as co-director with Janice Snith, who was to take
Moletsane’s place as administrator of the prc^ram in Ghana, the Institute
refused to accept this arrangement Despite further communications on this
subject frcm the Amherst staff, neither the Institute nor the project staff
seemed ready to take this step.
Subsequently to that time through early summer of 1977, relations
between the PEA leadership and the project staff, as well as internal relation-
ships, became strained. Quist later wrote that he felt that he "was not
involved in decision-making" and that decisions were made over and above
his head. This lack of communication, he believed, "seemed to create
favouritism, racist and coloniM attitudes on the part of the white team
members." At this time in the project's development, each team member
had his or her own project: Russell was workmg with cultural groups,
McLaughlin with the fitters, Quist with the village development programs,
and Snlth began her work in Koforidua on the literacy groups. Hence, for a
period, there could hardly be said to be a team project.
A contributing problem arose from the tacit decision on the part of the
team (with the exception of Quist, who did not agree with this policy) to
maintain primary communications with the Institute, A great many contacts
were made with Institute personnel during this period. The subjects of these
meetings were generally discussions of process, of how better programs
could be developed, of any areas in which a commonality of program interests
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could be exploited. These conversations generally foundered on the limits
of the Institute's mandate: The Institute was interested in conducting research
into literacy, project development and the like, but were generally uninterested
in mounting specific projects. At the same time, project staff, again with the
exception of Quist, allowed communication with PEA officials to diminish,
despite the need for cooperation toward the development of ideas on how to
continue project operations beyond to termination date of the project in
December, 1977.
A trip to Ghana by a UMass faculty member had long been considered
by project and UMass staff, and Abrams arrived in July at the same time as
did Elvyn Jones-Dube, who was to work with Quist on the village development
programs and on a general assessment of the project. Because of letters
written by various staff members to Center staff, indicating widely diverging
approaches and growing problems, it is possible that Abrams and Jones-Dube
were more aware of project problems than were some project staff. After
wide-ranging discussions with PEA, Institute and project staff, Abrams
instituted structured oiganization development training with two purposes: To
clarify project purpose and the relationship of various parts of the project,
and to stimulate frank discussion of various problems among project staff.
In addition, she began to serve as liaison with PEA staff through the PEA
Regional Executive Committee.
Further, Abrams planned and helped implement workshops for
facilitators connected with the project, and helped refocus project efforts on
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village-level development projects and facilitator training.
The consequences of Abrams' visit were:
1. An increased project staff agreement on project purpose and
methods;
2. A broadened base of "constructive collaboration" with the "PEA
Regional Executive Committee and the facilitators them selves" "78
3, Increased project staff skill levels in organization and planning;
4, Renewed emphasis on village-level facilitator projects and
training.
It should be pointed out that the stage had already been set for many of
these developments during the previous three or four months; Abrams* visit
had the fundamental effect of providing staff with skills and information so that
impediments to the successful completion of project efforts could be removed.
Upon her return she noted that a degree of "American arrogance and
condescension toward Ghanaians" among project staff had been turned around
once meetings began with the PEA R^ional Executive Committee—"Both on
the [contract proposal] and on the ongoing activities of the current project.
There were seme real changes in the amount and kind of Ghanaian involvement
—
possibly a growing recognition on the part of some of the Americans involved
79
that the Ghanaians in fact had a great deal to offer.
"
From this point through to the phase-out of the project, cooperation
continued between the PEA and project team. This was especially true in the
development of the proposal to AID for the continuation of many of the
activities undertaken jointly by the project and the PEA. Quist wrote that
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the PEA will henceforth play an important role in the implementation of the
set project goals. And in fact it was the intercession of the project team
that induced the Institute to invite the PEA President, T. K. Hagan, to the
Institute staff conference that reinforced the PEA*s acceptance as a co-equal
partner in the dual relationship. It was also during this time period that the
Institute began to accept the idea of outside funding for the PEA.
F rcm the PEA’s point of view, the major problem that evolved at the
end of the project was the difficulty in making the transition from the project
initiated by UMass to that initiated by the PEA and funded directly to them.
The transiticn period (the time between the end of the first program and the
beginning of the second) lasted about eight months, and for that period there
were no significant financial resources available to the PEA, The PEA, on
its own, paid for the rent for the project office in Koforidua; but the PEA
President felt that the Center should have done more to ease the transition.
At the end of the project, interviews were held with facilitators and
other staff, and a closing ceremony was held. The following lists some
statements as to the outcomes of the project through comments of PEA staff
and facilitators.
1. "The essence of the training the University of Massachusetts Team
has so far given to the facilitators, both the People's Educational Association
and non-People's Educational Association member, is that they should try to
do things systematically and pull their own bootstraps and that the members
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of the People's Educational Association should seriously think of this in order
to restructure the . . .Association not only to be a vehicle for learning but
a truly respectable democratic association of adults, "82
2. The Okorase cultural group training "has raised the consciousness
of my people in the community to Imow the importance of having social
amenities in the area which they lacked. And by putting up skits it has
encouraged them considerably to put up a building for a health center which we
will soon put up. '83
3. In Okarase the team has "already opened the door between us and
the government.
. . . Now the distance between Okarase and Koforidua is
shortened by creating friends from Kofodirua.
4. Pvnowlec^e has been acquired "to organize things in an orderly
manner, by planning and following through, and to evaluate what you have done
and to improve on one's performance. "8^ "We can competently identify, we
can competently analyze our own local problems and find right solutions to
them. Is that not a wonderful gift? Is it not worth more than money can
buy ?'^ 86
Counterbalancing these favorable responses are those, primarily from
Institute staff, which see the project as having failed in its research functions
and in communicating sufficiently with institute staff.
. . .
Apart from the cultural and mechanics projects which
have well defined objectives, the other aspects of the
collaboration programme have lacked well defined objectives
.... Without such clarifications a university non-formal
education project becomes just another agency for the
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provision of welfare services which has only a limited
objective once the service intended has been established
. . . . Cto the ^\dlole the programme has been a very
useful one but its full potential and implications are
yet to be realized, ” 87
The Center for International Educaticai
It may be well to remember that the purpose of the grant which funded
much of the project in Ghana was ”to increase the capability of the University
of Massachusetts to assist collaboratively developing countries, particularly in
rural areas, with development-oriented nonfoimal education programs. ”88
From this, as well as from other sectims of the Grant Document, the Center
identified three major functions that it expected the site project to fulfill for
the Center itself:
1, To develop a nonform al education prc^ram with an organization in
a third-world country;
2o To provide training, research, and materials development
opportunities for staff and students; and
3, To develop and test the ccmcept of collaborative programs.
Over the course of the program, the events of which have been
documented in previous sections, several issues arose which are significant
to a discussion of university-based international programs.
The nature of collaborative programs
To develop a theory of collaborative program development, two key
ingredients are required: An analytic framework which outlines the pre-
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conditions and other requirements for such programs; and a series of
implementation activities, that is to say, steps by which the probability of the
development of such programs becomes more likely.
At the beginning of the project, neither the framework nor the
implementaticai activities had been defined. What existed was the stated
intention of the Center to test various models of collaborative program develop-
ment which differed frcsn past technical assistance programs in that there was
to be a sharing of at least certain project objectives between cooperating
organizations, and, as the grant document stated, to work with host-country
officials "to set policy, plan programs, implement them and evaluate their
effectiveness and impact.”
This then became one of the two major research objectives of the
grant, the other being the continued testing of nonformal education methods
and techniques in the training, material development, and delivery system
areas.
The initially inchoate formulation of collaborative program develop-
ment led to conditions in which the prediliction of individual staff played a
larger role in project development than would have normally been the case;
and staff changes were consequently of greater importance to project direction
than usual.
The Center Guidelines played a background role as a stabilizing
conceptual force, and it was to the principles contained therein that Center
staff returned for direction at key points in the program. Some examples will
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illustrate the project changes that resulted.
The first project coordinator in Ghana believed that the role of ex-
patriot staff should be primarily in two areas; To assist Ghanaians in
identifying areas in which changes in consciousness levels would result in
societal changes, and to serve as a faciliator in changing the level of
consciousness of educated (or credentialed) Ghanaians so that a deeper under-
standing of societal inequities would be reached. The program he outlined in
a paper published by the Institute was basically a revolutionary one, in which
he concluded; ’’Only the Ghanaian who is committed, in helping to build a
Just Society for the future of his children—can be a motivator in such a
program no foreigner can fill this role.'®^ It is one of the ironies of the
situation that because of this dialogic approach the coordinator was thought
by many Ghanaians to be an intelligence agent; in any event, he soon realized
that his approach in this context could not be productive and, perhaps in part
because of this realization, resigned.
At the time the second coordinator arrived, it was apparent that without
^ecific program development the project was bound to fail. Within a very
short period of time, a number of village-level projects were developed with
the cooperaticm of PEA officials, without much regard for rhetoric or ideology.
The projects were classic community development efforts. What made them
collaborative was that the project staff began acting as organizers for the PEA,
as the National President pointed out later; and since the PEA had been involved,
at least in part, in nonformal education activities from its inception, the project
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staff brought skills and resources that the PEA readily incorporated. In fact,
this model, the use of full-time organizers working on project development
activities as the backbone of a revitalized PEA, was later adopted in the
proposal that the PEA wrote for funding through AID. And the same basic
project development process was used in developing the project’s work with
the cultural groups, the literacy classes, and for a portion of the fitter’s
program.
For a period after the arrival of the third and last project coordinator,
the project focus again began a shift, this time toward more formal research
projects with the Institute, However, the further the project focus moved from
village level work, the more separated it became frcm its source of strength.
The research or project development quandry
A dilemma basic to this analysis ccncerns the motivation of institutions
and individuals to engage in project development work. Because it is basic,
the dilemma was expressed in various ways. In its purest forms, it concerns
the question of who reaps the benefits of project development. The entire
issue of collaborative programs stems from the need to assure an equitable
distributicn of the benefits of projects.
The early radical critics believed the grant was a part of a neo-
colcaiialist activities, and hence could not benefit anyone except the riders of
the status quo. The Center Guidelines were ccnstructed to help assure that
communities involved in Center projects benefited from the programs. And
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the concept of coUaboratlve programs was an outgrowth of this same concern.
Another expression of this dualism is to be found in the issue of the
relative importance of research or grass-roots project development. The Grant
Document attempted to resolve the dualism by stating certain premises;
The belief that skills and knowledge are learned as
much through direct immersion in actual problem
situations as through academic treatment of subjects
. .
.; the committment to continuous direct participa—
ticai by people.
. . for which education is being planned;
the conviction that all ideas and techniques must be
either derived from field situation or face early reality
testing in settings for which they are intended. 91
This concern has found expression in another context—whether the
Center's programs should be considered service projects, research projects,
or graduate student training. 92 Within the Center itself, the consequence of the
ordering of these priorities determines the amount of faculty and student time
and other resources spent on competing activities—courses, proposal develop-
ment, field projects, research and evaluation activities, work on comprehensive
papers and dissertations, and the like.
In Ghana, this dualism operated in two basic areas: Among the
Ghanaians and their attitude toward the legitimacy of various Center activities,
and toward different views of their own priorities; and among the project staff
toward the two institutions with which they worked.
The concern shown by various Institute staff with respect to graduate
student research is most pronounced. It was only when such research was
directly linked to project development activities, as in the case of the fitters’
cooperative, that such research was at least in part legitimized.
186On the other hand, officials of the Institute and the PEA split in their
views of the legitimacy of various types of project activities. Institute staff
considered research activities to be by far the most important, and project
development activities alone as unjustified. On the whole, PEA staff were of
.the opposite opinion: That research without project development activities was
counte rproduct ive
,
Hence the ambiguous attitude within the Center found a similar split in
the attitudes of the members of the two principal organizations with which the
Center worked. This in turn helps to account for the changes in the course
of the project over time both toward and away from each of the extremes-
research or project development.
The Okorase Pipe-Borne Water Project, seen in this context, is a
crucial event in the history of the nonfoimal educaticm program in Ghana. It
was the most complete exemplification of the project (as opposed to the research)
approach adopted by the second coordinator. It crystallized opinions within the
PEA and the Institute regarding the efficacy of nonfoimal education and the
facilitator method. And it put the entire project on record as choosing the
village-level development approach as its fundamental m ethod of operation.
Within the spectrum of activities represented by the Institute and the
HEA, the Okarase and other village development projects came closest to
representing the approach of the PEA. It was natural, therefore, when the
project team was invited to attend the Institute staff seminar (during the summer
of 1977), that the PEA President should attend as a member of this group. The
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result was a newmeasure of legitimacy for these types of programs within the
Institute, and the approval of Institute staff for funding for such efforts, from
outside oiganizations as well as by provision of additional organizers paid for
by the Institute to service PEA regional groups.
During the transition to the last coordinator of the project, however,
the focus of the project efforts again became unclear for a period of about five
months. During this time, there was a sense of uncertainty about whether the
project should work on village-level projects with the PEA or on demonstraticn
and research with the Institute. Again the question of the ultimate beneficiaries
of the project was raised, and the Ghanaian member of the project staff, who
was also a PEA official of the Eastern Region, seriously questioned the project's
sincerity and purpose. The Amherst staff gave the following advice to the
Ghana project staff: "Please don’t spend all your time at the Institute level,
because we are not there to convince the Institute of the importance of NFE,
but to aid the villages in their village development activities. "^3 And,
Collaboration.
. .
can happen at different levels at different
times, and conversely can fail at different levels at different
times. But we must always work with the people and their
representatives as our first priority. . . . Since the
project does not give away diplomas, money, or Volkswagon
busses, it must provide programs which help people to
achieve their own goals—whether it be learning how to
read, clean water, or whatever. The people’s achievement
then legitimizes our own struggle. ... In the long run—the
very distant horizon— it doesn’t matter if our work is
recognized as useful by officials. It is important that the
village people see it as important. But the approval of
others may or may not come, (Such official approval is
great for annual reports and future funding but is not worth
buying on false pretences,), . . Also, your question, "Is
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itmore important that we do NFE or that we try to do it
with the PEA and the lAE, ” can be answered, it is more
important to cany out the NFE village-level programs.
.
.94
These concepts—or sentiments— refer back to the Center's Guidelines and to
the Grant Document,
The period of uncertainty ended with the staff training conducted by
Abrams and in the planning and the implementatim of the three facilitator
training projects conducted during the summer of 1977. Ultimately, the Center
and the project had chosen to accept the premise that nonformal education must
be based at the grass-roots level; that projects can only be legitimized through
the participation and collaboration of local groups and individuals. And in
working with the PEA to secure funding for the continuation of project activities,
the Center assured that the activities would continue beyond the termination of
this particular program.
Outcomes and Long-Range Effects
Many of the project outcomes have been described in considerable
QC
detail in Nonformal Education in Ghana—A Project Report
.
and will not be
repeated here. However, some general observations should be made.
Most of the activities begun or supported by the project are continuing.
These include, for example, the following village development activities:
In Suhyen, a day-care center. Sugarcane Growers Association, and Consumers’
Cooperative Society for purchasing essential commodities; road-building in
Nyerede; School Constructim in Jumapo; and extension of the pipe-bome
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water system in Okorase to nearby viUages.^® Toward the end of the project
It was reported that the demand for assistance by the project team from
viUage leaders "enthusiastic about our nondirective approach" exceeded the
ability of the staff to meet it,^"^
The Cultural Group Activities are also continuing under a contract from
AID to a group called APPLE (Association of People for Practical Life
Education) in the Atebubu region. It appears, however, that this project has
little if any current ties with the PEA and so PEA officials have had to fall
back on their ovm resources in support of cultural groups in the Eastern
Region,^®
The Literacy Team set up at the end of the project continues to function
in support of literacy classes in various villages, although at a diminished
capacity because of transport and travel reimbursement restrictions.
The fitters program also ccmtinues. The Institute has agreed to pay
instructors for evening classes and the building to be used as a vocatiaial
center has been renovated through assistance of the Institute. Tools for the
classes have arrived from Germany. Progress toward relocation of the
Koforidua Wayside Fitters to anew locaticn proceeds slowly pending release
of the necessary funds from the Regional Govemment.^^^
The general collaboration between the PEA and the Center is also
continuing. The PEA has requested that the Center send two staff members
to Koforidua for a period of about aie year in the areas of management and
training, under its new contract with USAID/Ghana. Vidal Quist is the
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Director of this two-year contract, and he has taken over the old project
offices at the roundabout in Koforidua, Further agricultural/ cooperative
development funding may also be forthcoming from AID for other PEA regional
office So
The new contract for the Eastern Region will carry on many of the
activities supported by project staff including cultural groups, literacy training
and village development projects.
Both caution and optimism can be expressed over the long-range
effects of the original collaborative project. There is a considerable danger
in claiming more for this project than was its true effect. For example, the
resurgence of the PEA is no doubt a consequence of factors which spring frcm
changing socio-political factors in Ghana and the leadership qualities of
current executive officers. Perhaps the true value of the project to the PEA
is that, as the Naticaial President noted, the progress of the PEA would have
been slower without the catalytic effects of the project.^^^ In addition, the
project introduced certain nonformal education techniques, such as the training
for facilitators and the Ashton-Wamer learner-centered literacy concept,
which have generated considerable enthusiasm in the Ghanaian context.
It is highly doubtful that the Institute has been particularly benefited
by the Project except to the extent that there are more creative and dynamic
relations now between the PEA and the Institute than there were three years
ago. Here again, caution in interpreting the effects of the project is advisable,
since relationships between the two oiganizaticais have undergone considerable
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fluctuations over the thirty years since their operations began, and recent
changes may be more attributable to staffing issues than to effects of the
project.
It is important to note that both the PEA and the Institute are aware of
the dangers as weU as the advantages of outside support. They have agreed to
strengthen their interrelationships by forming a combined board to review
progress under the new contract. In addition, and most significantly, the
PEA has determined to establish a revolving fund for the support of projects
after outside support has terminated. 102
AID has also reaped certain advantages through the project. Two and
possibly three separate contracts have been established directly with Ghanaian
organizations as a consequence of the project. It terms of AID’s most recent
mandates to establish direct linkages with organizations in third-world
103
countries, the project must be seen as successful, at least in part.
The Center also has benefitted through training opportunities made
available to graduate students and staff; through the opportunities it has had to
test methods and techniques in nonformal education; through the international
contacts made as a result of the project; through the opportunity to test the
concept of collaborative development; and through direct and indirect support
of the Center and its students. Whether or not the project has brought about
the enhancement of the Center's reputation remains to be seen.
The project has represented a step in the development of the Center.
It has Icgically followed from the Ecuador Project, and has implications for
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the search toward solutions of problems in international educationo The last
chapter will discuss this area in more detail.
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CHAPTER VI
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS
IN ECUADOR AND THAILAND
The two prcgratns outlined below chronolcgically bracket the Ghana
Program; The Ecuador Project was the first program in nonformal education
developed by the Center for International Education, and the Thailand
program, still ongoing, is one of the most recent. The Ecuador Project
was funded from 1972 to 1975 through a direct contract with the Agency for
International Development (AID); the final year, 1975-76, was funded through
the Government of Ecuador. The Center's program arrangements with the
Government of Thailand have been funded in part by a grant from AID, and
began in early 1977.
The programs are presented here as contrasting representatives of
what have been termed collaborative programs, and because they suggest
different approaches to international educational development that may be
taken by universities. Taken together with the Center's program in Ghana,
they suggest a range and variety of prc^ram types in international
education.
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The Nonformal Education Projent.
in Ecuador
The Ecuador Project has been a frequently evaluated and painstakingly
well-documented effort. For those ^^^o want a more comprehensive outline
of the project than the following synopsis, James Hoxeng's Let Jorge Do Tt.
and the Center*
s informal Education in Ecuador. 1971-1975
^
are recom-
mended.^ The synopsis presented here outlines the phases of the project,
the methods and techniques developed during its lifetime, and some of its
characteristic and unique features.
The Ecuador Project can be conveniently understood as having four
phases: exploration, experimentation, implementation, and institutionaliza-
tion. Even before the exploration phase, however, there were those who
were looking at ways in which education and learning could be rethought
so that it could reach larger numbers of people and help them to transform
their lives. The concept of schoolmg and certification came under attack
from a number of intellectuals, including Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich.^
Their objections to schooling centered around its function of legitimizing
privilege within society, and consequently stifling a transformation to a
more just society.
Some of the members of the Center met and discussed these issues
with niich and F reire at various seminars; niich visited the University in
1970 and these concepts were debated. At the same time m Ecuador, these
issues were being talren up by both Americans and Ecuadorians. When
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representatives of these various groups met in 1970
,
they found that they
had many common assumptions of the kinds of changes needed in order to
make learning a more effective vehicle for social transformation.
The three groups that eventually joined forces to develop the Ecuador
project were members of the Center for International Education at the
University of Massachusetts; staff members of USAIDin Ecuador; and
Ecuadorians with private organization and governmental connections in
Quito. They shared the conviction that the time was ripe to mount an
experimental program in rural nonformal education in Ecuador.
The Exploration Phase
After an initial series of meetings in Quito and Amherst, individual
members of the Center were invited to conduct a feasability study for the
development of a nonformal educaticai pregram in Ecuador. The four-
person team conducted a thorough survey and wrote a report which, in its
findings, contained recommendations which were eventually to be adopted
in the development of the project. The report further surveyed some twenty
different Ecuadorian organizations involved in a variety of nonformal
education activities. Many of these organizatiens were later to become
involved with the University of Massachusetts Project either as program
collaborators or as users of Project techniques, methods or educational
curriculum.
Ctae of the organizations identified by the feasability team was the
Center tor Motivation and Advisory Services (CEMA), which had a contract
from USAID to develop community-based education programs in rural
communities in the provinces of Chimborazo and Tungurahua. Patricio
Barriga. then a consultant to USAID in community education, suggested
the project in April, although it was not formally initiated until December
of that year. At that time Jim Hoxeng was working in Quito with USAID
on a personal services contract and developed the original version of the
Hacienda Game and the Ashton-Warner Literacy Method® for the CEMA
Project.
The CEMA Project began with the following hypothesis;
That the level of efficacy of campesino community members
would be increased to the extent that they would better utilize
the existing process of non-formal education , and take
advantage of the action promoted by the facilitators under the
program, 4
Facilitators were described as coming "from the community itself, trained
by the program, who are not teachers in the traditional sense but serve as
resources that promote, catalyze and stimulate learning through using the
non-formal education processes.”^
By the time the University of Massachusetts Project (hereafter called
the UMass Project) began in January 1972, two of its stafj^ Barriga and
Hoxeng, had already been involved in nonformal education activities in
Ecuador. CEMA then entered into an agreement with the UMass Project to
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'introduce literacy materials and visit each community monthly for the
duration of the project.
The Experimental Phase
Thus the transition from the exploratory to the experimental phase of
the project was smoothed by the fact that the staff were conversant with a
number of existing efforts in nonformal education. Indeed, a principal
strategy of the early development of the UlVIass project was to serve existing
organizations who were working in the area of nonfoimal education.
During the experimental phase of the project, a number of nonformal
methods and techniques were created and offered to organizations working
in the field for pilot-te sting and further development. Most of the development
of the early games and simulations developed during this stage of the process
was done in Quito, although some were created in Amherst and sent to field
staff for testing.
Organizations often guard their information as a source of power. The
UMass Project took the opposite tack. One of the first and most significant
activities of the UMass Project vra.s a "show and tell" session for a wide
variety of representatives of organizations dealing with adult and nonformal
education programs frcm around the country. During this session, and
subsequent ones, individuals were invited to try out seme of the ideas,
methods and techniques developed by the UMass Project. These were
'Tiands-on laboratories to vvhich everyone known to us who might be interested
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in using the materials was invited. The day-long sessions, over vvhich
time participants played the games, developed and redeveloped a number of
them, and made suggestions as to how they could be modified. One of the
early participants in these sessions was Carlos Poveda, then head of the
Adult Education Division of the Ministry of Education. Representatives of
fifteen other public and private organizations attended.
These sessions established the UMass Project’s ''bona fides" and
indicated, as one of the staff later noted, that "we weren’t coming in like
two empty glasses trying to fill each other. The sessions also served to
demonstrate the concerns that lay behind the games, simulations and other
ideas: That the UMass Project was intending to develop inexpensive,
learner-centered methods which would be diverse enough to meet a wide
variety of needs.
During the experimental stage, the project worked intensively with the
facilitators project through and with CEMA; with Radio Mensaje, for which
it provided tape recorders; for the Federation of Rice Cooperatives, through
a training program developed in cooperation with Department of Adult
Education of the Ministry of Education; with the Ecuadorian Volunteer
Service (SEV) through another training program; and in literacy training
with a group of Quechua-speaking Indians. In the mid-year report of
August, 1972, some 26 organizations were listed as having used materials
or requested training frcsn the UMass Project. The same report noted that:
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The development of materials has proceeded satisfactorily.
anticipated, a temporary
surfeit of materials. Some 15 games are available, but ithas not been feasible so far to utilize more than nine or ten
of them. More will be made use of as the projects continue.
9
The report added;
The project set out during its first six months to tiy to
answer several basic questions:
—Will anyone be interested in these new ideas and techniques?
—Can people learn anything with this kind of approach?
-Will the Ecuadorian Ministry of Education be willing to use
some of these ideas in their programs?
The answers in all cases seem to be clearly positive.
Another unique circumstance set this project off from other foreign-
financed development programs: The Project Director, Padricio Barriga
(who was therefore Chief of Party of the UMass Team) was an Ecuadorian
who enjoyed the confidence of the University, the USAID staff, and Ecuadorians
in the Ministry and in other organizations. This may have been the first
time a "host-country national” served as Chief of Party of an outside-
funded development program, at least one developed through AID funds.
Later, Barriga commented on this aspect of the program;
The Center advocated local participation in Ecuador. I
remember that Dave Evans [Center Director]' and other
people (white Americans) negotiated, and one of the
proposals was that the chief of party was going to be
Ecuadorian. And that worked out. And 95 per cent of
the team was Ecuadorian. It was an authentic, cross-
cultural, cross-international learning experience, even
for ourselves, because we had to redefine relationships
between bureaucrats, technocrats, ccmmunity, Indian
communities, non-Spanish- speaking communities. So
we learned in the two different settings.
208
Assisting m program development in the campos was Enrique Tasiguano, a
native Quechua-speaker. His capable work in the villages made possible
much of the work of the project, as Hoxeng pointed out; ’’The Indians,
always very chaiy about accepting outsiders, invited the staff to share ideas
because of the confidence inspired by the project’s field man."^^ The
staffing pattern itself, then, was a key to the work of the project and
embodied coed the values that lay behind the methods and techniques of
adult education the project advocated,
The bnplementation Phase
During this phase, expansion of earlier pilot materials and training
continued. There was further an increasing ccncern with what was called
"delivery systems"—that is, how to disseminate both the materials and the
training models more widely. Ih part this concern reflected the original
purpose of the UMass Project which was to serve as a research and develop-
ment organization for others working directly in the field, as well as to test
these ideas out in pilot programs. It was also, however, the result of
concern by officials at USAID that the project was not being institutionalized
in an existing Ecuadorian organization.
While AID staff were using "reasonably gentle suasion" toward
institutionalization of the program within the Ministry of Education, UMass
Project staff were somewhat resistant. One reason was that some Project
distance would allow the Ministry to either reject or embrace aspects of the
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Project, depending on the compatibiUty of the Project goals, activities
and values to those of the Ministry,
At the same time. Project staff
programs with Ministry staff which led
were involved in a series of training
to the implementation of a nonformal
education experimental project In eight provinces of Ecuador. At that time
the staff were working with officials from two Ministiy departments. Adult
Education and the National Audio-Visual Service (SENARED). UMass Project
staff trained both Ministry staff and facilitators who would work under the
Provincial Directors of Education. Some of these facilitators were not
community members but graduates of teacher training schools: Their
acceptance mto village communities turned out to be less successful than
previous facilitator pregram s.^^
The middle period of the UMass Project has been summed up in a
project document;
In the second year, the project assembled the materials
[previously developed] and experimented with delivery
systems in order to find the best viable ways to disseminate
the materials in rural Ecuador. In the period of 1972 -74
,
the project developed various components such as the
facilitator model, radio programs, training models, and
the fotonovela, with the purpose of experimenting with
nonformal educational strategies that could reach the
rural areas of Ecuador not serviced by the foimal
educational system. The third year focus was to evaluate
the potential value and capability of institutionalizing
nonformal education in Ecuador by documenting in a
systematic and conceptual form the assumptions, goals,
materials and methods, delivery systems, and project
components.
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to addition, in early 1974, "a toll scale traveling educational fair was
mounted on an experimental basis in fourteen communities of the sierra.
The bibliobus
,
as it was called, combined puppet shows, movies, rural
theater, fotonovelas, games, discussions and music to bring nonformal
education to cam^estoos in a number of villages. This idea eventually
migrated to the United States, where it was modified and developed for
implementation in the hill towns of western Massachusetts, under a grant
from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Still later the approach
was further modified and used in the Ghana Project in conjunction with the
indigenous village cultural groups. The bibliobus/fun bus/drama group-
all names under which this concept has been known—represents an interesting
example of the spread of a nonfonnal technique to three continents.
It is appropriate to ccaiclude this section of the implementation phase
of the project with some subjective evaluations of the project. As a close
observer of the project wrote, "the principle which united all the divergent
activities of the project into a cohesive whole was one of reaffirmation; to
reaffirm that campesinos had the capacity to direct their own development
within their own cultural framework. Project staff asked, "if people
are interested in changing
. .
. ,
then can we put together some materials
and seme processes that will give them the tools they need to change their
environment?" And ultimately, in the act of bringing people together
to discuss common problems and grope toward solutions, even here some-
thing was accomplished. An unidentified observer of the last facilitator
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training program held under the auspices of the UMass Project, realizing
the risks the campesinos were asked to accept, wrote;
They seem to understand that the results we are seeking are
impractical given the socio-economic context in which they
live, but that changes in a man’s heart, in the way he "feels"
about himself and his friends more than justifies our inter-
vention. For a man to say that he no Icnger feels alone is
perhaps a goal few of us have met in our own lives.
The Institutionalization Phase
In early 1975, the Government of Ecuador committed about one and
one-half million dollars to the development of ncnformal education in Ecuador.
In May of that year, a one-year contract was signed by the Government of
Ecuador and the University of Massachusetts (with the assistance of a
USAID loan) to bring to the Ministry of Education the materials, training
ideas, and some of the staff from the UMass Project. The project was placed
under the general direction of Carlos Poveda, who had worked with the
Project from the start.
There were many problems during this transition period, symbolized
by the fact that the UMass staff were sometimes locked inside the Ministry
building because they worked after closing hours. However, Ministry
education staff and UMass staff worked tc^ether in planning and implementing
comparatively large training programs in three provinces and in the re-
production of considerable quantities of the materials developed over the
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past three years of the project. The nonfonnal education concepts were
subsumed under the '
’
nuclearizacion* ^ program of the Ministry, into which
health, education and nutrition programs were integrated at the Provincial
level.
During the integration period, problems endemic to bureaucratization
occurred. Facilitators were chosen who were not from the communities;
they were often unemployed recent teacher training graduates who saw the
project as a step to a permanent teaching post and were otherwise
uncommitted; there was sometimes little support for the program from the
Provincial Directors of Education; and follow-up by NFE support teams
was often inadequate.
On the positive side, the Ministry was producing and using materials
and methodologies developed earlier by the Project; the NFE methodologies
were receiving support at the central Ministry level; the combined staffs
had formed a cohesive working team; provincial teams believed in "the
capacity of the campesino to direct their own lives"; locally selected
facilitators were making major contributicns; ninety communities in the
three provinces had requested the services of the program,^^
Now, two years after the contract between UlVIass and the Government
of Ecuador ended, reports indicate that many of the elements of the original
Ecuador Preject have been adopted and expanded by the Ministry. Carlos
Poveda, an important supporter from the outset, is still in charge of the
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program for the MLnistiy. A former UMass Project staff member, Carlos
Moreno, is in charge of the nuclearizacion program in Chimborazo Province.
He writes that nonformal educatim should not be looked upon any longer as.
an experimental project: "Fue also mas que eso; fue un Programa
Educativo de singular impacto en el campo de la Educacion de Adultos.”23
Moreno also charts the progressive rise in the number of facilitators in
Chimborazo province since the beginning of the project:
Year Facilitators^*^
1973 4
1974 20
1975 30
1976 65
1977 117
1978 260
Many of the personnel that worked with the UMass Project are now working
with the nuclearizacion program.
Another former staff member, Enrique Tasiguano, in a recent report
on developments in nonformal education in Ecuador since the termination of
the program, notes:
• • . The lineaments of the Nonformal Education program are
prevailing in the work style, the trend of teaching-learning,
reinforcing the activity of the most recent and true "field
workers, " "community educators, " "facilitators, " or
't>rofessors" of adult education, as they are called. In
Chimborazo Province is where the continuity of the Non-
formal Educaticn program can best be appreciated, albeit
under other names which are required by momentary
political exigencies.
214
On the other hand, it is also true that many of the problems that existed
during the transition phase of the program hvo years ago still exist today;
Tasiguano reports that some facilitator sessions have become classrooms
once again uhere learning is secondary to teaching, and materials and
activities originally designed to promote self-management and self-education
have suffered a recidivism to standard literacy texts.
On balance, however, the continued spread of the concepts, techniques,
methods and staff of the original program is encouraging. One staff member
has speculated that the Ministry accepted much of the UMass Project’s
features because it was one of the few successful methods of communication
with cmnjesinos. The government had programs designed to raise the
standard of living for the rural people, but no way to foster enough participa-
tic*i to have these programs incorporated in the mainstream of village life.
The Project’s techniques and methods were at least partially adopted because^
as it were, it was the only game in town.^^ Yet it remains to be seen whether
the essential principle of the pregram—that of empowering campesmos to
"direct their own development within their own cultural framework"~survives.
The Project has at least opened opportunities toward that goal.
Nonformal Educaticai in Thailand;
The Role of the Center
In late 1966, members of the Asia Group of the Center for Intemational
Education debated and then laid out a tentative design for the development of a
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collaborative nonfonnal education site in Asia, and plans for a visit to three
Asian countries were made. The planning for this program was stimulated
by the promise of a supplementaiy institutional support grant from AID for
nonformal education sites in Asia and Intin America. The grant, although
relatively small, allowed the Center to mount programs with staff trained
through the earlier support grant. Through internal discussions and
negotiations with AID in Washington, in which at least one country was
eliminated from consideration by AID,^^ three countries-Ne pal, Sri Lanka,
and Thailand—were determined to be the most likely candidates for potential
collaborative program development in nonformal education.
R^ional groups within the Center— of which the Asia group was one
—
had been assigned program planning responsibility for the development of
sites in other countries. The debates which occasioned decision-making in
the Asia group were sharp, reflecting interests of individual members in the
determination of the location of and staff selection for the site, as well as
philosophical differences about the nature of the potential program. Some
confusion regarding the responsibility of the Asia group for decision-making
also contributed to a sense of frustration among its members, for at critical
junctures decisions were made at the faculty level within the Center. Thus
some of the base within the Center for support of a potential site was eroded.
A faculty member at the School of Education with previous experience
with programs in Asia was selected to make an exploration trip to these three
216
countries, and he was later joined in Thailand by a Center graduate student.
They took with them a packet of information organized by the Asia Group
which contained a broad outline of the purpose of the projected program:
The purpose of the collaborative proposal is to help further
an Asian host country's community development plans; and
to further the knowledge base about nonformal education
techniques and materials.
A small team of two UMass persons from UMass will
seek an ongoing Asian NFE project that would be interested
in the mutual benefits of such a cooperative effort. A
collaborative would then be established between the Asian
project and UMass.
The Asia Group, carrying on the reputation of the Center for pragmatism
and flexibility, did not design a firm plan for the program. Rather, they
outlined in general terms a process that would be followed:
Specifically, the CIE would provide the support for a small
team of UMass persons to woidc in the host country. They
will seek host country help in selecting host country people,
supported by the grant, to work as an enlarged team in the
collaborative. This cooperative team of Asian host people
and UMass people will share in decision making concerning
the implementation of NFE techniques and materials.
That this did not occur led to problems later on in the development of the
program.
The Exploration Phase
Two problems were encountered in all three countries which reflected
what might be called "macro-issues,” conditions which helped to form the
attitudes and expectations of potential collaborators. There was at this
time (and perhaps still is) a considerable skepticism regarding the
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motives and purposes of Western assistance efforts in general, and U.S.
efforts in particular. Consequently, the climate for developing new programs,
especially rural-based nonfoimal education prc^rams, was not good. Second,
the political situations in all three countries were at best difficult to read,
especially in the time alloted to the UMass staff—and in certain cases was
unpredictable.
By the time the UMass team reached Thailand, they knew that
conditions in both Nepal and Sri Lanka were not conducive to immediate
program development, although long-term project development in Sri Lanka
seemed possible. But the UMass grant time-line did not allow the luxuiy of
time for long project development efforts.
The team was to meet with the Adult Education Division (AED) chief
and staff. AED is a division of the Ministry of Education. There were
certain favorable circumstances that operated during the exploration phase
which pointed toward the possibility of collaborative work with AED, To
begin with, about a year before, the Director of the Center had an informal
meeting with the then Director of AED, the well- respected Dr. Kowit
Vorapipatana, creator of the khit-pen concept of problem-solving. At this
meeting in New York, discussions were held on the possibility of the Center
woii<:ing at the provincial level in Thailand on nonformal education materials
development and training.
Upon Kowit' s appointment to a position of higher responsibility in
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the Ministry, his place was taken by a former Center fellow, Sunthom
Sunanchai. The latter had only recently left the Center and assumed his new
post. These contacts, as well as the presence at the Center of another
graduate student from AED, produced an initial positive inertia which led,
after protracted negotiations, to the signing of an agreement to collaborate.
The Agreement required approval from a number of bureaucratic
entities in Thailand, and its final form reflected the necessity to satisfy a
number of disparate groups. The Agreement provided for two major
activities: The first was a provision for graduate study at UMass for Thai
students designated by AED; the second, for a series of material development
efforts, training, and workshops to be conducted by UlVIass staff for AED.
The Agreement was not specific as to the contexts in which the program
development phase would take place,
During the negotiations, high Thai officials within the Ministry required
that UMass staff were to be paid, not through the UMass project, but rather
through a new World Bank loan administered by World Education, Inc,
,
of New York, through their office in Bangkok. In turn, UMass would have
more funds available for the support of Thai graduate students at the
University of Massachusetts, The number and length of service of UMass
staff remained unstipulated in the Agreement. Toward the end of the
negotiations process, the UMass faculty member wrote from Bangkok that
”the whole tone of the agreement downplays foreign intervention into Thai
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affairs. There is a history to all this that has nothing to do with UMass,
b ut does have to do with many decades of Thai-U. S. history, as well as
Thai-nonThai history in general,
The Implementation Phase
Shortly after the return of the UMass faculty member, and the official
signing of the Agreement, a second Center staff member joined the student
member of the exploration team who had remained in Bangkok to serve as
program staff. At this point serious divergencies developed between the
UIMass perception of the program and AED’s. The UMass team was not seen
as a separate group but rather as integral members of the World Bank
consultant group (although it should be noted that they were not paid a
consultant rate, but rather the equivalent of a graduate student stipend).
They were given position descriptions which corresponded to World Bank
Consultant areas, and were informed that they were to work within this plan
under the general direction of the World Education representative and the
Director of AED.^^
For a number of months the staff held English language classes for
AED staff who were taking English language examinations for study in foreign
universities, and themselves took classes in the Thai language. They were
then assigned to separate provincial centers to develop materials in adult
education. It was at this point that the staff member who had been a member
of the original negotiation team resigned, AED, citing new restrictions on
foreign personnel, did not approve the staff replacement
the Center,
recommended by
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It soon became clear to Center personnel that the Agieeinent would
not result in the development of a collaborative program or a "site"; rather.
the Agreanent was "with an institution that had a number of sites. "^3 The
principal positive result of the reality of the Agreement was that it would
result in a long-term relationship with AED through the graduate-student
training provisions. But the annual report on the project gave an indication
Of the disappointment among UMass staff at this time:
In building the agreement with AED, an ever increasing
problCTi arose due to the involvement of several institutions
in additicm to AED and CIE. Working out understandings
among the varied agendas of CIE, AED, World Bank, World
Education, Thailand’s Ministry of Education, ATD-Washington
and Thailand, the School of Education and University of
Massachusetts, has proved more difficult than had been
anticipated.^^
The Project Officer in AID Washington pointed out that UMass had
been put in the position of "working out collaborative arrangements not with
the ultimate collaborators, the Thai, but with their American designee. "^5
And the designee, the representative of World Education in Thailand, told
a Center staff member during a visit to the United States that UMass was
involved "three years too early,
Meanwhile, the remaining Center member in Thailand was assigned
the task of developing a training program for rural youth, to be presented
at the Ubon Regicaial Center, which was to serve two purposes: "The
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training of trainers from the other four LECs [Lifelong Education Centers]
through their own 'learning by doing' (sharing facilitator responsibilities with
the Bangkok staff) and the training of the Ubon youth participants in the
37program." Following this fourteen-day training program, the program
was implemented by the original trainers in four other LECs; following
these programs, the training manual was revised by the Thai trainers, and
a final Training Program Manual was developed by the UMass staff member.
The training program and associated materials combined the Center's
learner-centered nonfoimal education techniques with the khit-pen philosophy
developed by Kowit, The training was very well-received, and quickly
adapted and adopted for use in other Thai training programs. Later AED's
Director would write:
. . . The Division is pleased with the continued impact of
Suzanne Kindervatter's contribution. The youth leadership
training model she helped to develop and test has attracted
considerable attention. Most recently, we were approached
by the Girls' Guide Association of Thailand for information
about this training model and requested to help train their
staff in its use. Equally important, elements of this model
have given our staff scane ideas as to how we might go about
revising our vocaticmal course curriculum in order to make
them more reflective of our broader khid-pen goals. It
is in this latter area that we hope UMass will concentrate
its assistance for the remainder of the project.^®
Program Summary
Currently, two members of the AED staff are in residence at the
University of Massachusetts in graduate degree programs, and one Center
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member is on a short-term consultancy in Thailand. The Center consultant
IS involved in planning, implementing and evaluating a nonformal education
facilitator seminar; creating local NFE learning techniques; and writing
a training manual for village facilitators.^^
With respect to the graduate student training provisions of the
Agreement, the program is fulfilling its intended role. Center staff have
made a contribution to learner-centered nonformal education and training
within AED. Macro-issues and complex institutional relationships have
made the fulfillment of nonformal education program development by
Center staff a shadow of its potential. The development of long-term
institutional relationships between the Center and AED will depend upon
the resolution of the institutional relationship problem and the establishment
of a climate of trust and a mutual belief in the competence of each of the
involved organizations.
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CHAPTER VII
COLLABORlYTIVE PROGRAMS: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
D6finiDg Collaborative Programs
At the time that the programs outlined in the proceeding two chapters
were developed, there was no commonly-held definition of what collaborative
programs are, under what conditions they are most likely to develop, and the
particular advantages and disadvantages to cooperating groups. The Ecuador
Project was primarily focussed on developing a learner- centered nonformal
education alternative to schooling, and not with collaborative programs as
such; but much of what was done in that program pointed toward a change
in relationships among those involved in the field of international education
programs. Responding to these influences from the Center for International
Education's own prc^rams as well as frcan the larger international program
arena, in 1974 the Center developed a focus on collaborative program develop-
ment as the m ain emphasis of the Grant under which the Ghana and Thailand
nonformal education efforts were initiated,
Haxeng, in his 1973 study of the Ecuador Project,^ observed that
schooling was no longer meeting the learning needs of many people throughout
the world, and that a new paradigm of education was likely to emerge. In a
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simaar way, foreign aid programs have been attacked from a number of
perspectives for their failure to meet objectives; and alternative paradigms
are also being sought in this area. Many of these have been discussed in
Chapter II; they include targeting programs toward the poorest groups in
third-world countries and the current efforts (especially those made through
specialized agencies of the United Nations) to redress overall economic
imbalances through a new world economic order. Just as schooling has been
judgpd an inadequate solution for the transformation of inequitable societies,
so foreign assistance in its current forms is perceived as inadequate to the
task of reaching a more equitable and stable world economic order.
Fundamental to this shift in perspective is the growing understanding
of the ccaisequences of global interdependence. Many sectors of the world’s
economic and social systems are now perceived to be increasingly vulnerable
to developments in and actions taken by other sectors. Related to this is an
increasing awareness of the world’s ecosystems as a commons resource
vulnerable to overexploitation by any one group or a combination of groups
to the detriment of all. These new conditions are less susceptible to solution
by force, by military means, then before. A number of commentators,
both inside and outside development agencies, have observed that:
The call for, and determination to bring about, a New Inter-
national Economic ^d Social) Order opens the way toward
more equitable relationships in the world, internationally
as well as nationally, and toward new forms of international
cooperation involving the mutual sharing of human ccmpetenceo^
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It appears that a precondition for international collaborative programs
is interdependence. Using Keohane and Nye»s definition of complex inter-
dependence,^ discussed in detail in Chapter III, this means, first, that
multiple channels connect the larger societies in which the program is to
operate. These include not only governmental, but also private and professional
organizations. Second, the relationships between these two societies are not
dominated by any one issue—what Keohane and Nye call the "absence of
hierarchy among issues." And third, military force is not predominate, and
its use is less-and-less practical in certain kinds of international dilemmas.
Why is interdependence a necessary precondition of collaborative
programs? Referring to the Intergroup Behavior Matrix (Table 3 of
Chapter III), it can be seen that there is a temptation to exploit a partnership
when force can be successfully used. Under conditions of interdependence,
mutual vulnerability (in certain respects) and the absence of the option of
force, increase the likelihood that collaborative pregrams may develop. The
opposite is of course also true: In situations in which one group has full
control over another, genuine collaboration is unlikely, except in the special
sense of forced collaboration, as in time of war.
Although interdependence is a necessary precondition for the develop-
ment of collaborative programs, it is not necessarily true that caily
collaborative programs will develop under these circumstances. It simply
makes them possible. For example, given two countries with an inter-
dependent relationship, an organization in one may wish to hire an organization
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in the second tor specific purposes. Under these conditions, the group hired
is subservient to the conditions negotiated in the contract, and a collaborative
relationship cannot be said to obtain.
Collaborative programs are more likely when the involved organizations
are working on a common issue or problem. In collaborative programs in
education, this means that cooperating groups must share certain concepts
and values regarding the nature and purpose of the educational process. In
such programs, there must be a linkage between the objectives of the involved
organizations. For example, one of the groups may have a need to field-test
specific curricula; a second a need for techniques and methods to promote
learning in a specific setting.
To arrive at a definition of collaborative programs, let us re-examine
the conclusions drawn from the study of the Intergroup Behavior Matrix. It
was determined that cooperative choices are most likely to be selected:
1. When rewards to both parties are roughly equal or are perceived
to confer net benefits. There must further be a relationship between the
relative risks and rewards for each group.
2. When the rewards for both groups for cooperative behavior are
higher than the rewards for coercive behavior, or for sabotaging cooperation.
3. When neither group has sufficient power to force its choices on
the other.
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4. When both groups have an understanding of the consequences of
different behavior choices.
5. When deviations from cooperative behavior are minimized through
joint agreement, or through the intercession of a third party.
To summarize: Cooperative enterprises require groups of more or
less equal strength, equitable rewards consonant with risk, and guarantees
against cheating. Incorporating these elements, then, a definition can be
constructed:
Collaborative programs are those in which two or more groups
agree to contribute resources, work together toward common,
mutually agreed-upon objectives, share appropriate rewards
*
amcHig each of the parties, and work out reasonable guarantees
of mutual compliance,
A pregram will be symmetrical—hence more collaborative-
-to the extent to
which there is an equal sharing of goals, costs, risks and benefits to each of
the participating groups; asymmetrical—less collaborative—to the extent to
which there is an imbalance in goals, costs, risks or benefits.
It should be understood that collaborative pregrams are generally
complex enterprises which change over time; the cooperating groups may have
differing contributions to make over time, and the rewards may also be
different, although they must be equally valued. The definition and analysis
presented here are a necessarily simplified representation of a very complex
reality.
There is one very important implication of intematicaial collaborative
pregrams in education that requires emphasis. Because collaborative programs
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require a degree of Independeoce of each of the involved parties, there is an
inherent value set on the concept of self-reliance. Therefore, to the degree
that joint programs are collaborative, they can be expected to reinforce among
client groups (such as the viUagers in the Ghana project) some of those same
values. The reverse would also appear to be true: Coercive relationships
between groups would foster the same atmosphere among client groups.
Talcott Parsons presumes that this value relationship exists between different
organizational levels:
The main point of reference for analyzing the structure of any
social system is its value pattern. This defines the basic
orientation of the system (in the present case, the organization),
the situation in which it operates; hence it guides the activities
of participant individuals.
In the case of an organization.
. . this value system must
be a subvalue system of a higher-order one, since the organiza-
tion is always defined as a subsystem of a more comprehensive
social system."^
Other observers have noted the relationship between collaboration and
participation:
Collaboration in development projects.
. . . involves a
change in the decision making process that has existed in
these projects, and that change is the increased participation
of the clients. ^
It follows then that collaborative projects should have a certain value pre-
disposition toward the development of the kind of learner-centered training
and materials which develops with and from the participants in such programs,
and which leads to their increased self-reliance, depending on the effectiveness
of the project.
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Analysis of Collaboration in Three Projeots
An examination of the three projects— in Ecuador, Ghana, and
Thailand—presented in the previous two chapters presents a range of types
of programs for study. Through such an analysis, recommendations regarding
the context, planning, and implementation of future collaborative programs
will be made. An acquaintance with the histories of these three projects is
presumed in the following analysis.
A caveat: The analysis is limited by the fact that although it is based
upon interviews with many of the project participants, a study of the relevant
documents, and personal observation, it cannot in all cases represent the
spectrum of views which existed within the projects and within cooperating
organizations. This, although a serious limitation, seems unavoidable and
can only be remedied by other studies from other perspectives which may or
may not confirm the conclusions reached here.
The analysis will be concerned with certain general questions;
1, What were the conditions under which these programs were initiated,
and what circumstances assisted and impeded the development of the programs?
2, Who were the participating groups involved in the projects?
3, What client groups were served?
The following questions relate to the elments of collaboration identified
above;
1. Was ther« a symmetrical or asymmetrical set of contributions
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and rewards to each party? Were these stipulated?
2. Were there deviations from cooperative behavior? How did they
originate, were they resolved, and how?
3. Where was the locus of project control in each of the project stages-
planning, development, implementation, evaluation, and follow-up? Whose
sets of goals dominated at various stages? Did the nature and extent of the
relationship of the participating groups change over time, and how?
4. Was the project itself (as distinct from the relationship between the
mvolved organizations) participative or directive; centralized or decentralized;
learner-centered or staff-centered?
5. Under what conditions were these programs effective (reached
their stated goals) ? Under what conditions were they least effective ?
6. Were there common or linked issues involved between the
participating groups?
Nonformal Education in Ecuador: Analysis
At the initiation of the Ecuador project, there was a community of
interest between three groups: The Center for International Education,
members of which were interested in exploring alternatives to schooling;
certain staff with USAID in Ecuador; and a group of Ecuadorian intellectuals.
All shared a skepticism about the ability of formal schooling to reach and
assist people in the campo, or to empower them to participate in the systems
controlling their lives. All shared a willingness to explore alternatives to
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schooling through nonfortnal education methods. Much of this interest was
supported by USAID, through contracts to Ecuadorian organizations and to
the UMass Project.
Frcan the exploration phase of the project through to its completion,
the fact that these three groups worked closely in planning and implementing
the project was a significant factor. During the implementation of the project,
a number of other groups began cooperating with the project, the most
important by far being the campesinos who joined the facilitator project,
f irst with the Ecuadorian organization CEMA, and later with the UMass
project. Other private and government organizations used materials and
training provided by the project. These groups may be termed clients of
the project, since they utilized project outputs. But in some senses they were
also collaborators, because they contributed ideas and resources to test out
materials and methods, which was a project goal.
It was not until the institutionalization phase of the project, in its
fourth year, that it had a formal relaticnship with an Ecuadorian organization
(except for short-term training agreements)—with the Ministry of Education,
\diich it was to assist in the transfer of techniques, methods, and training
skills for wider implementation in Ecuador. There was no one organization
with which the project worked that could entirely fulfill the definition of a
collaborating organization. On the other hand, it was the unique quality of
the project that in working with other groups, many collaborative aspects were
present—the staff were at all times concerned with equitable rewards for re-
sources expended.
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As the project developed, it became clear that, on another level, the
Americans in the project were collaborating with the Ecuadorians associated
with the project. This was true not only within the project, in which two
Americans served as project administrators over the course of the program,
but between the staff in Ecuador and in Amherst. There was considerable
negotiation over the equitability of salary arrangements, for example. At caie
time there was a protracted series of discussions with AID regarding their
differential pay policies for American and host-country staff. The UMass
staff member from Amherst took the position that these salaries should, in
the long run, tend toward equality. This indicates a concern with the issue
of equitable rewards for joint work that is a component of collaborative
programs. Interestingly, the same issue came up between the original group
of facilitators and the project staff. In this case too, there was a realization
that the principle of equitable compensation for contributions exists and has
to be taken into account. The asymmetry in rewards for participation in the
project can therefore be said to have been a problem which staff were aware
of and attempted to resolve, without complete success. This may reflect the
larger issues involved in interdependence. The legacy of the inequitable
economic circumstances that account for the different standards of living,
both between the Americans and the Ecuadorians, and the Ecuadorian pro-
fessionals and the campesinos, led to a situation in which there were built-
in biases against equal rewards.
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With respect to (^viations frcm cooperative behavior, there were
times when project staff believed that the University was requiring over-
stringent bureaucratic requirements. This again sometimes became an
American/Ecuadorian issue, since it was an American university which
parceled out project funds. The major project concern was with the USAID
requirement that the project eventually became attached to a permanent
department within the Ministry of Education. Ickis* evaluation report noted
that "the institutionalization process caused certain discord in the National
team, especially among the original University of Massachusetts/NFE staff,"
due to a loss of the "sense of ccmmunity and commitment they generated as a
team. In addition, "many Ministry officials felt that campesinos were not
capable of making rational decisions on their own and therefore needed the
constant guidance and direction from govenmient personnel."® The latter was
serious since it struck at the heart of the concept of local self-reliance, a key
to the project.
The locus of project control was a key issue throughout the program.
Project staff in Ecuador jealously guarded their right to determine the objectives
and processes of the project, as an independent unit. In this respect the
project was quite different from a collaborative model, except to the extent
that the project itself internally represented the collaboration of various
groups—Ecuadorian professionals, Americans, campesino. Toward the end
of the project, as it became amalgamated with the Ministry, the locus of
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control shifted to the Ministry. However, since the individual in charge
of the Ministry Department had been associated with the project since its
mception, there was a continuity which allowed significant elements of the
staff and project to continue.
The project was^rticipative. decentralized, and It^amer-cent^rpH .
In this respect, it subsumed values associated with collaborative and
participative programs.
^ogram effectiveness is a multifaceted issue in the Ecuador project.
Different stages had different objectives. Throughout most of its history the
project was concerned with enabling others to achieve their objectives, either
through the use of materials and training methods developed by the program,
or through fostering self-reliance in facilitator ccanmunities. To be effective,
the project had to work with others. To the extent that those with wham the
project worked shared the same values as project staff, or were open to
^perimenting with new ideas, the project was thereby enabled to carry out
its purpose. These values reflect major divisions within Ecuadorian society,
and, for example, to the extent that these values are now held by members of
the Mini^iy staff will deteimine the extent to which the project's ideas,
methods and techniques are implemented. There were many Ecuadorian
organizations and individuals with whom the staff worked who did share these
values, and helped the spread of the project's concepts and methods.
The common issues were centered in ideas, concepts and methods.
This brought the original three groups together, and has determined the
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project* s continued effect in Ecuador.
The Ecuador project was not a typical collaborative project, if there
IS such a thing, but rather cooperated with a number of private and govern-
mental groups and to some extent internally demonstrated aspects of
collaborative behaviors. Perhaps it was considerably ahead of its time in the
sense that it had gone beyond collaboration to an organization with a set
of commonly-held values which transcended narrow ethnic and national
inte rests.
Nonfoimal Education in Ghana: A.ialysis
The NFE Project in Ghana was a tripartite arrangement between the
Center (CIE;, the Institute of Adult Education (lAE) of the University of Ghana
at Legon, and the People's Educational Association (PEA), a private
voluntary organization devoted to the development of adult education programs
in Ghana.
An agreement for collaborative program dsvelopment in nonfoimal
education was drawn up in Ghana by the Directors of the Center for Inter-
national Education and the Institute of Adult Education after a team of Center
members had twice visited the University of Ghana. The collaborative
program was funded in the main by the Center, through the AID institutional
support grant. However, resources wore committed by the Institute toward
the end of the program, and the People's Educational Association contributed
volunteer resources that provided much of the staff support for the project.
There was some dissonance among the three involved organizations
regarding who the client groups were in the project, although by the end of
the project these differences in viewpoint had been in the main resolved.
The lAE generally saw the PEA as the client group, at least for the greater
part of the project; whereas both the CIE and the PEA saw the village-level
development projects as comprising client groups.
Both CIE and the PEA appeared to believe that the contributions and
rewards to both groups were symmetrical. The Center was given the
opportunity to further develop many of the concepts, methods, techniques
and training models that had been developed through the Ecuador project;
to work with an organization that shared many of the values of self-reliance
and learner-centered programs held by the Center; and to provide training
for Center members. The PEA saw the project as providing field organizer
to increase its effectiveness in rural development projects; in providing
techniques and methods consonant with its objectives; and contributing small
amounts of financial resources to promote program development. One
consequence of the project for the PEA was a direct AID contract to further
increase its organizing capabilities in the field. The lAE, for much of the
early and middle periods of the project, was on the whole less satisfied with
the outputs of the project: The Institute thought more emphasis should have
been given to basic research and research dissemination, which would have
been more useful for its purposes. Perhaps as a consequence, it was not
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unta the latter stages of the project that contributions from the Institute
toward increasing the effectiveness of the program were evident.
There was a gradual shift of the locus of control of the project from
the CIE to the PEA. The Institute was generally, during the early stages,
concerned about what it considered too much devolution of control to the PEA.
And, during the middle period of the project, the PEA was also concerned
that project direction seemed to be moving away from their influence. The
latter problem was due to staff changes in the program itself; the question of
Institute concern was much more due to the history of PEA/IAE relations
over a twenty-five year period, a history of which Center staff was for some
time quite ignorant. Both the staff changes and the PEA/IAE historical
relationship cause some deviations from cooperative relationships, especially
during the middle period of the prc^rem. The consequence of this was that
the Center failed to promote the kind of integration of project staff which
characterized the Ecuador project, which unquest icaiably hindered the
collaborative development of the project. However, this problem was
resolved in the latter stages of the project.
hi the projects, concepts, materials and training developed and utlized
by the project, participative and learner-centered modes generally prevailed.
The joint value placed on the development of this type of project development
was one of the principal reasons for the close working relationships which
ultimately developed between the CIE and PEA groups, and the fact that the
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Institute was less interested in these types of projects was a cause of its
distance from the combined program during much of the project. This was an
important common issue .
The program had a difficult start. In its effort to promote a collaborative
style, the Center was initially perceived by Ghanaians to be without a program-
as an empty glass trying to fill another, as it were. This problem was remedied
after an initial period of uncertainty, but at the time almost caused the termina-
ticai of the program. Another factor which related to conditions of program
effectiveness was the difference in perspectives about what constituted
appropriate project development activities, with the Institute questioning some
of these activities, as noted above.
Looking at the project as a whole, the mixture of rewards and ccaitribu-
tions from the collaborating gixrips appears to be reasonably equitable and to
have led to a project perceived to be worthwhile for the institutional participants
as well as for the people involved in the development projects themselves. In
so doing, the project comes reasonably close to fulfilling many of the
conditions for being termed a collaborative program.
Nonfoimal Education in Thailand: Analysis
As in the Ghana project, the Center entered into an agreement to
collaborate with an organization, the Adult Education Division (AED) of the
Ministry of Education of the Government of Thailand. At the same time that
this agreement was being reached, however, the AED was also involved in
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developing a much larger working arrangement with the World Bank. Hence, the
interests of the Center and the AED tended to diverge rather than converge,
with the latter concerned with implementing the (to them) more important
World Bank program vriiich was, by and large, not always consistent with the
program suggested by the Center. Under these conditions, the rewards fnonn
tee program have been somewhat asymmetrical to both parties. The World
Bank program has required infrastructural development, while the Center had
originally planned to work in learner-centered nonfotmal education program
development.
Because of the ^mon base of the khitz^en. philosophy of programming
and the Centef-'s emphasis on leame r-centered development strategies, in the
few instances where the opportunity to work with an actual field-based program
has arisen, there has been mutual benefit. The major problem has occurred
in the limited number of these opportunities. The locus of project control has
primarily rested with the AED, and as such the program, from the Center's
perspective, resembles more a contract to perform services than a collaborative
agreement.
There are two other significant limits to project effectiveness. A
limited understanding of Thai language and culture by Center staff may have
resulted in misinterpretations of the nature of the original agreement and the
conditions under which it would be implemented, as well as limiting the
ability of Center staff within Thailand to work in the kinds of field situations
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most app^priate to the develo^ent of learPer-centered progr^s. Second,
a legacy of suspicion regarding the intent of Americans in working with AED
has not, up to this time, been dispelled, at least with respect to the nature
and purposes of the Center's programs. Partially a result of the legacy of
American involvement in Southeast Asia, and partially a result of special
conditions relating to the larger World Bank contract, this has seriously
limited the capacity of the Center to reach some of its objectives. All of
these factors havejimited cooperative hehavfo.- m certain aspects of the
program.
The exchange program wiiich has brought AED staff to the Center for
graduate study continues, as does short-term consultancies by Center
members to AED. Over the long term, whether the project moves toward
a collaborative mode may depend on factors nowoutside the control of
both AED and the Center,
Recommendaticns Regarding the Development of
Collaborative Programs in International Education
As these analyses have demonstrated, the real world of program
development is much more complex, more unpredictable, and less tractable
than the realm of theoretical models. However, hindsight may lead to foresight;
and an understanding of the underlying features of collaborative programs
should provide for a better base for planning.
The following lists recommendations for planning future collaborative
programs.
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1.
The greater the conditiohs o£ interdependence that prevail, the
higher the likelihood that collabomive programs can be developed. Indeed,
collabomtive-type programs are a part of the network of interconnections that
develop under conditions of interdependence. Such programs are manifestly
more difficult where suspicion and hostUity exists from present or past
circumstances of domination or oppression. It is equally difficult to develop
collaborative programs under autocratic national system s because of the
clash in cooperative-coercive values. This suggests that initiators of
collaborative programs carefully analyze the sets of larger conditions that
prevail.
2. In order to develop a collaborative program, the cooperating groups
must share a set of values regarding the programs they undertake. In the
case of the Center these values have included the development of learner-
centered programs which involve providing skills to participants to begin to
manipulate the social and economic systems of which they are a part. To
carry out effective programs, potential collaborators must be able to have
effectively communicated these values as well as model them internally.
Oiganizaticaas which plan to involve themselves in collaborative programs
must therefore be able to define, describe, and communicate their own value
sets. This involves a phase prior to the development of the project itself.
3. The most important stage of any collaborative program is the
first. Since these programs are by definition cooperative, self-selection
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can be the oely „eans by which two ec^blne to develop a coUabotatlve
project. In order to achieve the best possible matches under these circum-
stances, a great deal of information must be communicated during the self-
selection stage of collaborative program development. There is no reason
why workshops cannot be designed specifically to accomplish this objective.
There must, of course, be a sufficiency of mc*ivatlon on both sides, as well
as an initial understanding of cultural variables which might affect understanding.
In the programs analyzed above, by far the most serious difficulties were
encountered in those oases in which sufficient information was not shared
during the initial stage. If a workshop is not possible at the time, other
methods must be found to ccmmunioate enough information to make self-
selection possible,
4, There must also be a goal which the organizations hold in common
which motivates them to collaborate. The greater the importance of the goal
to the organizations* own purposes, the greater the likelihood of effective
collaboration. These common issues do not have to be the same, but they
must at least be complementaiy-mutually supplying each other's lack, as it
were. In the case of the Ghana project, for example, the PEA supplied the
opportunity for the field-testing of ideas, materials, and training models; the
Center provided a way to increase the effectiveness of the PEA in development
programs. If these goals are neither complementary nor synergistic, then it
is unlikely that a collaborative project is feasible. These possibilities must,
therefore, be explored carefully in the earliest stages of the project, prior to
agreement to collaborate, probably through the workshop described above.
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5. Devolution ol authority by both collaborating groups is essential,
since in a sense the joint program represents an effort distinct from the
activities of both organisations. Clarity is required as to what aspects of
project management will be delegated, by whom and to whom.
6. Resources must be jointly contributed, rewards and risks must be
shared. The resources contributed to the project do not necessarily have to
be of the same kind, nor do the rewards, but they must be appropriate to the
organisations involved. Integration of program staffs is one way to predispose
a project in this direction.
7. Situations which lead to coercive relationships should be foreseen.
The most practical way of avoiding coercive behaviors is for two organizations
of about the same size and relative power to work together; when this is not
possible, it may be necessary to rely on third-party adjudication of disputes.
Past efforts in international collaborative pregram development have
been limited by a lack of clarity regarding the cempenents and processes that
these efforts require. As these become clearer, it should be possible to
improve the planning and design of such programs.
Future Directions in International
Education Pregrams
Collaborative programs are not new. They have existed for some
time, particularly amcaag private, nongovernment groups. In many
international programs today, they are probably not appropriate or possible.
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This IS especially true in terms of working with government or government-
controlled agencies in other countries: National govemments rarely share
their authority with groups from outside that country. Collaborative programs
in which nongovernment groups work together are much more likely possibilities.
But even govemments will increasingly have to work in a more cooperative
fashicn—ceding some of what has been considered national sovereignty as the
price for preserving the ecological and economic systems upon which each
depends. The more prevalent these circumstances, the more likely it is
that collaborative programs will be developed to seek solutions to commons
problems.
Universities around the world should be leading in research on these
vital matters. In the United States, a new Fulbright program should be mounted
to sponsor exchanges of faculty, students, and the development of collaborative
programs in areas where the common ecological, economic, and social interest
prevails. Title XII of the International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 1975 was a step in the right direction, but it was a small and tentative step
which has so far yielded little, in part due to the inertia of the aid establishment.
But both the universities and the U. S. government suffer from the same
myopia; neither has shown the will to shake off a national parochialism which
settled in during the mid-fifties. John Gardner has noted that "in order to
educate their students for the world of today and tomorrow and to carry out
their tasks of advancing human understanding, universities must relate
themselves to the rest of the world, ” He has also pointed out the "most
universities do not command the resources to extend their interests so
broadly. "7 A new Fnlbright program centered around global issues would
provide the incentive to which the U.S. system of higher education could
respond.
There is also a crucial need for coordinating the increasing inter-
national interests of groups all over the world, interests created under the
net of interdependence. Sdch a coordinating role could be played by a
specialized agency of the United Nations. Government, professional, and
private groups of all types interested in collaborative programs on common
issues with groups in other countries could be coordinated through such an
agency. Presuming that the United Nations would not directly fund such
programs, but limit their role to one of coordination, the cost of such an
operation would be small.
With linkage developing between domestic and international systems,
there is a glaring need for an equivalent linking of research into the effects of
these mterdependencies, and how problems and opportunities arising frcm
them may be best approached. For example, one of the most crucial
international issues is how to mtegrate national economies into the inter-
national economic system, as local systems were once integrated into
national ones. Such an issue effects most of the people in the United States,
indeed in most countries, yet there is little research undertaken by
universities on this subject.
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As global systems gradually incorporate local ones, institutions
created by the older systems will come under stresses for which they
may not be prepared. Under these circumstances the institutions that survive
will be the ones that have the leadership and foresight to plan for. understand,
and adapt to new realities. The development of international programs In
collaborative education may be an adaptive method of providing opportunities
in research and development that will contribute to a transition to a global
society.
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